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Valérie Amiraux & Gerdien Jonker 
INTRODUCTION: TALKING ABOUT VISIBILITY – 
ACTORS, POLITICS, FORMS OF ENGAGEMENT 
This volume started as several scholarly enterprises on the periphery of an 
international conference. Perhaps dissatisfaction with the meeting in question 
was at the root of its initiation, but more decisive, certainly, was that the right 
people happened to meet at the right time. The group that gathered together 
had not met before in this particular configuration. There were established 
academics and junior academics from different disciplines and with different 
scholarly backgrounds. Some had published extensively, whereas others were 
still working on their dissertation. What they shared was an awareness of a 
quickly growing gap in the field of Muslim visibility in Europe through the 
emergence of a heterogeneous and—to all appearances—very resourceful 
group of newcomers in the public arena. And a wish to make these voices 
available to a larger audience. 
 
 
Mapping  the  F ie ld  o f  Musl im Vis ib i l i ty  in  Europe  
 
In 2003, when we began the data collection that builds the basis of this book, 
policymakers and important segments of the media in many parts of Europe 
had been putting pressure on local Islamic organizations, accusing them of 
covering up fundamentalist sympathies and networks and of siding with 
terrorists. Translated into different discourses and practices, this trend spread 
throughout Europe. As a side effect of 9/11 and the Madrid bombings, the 
Islamic tradition was once again publicly charged of not being compatible 
with Western values such as democracy and human rights. Suspicion had 
taken root that, when all was said and done, Islam fostered principles that 
justified terrorism. Allegations of the incompatibility of Islamic and European 
values became stronger and more frequent, re-inviting public discussion about 
the loyalties of Muslim European citizens to democratic values. Almost 
everywhere in Europe, the public sought information about the scriptural 
basis of this religion, and sales of the Quran and related exegesis increased 
accordingly, sometimes creating the conditions for “public moral panics” that 
fed the general perception of Islam as an internal threat, in particular in 
countries where liberal multiculturalism had been the policy of choice 
(Werbner 2004, 452). A situation arose in which migrants from Muslim 
countries and their offspring were stigmatized as Muslims—regardless of 
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their degree of religious involvement or Muslim identification—and treated as 
a potential danger. 
Coinciding with this development was the emergence of a very heteroge-
neous group of young people which was publicly redefining what it meant to 
be a Muslim in Europe, as individuals or as members of a collective. Young 
people not only were taking the place of the older generation in almost all of 
the “old” Muslim associations across Europe—reflecting a generational shift 
in leadership in most of the European host countries. In addition, we noted 
that new youth groups were forming and organizing across the boundaries of 
nationality. Moreover, many actors made their entry on local and national 
stages who were not part of an organization and did not stress their religious 
belonging, but who nevertheless insisted on acting and speaking as a Muslim. 
What seemed to connect all these actors was their search for public recogni-
tion of a distinct identity that they themselves labeled “Muslim.” They also 
shared a desire to be treated not as second-class citizens but as full citizens. In 
other words, a group of young people had made its entry on the European 
public stage, and it had laid claim to its own definitions over and against the 
political labels with which it saw itself confronted. 
The countries in which we traced this group of people were Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy; the urban 
settings included Berlin, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Bradford, Paris and its suburbs, 
and Carrara and Macerata in Italy. The scale of the initiatives we examined 
included the cleaning of a neighborhood park (Berlin), the repainting of a 
local train station (Macerata), the defense of Islam on talk shows (France, the 
Netherlands, Great Britain), the organization of exhibitions on Islamic history 
and Muslims (Antwerp, Paris), and interfaith encounters (Italy, Great Britain). 
Political careers and activism popped up just about everywhere. In addition to 
these actors, we also searched for radicals, from hard-to-reach youth to the 
jihadis who were so persistently evoked in the media. From our collective 
findings it appeared that, within the Muslim populations of Europe, the latter 
represented an obscure domain, one that was avoided in public and very 
rarely commented upon to outsiders. Terrorists, or so it appeared to us, are the 
eternal absentees. Whenever possible, we have tried to locate their relation-
ship within the larger context in order to convey the voice of these marginal 
actors.  
Our common research question, however, aimed at encompassing a far 
larger group. Without excluding the phenomenon of terrorists, it intended to 
map the whole field of Muslim visibility. Over the last two years we explored 
the available space for action that is open to self-described Muslims in 
European Union (EU) member states. When a minority group hitherto hidden 
from view suddenly becomes public, and migrant communities turn into 
public actors that are labeled Muslim from the outside, what is the sanctioned 
space in which they may act? How, in which specific arenas, and with what 
intensity are they allowed to act in terms of their own definitions in the 
European public sphere? Where are the limits and who defines these limits? 
INTRODUCTION 
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The answers we have come up with are not a recital of halal and haram, of 
the religiously allowed and the forbidden, although these may exert their 
influence in some cases. Rather, through the different chapters of this volume 
the reader will get to know the grey zones of interaction between groups, 
communities, and individuals on the one hand, and self-described Muslims 
and majority society on the other. All kinds of (in-)visibilities take shape in 
these grey areas. The contributions in this volume examine, from different 
perspectives and on various scales, the processes that transform these grey 
zones into accepted spaces for discourse, dialogue, and actions.  
 
 
Forms of  Di f ferent ia t ion   
 
In the articulation of Muslim visibilities, two opposite forces seem to be at 
work: pressure from without and pressure from within. We consider their 
existence side by side without overemphasizing the impact of terrorism and 
the ensuing security measures on Muslim populations. If they had an impact 
at all, it may well be that violent action in the name of Islam urged other 
Muslims to create counterimages and to come to the rescue—if not the 
recreation—of the Islamic tradition. We instead focus our attention on a 
cluster of developments that occurred more or less in the same time span in 
the seven countries presented in this volume but that seem to have very 
different roots. 
On closer inspection, three developments especially turned out to be reac-
tions to the stigma of “Muslim” imputed from outside the Muslim commu-
nity. First, over the last few years many local religious communities have 
withdrawn from whatever exchange they had been entertaining with majority 
society. Once pressed into the defensive, they ceased to participate in public 
events that addressed Islam or the Muslim minorities in Europe. Thus, 
numerous intermediaries, study circles, roundtables, boards, advisory com-
mittees, and hearings lost their Muslim participants. The first differentiation 
thus entails a distancing from non-Muslim society (Jonker, Fadil, Amiraux, 
Abdel-Samad). 
Not necessarily connected to this development was the exit of the old gen-
eration of mosque founders and the entry of a new generation that was born 
or socialized in Europe. The newcomers set about the task of formulating an 
Islam of their own, which sometimes differed radically from the traditional 
and defensive ideas of their parents. Most of these reformulations are now 
oriented towards Europe; nonetheless, they do differ very much from one 
other. What they share is a notable distance from the parent generation. The 
second differentiation, therefore, is that between the generations (Frisina, 
Jonker, Fadil). 
The security-related pressures set into motion a process of internal differ-
entiation aimed at distancing oneself from external stigmatization. This 
process involved distinguishing oneself, with all available means, as the more 
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cultured, the more religious, and the most secular, as better educated and less 
primitive than one’s neighbors. All over Europe, Iranians and Turks distanced 
themselves from “Arabs,” as did Bosnians from Turks, Lebanese from 
Palestinians, Sufi-oriented groups from Islamist ones, and secular Palestinians 
from their religious compatriots. In some contexts, the distinction between 
secular groups and religious groups led to a clear articulation of one’s politi-
cal values within the context of settlement. In other contexts, it led to redefini-
tions of what Islam in Europe is about. It urged definitions of a “real Islam” as 
well as attempts to identify who “belongs” and who does not (Fadil, Boender, 
Amiraux, Frisina, Yurdakul). The third differentiation therefore gravitates 
towards claims of representation and power. 
In the emerging display of Muslim visibility in Europe captured in this 
volume, Muslim democrats face Muslims who question democratic structures, 
and zealots and missionaries challenge believers who insist on private, 
intimate religiousness. There are radical activists who join with intermediaries 
looking for compromises, and secular liberals who keep their distance from 
the rule-abiding orthodox. The reader will encounter hate preachers as well as 
imams who manage to network in civil society, hard-to-reach youths, and 
partners in interfaith discussion groups. Angry young students have been 
given a voice, as have content believers with a high spiritual mission in 
secular society. All of these groups and individuals compete with each other 
in the articulation of what it means to be a Muslim in Europe. The competi-
tion is not always conscious and in some cases may also be the result of 
public policies. Hidden from view are the faceless young men who contem-
plate, prepare, and/or execute mass murder. Over recent years their actions 
have managed to attract the bulk of media attention and throw a shadow on all 
other forms of Muslim claims-making. One aim of this volume is to clearly 
show that the articulation of Muslim difference in Europe takes on many 
other forms.  
 
 
Performances  on  Publ ic  S tages  
 
Once these coexisting and extremely diverse modalities of being a Muslim 
had been observed and documented, the question of their interpretation and 
the choice of the relevant framework for analysis came to the fore. The central 
difficulty that we faced when collectively preparing this volume was the 
identification of both a common conceptual “language” and a common 
analytical approach to apply to our respective work. In purely descriptive 
terms, what we were facing in our various research contexts were combina-
tions of strategies to go public that were presented in roughly the same period 
(2003–2005), both on national and on local stages. The ultimate decision to 
bring our work together under an analytical “public” umbrella came naturally 
after the first discussions, when we sat down together and started describing 
aspects of the ethnographic observations that we had made. 
INTRODUCTION 
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The strength of this volume lies precisely in the different types of qualita-
tive data that were accumulated through fieldwork by its contributors. An 
emphasis on this qualitative dimension is central to the study of Muslims in 
Europe. It illustrates that it is possible to write a theoretically informed piece 
that is empirically grounded but nonetheless relevant to a broader context of 
political sociology and the sociology of religion (Madsen et al. 2002; Modood 
2005). Ethnographic descriptions are present in all of the chapters of this 
volume, though they do not address similar samples. This method allowed the 
authors to illustrate in a concrete manner the multiple and complex modalities 
through which Muslims are engaged as Muslims in their various contexts. 
Nadia Fadil, in her analysis of the Union of Mosque and Islamic Organisa-
tions of Antwerp, concentrates on how individual members of this group 
relate their personal conception of being a Muslim to practices of citizenship. 
Valérie Amiraux addresses similar questions while giving the floor to Mus-
lims who do not belong to associations. Philip Lewis provides snapshots 
based on conversations with imams whom he characterizes as educated, and 
also describes these individuals in their routine activities. Welmoet Boender 
focuses on the incorporation of Dutch imams through the institutionalization 
of Rotterdam-based religious training. In these contributions, the authors 
needed to master both the semantics of their discussion partners and their 
location in a network of meanings that is produced by others (e.g., the state, 
other Muslims). Gerdien Jonker’s contribution specifically focuses on the 
elaboration of distinct discourses by competing Muslim associations which 
see themselves as confronted with the same security-inspired stigmata.  
The use of ethnographic data enabled the authors to underline both the 
subjective dimension of the formation of public engagement and the coexis-
tence of competing narratives in a public sphere. It also helped them to do 
justice to a nonutilitarian reading of the way in which Muslims—with differ-
ent skills and different objectives—make their way to participative citizen-
ship. From this qualitative field approach emerged a study of normal “in-the-
making” experiences of Muslims in Europe. Our approach illustrates the gap 
that exists between the ideological bias with which policymakers and large 
segments of the media observe Muslims in Europe, and the pragmatic analysis 
of individuals’ practices and actions that is prevalent in the social sciences. 
Unlike the former, our data also encompass subjective experiences of justice 
and injustice, trust and mistrust.  
The notion of public space helped us to select our different fields while 
heeding at least two dimensions: Public space was, first of all, the space in 
which social actors played a public role and presented themselves to others. 
In a way, this is the sensorial, perceptive dimension of public space, the one 
that gives all participants the opportunity to consider otherness and to con-
front it in physical space (on bodily practices, see Göle 1997; Arthur 1999). 
This concept of public space also applies to Muslims who discover their 
internal plurality through the options they have within their respective 
European contexts. Public space also appeared to be the site for elaborating 
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on common values and projects; in this sense, it was a nonmaterial space 
utilized to define the conditions of living together. Some would say that 
public space has a visible and an invisible side. What are Muslims entitled to 
do? And what is explicitly prohibited in non-Muslim European societies? It is 
clear that going public is unavoidably linked—both for collectives and for 
individuals—to the opportunities offered by the specific context and the 
institutional landscape. 
While analyzing our findings, another aspect of public space became im-
portant for our work. This was the theatrical dimension, in which public space 
becomes a “stage” on which people play “roles” (Goffman 1971, 1980). As 
shown throughout this volume, individuals and groups compete on this stage 
for the ownership of definitions concerning the nature of being Muslim and 
the meaning of Islam. The discussions of good versus bad Muslims, of pure 
and impure, can be related to this notion of an image that should be presented 
to various types of audiences. Pnina Werbner, who in her most recent work 
elaborated on the impact of 9/11 on performative ability, described the pre-
9/11 Pakistani community thus:  
 
“In the past, British Pakistani Muslims had always been a vocal minority, demanding 
equal citizenship rights and never being afraid to speak their minds even if their 
opinions—support for the Iranian fatwa against Rushdie […]—were out of line with 
British popular sentiments. They felt sufficiently secure in the UK to express their 
political opinions, however contentious, without fear. Indeed, in their own public 
arenas, in the diasporic public sphere they had created for themselves […], Manches-
ter Muslims articulated familiar visions of apocalyptic battles between Islam and the 
West, especially the USA, source of all evil.”  (Werbner 2004, 463)  
 
Local public arenas offered them the opportunity to perform, as theater actors 
would do, in front of audiences that did not systematically share the same 
views. In return, the audience discussed and made comments, criticized and 
supported, denounced or identified with the actors on stage (on the use of 
Goffman’s backstage and front stage in ethnographic work, see Eliasoph 
1998). The same dynamics occur in European contexts when certain norma-
tive issues are discussed (e.g., wearing the veil). 
Competition of necessity engenders a public setting, a space for represen-
tation or a front stage, in which actors appear, leaving a public impression or 
confronting policymakers. Public space offers them an open space, but one 
with certain constraints within which the players must respect the rules of the 
game. Unlike individuals, Muslim organizations in Europe no longer can 
ignore these rules. After forty years of sometimes invisible, sometimes 
distinct cohabitation, all now respond to post-9/11 policy-making, both on a 
national and on a European level.  
Policymakers who define the “Muslim problem” in public space also draw 
profiles of possible discussion partners and try to exclude those who do not fit 
their rules (Amiraux 2004; Jonker 2005). Sometimes actors perform before an 
audience in accordance with rules that have been laid down by others. The 
INTRODUCTION 
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question thus presents itself: How is the performed message perceived and 
received by the public that observes the scene? What is its reaction to the 
performances on the public stage? Both supporters and dissenters may 
distrust the players. They may keep silent or express their support in public. 
They may continue to gossip in private or confront the speaker during pauses. 
In some of the contributions to this volume, the generation gap is expressed 
only through the comments of the older generation on the efforts of their 
successors. In other cases peers formulate criticisms, boards appoint and 
dismiss representatives, and religious communities grope for a consensus that 
brings together opposing views. 
Of course, to work with the notion of public space is to tackle a complex 
and well-studied field (Gaonkar and Lee 2002; Cefaï and Pasquier 2003; Göle 
and Amman 2004). Its multiple significations mean that it cannot be applied 
as a universal tool to any and every situation. Our larger framework can be 
compared to the “deprivatization” process described in the comparative work 
of Jose Casanova (1994). However, our purpose was not restricted to the idea 
of an eruption of religious issues in the public sphere.1 Some contributions 
address the formulation of grievances, the way in which self-described 
Muslims protest against the redefinition of their belief system as a public 
problem, and their endeavors to shape and undermine that process (Abdel-
Samad, Frisina, Jonker). Others cover the constitution of the public arena 
itself and analyze the modes with which Islam and Muslims have been turned 
into a public problem (Amiraux, Fadil; cf. Gusfield 1981). Other authors 
address the genesis of whole new grammars resulting from the political 
stigmatization of Muslims as a potential threat for non-Muslim societies 
(Jonker; cf. Gusfield 1996). Some contributions also address the commitment 
of non-Muslims in supporting the cause of Muslims and the response of 
public authorities to this support (Lewis). 
The relevance of the concept of public space for mapping our work can be 
summed up in a number of points. First, it helped us to pin down the local and 
national specificity of which all contributions give evidence on different 
levels. Though we were collectively aware of a dynamic of “Muslim coming 
out” in European public settings, we were also perfectly conscious of its path-
dependency on context-specific opportunities. We are referring here to 
political and legal opportunities as well as cultural types of opportunities, all 
of which continue to differentiate in each context and delimit the way in 
which religion finds its public place. The case studies, even when they 
sometimes appear to be similar, thus were firmly anchored in national and/or 
urban trajectories, and historical national variables could be kept in focus. 
Moreover, specific tensions and opportunities that are rooted in national 
trajectories could been taken into consideration. The same goes for the 
                                                 
1  The process of making religious issues key public issues can be driven by state 
policy, a political party, or the establishment of institutions representing one 
religion, or it can occur through the circulation of opinions, ideas, and shared 
knowledge. 
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specific conditions that Muslims deal with in order to raise their voices in 
public. The contributors shared the view that individual contexts and history 
play a role in explaining the specific articulation to the political domain of 
one’s commitment as a Muslim in public. The public sphere is not neutral, 
and, as the product of a specific history, it is embedded in a complex of 
influences that reflect the national political culture. Muslims have not always 
been actors in that historical process, but they are now demanding participa-
tion and equal treatment as citizens of these countries. Likewise, national and 
European religious histories have an impact on how this minority religion 
acquires public presence. As the contributions illustrate, the private/public 
relationship should therefore be understood as an interdependency rather than 
as a strict separation. In that context, the quest for equality and recognition is 
also the demand for a civil society that is open to religious pluralism, both for 
individuals and for groups (Modood 2005). European states no longer can 
consider Muslims to be citizens without opening public space to the recogni-
tion of others’ ways of doing things according to religious belief. 
Second, all of us dealt with a new type of actor: people who interact with 
society as Muslims and who are determined to make their voices heard, 
regardless of the actual domain of their initiative. Their commitment surfaced 
in expected as well as unexpected spheres of activity, from religious teaching 
to political activism, from music and Sufi discussion groups to art. We 
quickly recognized that underlying all the case studies was a form of commu-
nication and relationship to society in which one’s self-definition as a Muslim 
was never questioned but simply affirmed. The meanings of this identifica-
tion, however, appeared to be very different from one situation to the next. 
Our choice to frame Muslim commitment as public commitment was influ-
enced by the extreme diversity of the actors discussed in the various chapters. 
An analysis in terms of public space enables one to cover collective, organ-
ized activities as well as individual ones. It does not restrict the field to 
organized forms of engagement, but instead opens it up to relatively isolated 
and anonymous forms of being engaged as a Muslim.  
The millions of Muslims living in the EU are indeed a complex and het-
erogeneous population that includes migrants, converts, European citizens, 
foreigners, men and women, old and young, believers and nonbelievers, 
secular Muslims, traditionalists, and radicals. The majority of them do not 
identify with the small minority of Muslim association members. The studies 
that compose this volume therefore include a broad spectrum of Muslim 
actors; sometimes their only commonality is the skills and resources needed 
to go public. We spoke with religious experts, imams, male and female 
teachers, social workers, political actors, charismatic leaders, anonymous 
believers, and political activists. The channels in which they operated, their 
level of experience, and their motivation to go public differed. But they all 
shared a self-definition as Muslim when confronted with public situations.  
Third, as mentioned earlier, we selected our interview partners at the 
crossroads of the internal process of becoming visible (i.e., Muslims making 
INTRODUCTION 
 17
Muslims visible) and the push from outside to pinpoint Muslim presence in 
Europe (i.e., Muslims as a security problem). The chorus that can be heard 
today in European public spaces includes religious voices (e.g., when imams 
publicly assess the normative validity of homosexual behavior), political 
voices (e.g., when Milli Görü leaders claim the right to become accepted as a 
partner of the state), and civic voices (e.g., when Muslim representatives 
denounce bombings or condemn the hijacking of journalists in Iraq). Conse-
quently, the volume highlights the variety of potential attitudes towards 
society, including exit, silence, and loyalty (Hirschman 1978). The multiple 
meanings that are given to the word “Muslim” in the currently tense environ-
ment allow for defensive and inimical reactions but also involve positive 
communication about one’s position in society. Some contributions touch 
upon the innovative ways in which self-described Muslims react when 
confronted with situations that provoke the Islamic tradition—although their 
religious identification requires them to either justify their tradition or keep 
silent. In this respect, the shift from the older guardians of the Muslim faith to 
a younger generation has been essential and is common to all countries, 
regardless of their history of migration. It is above all younger Muslims who 
are creating distance from traditional institutions, elaborating new demands 
for recognition and for the representation of interests, and developing strate-
gies to distinguish the Muslim community from the dominant representation 
of Muslims as enemies.  
Fourth, the precise nature of belief and its limits were never at the center 
of our research. We even thought it abusive to suggest that fieldwork 
grounded on the observation of religious practice could facilitate our under-
standing of belief, which is, after all, anchored in individual experience. 
Moreover, such experience must first be voiced in order to exist as a social 
fact (Luhmann 2000). It is only when people declare their faith through 
language or bodily practices that one can start to assess the role that religion 
plays in their actions. Thus, the role of religious practice and values in the 
daily exercise of citizenship was taken into consideration only when our 
interview partners chose to negotiate “lifestyle choices among a diversity of 
options not necessarily congruent with collective religious sentiments” 
(Eickelman 2000, 120). When, however, the individual did not express 
religious sentiment, it was not for the observer to ascribe religion as a frame-
work to explain what he or she saw.  
Finally, we wanted to maintain a constant focus on the plurality of experi-
ences that our fieldwork made visible. The performance and expression of 
difference are central to the constitution of a democratic dynamic public space 
that enables the meeting of different types of beliefs, belongings, identities, 
and representations of the world. “The public sphere is articulated as includ-
ing people with different characteristics, and as requiring participants to be 
able to carry on conversations that are not strictly determined by private 
interests or identity” (Calhoun 2002, 165). Unlike policymakers, who barely 
discern between one Muslim and the next, the new Muslim actors discussed 
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in this volume themselves discern between those who “belong” and “others.” 
This differentiation resulted in the coexistence of clashing visibilities. The 
questions of what “real Islam” is and who the “real Muslims” are loomed 
large and continue to do so. This process inevitably leads to competition and 
the empowerment of the group that gains the most support.  
The attitudes and statements described in this volume mirror the emerging 
“work in progress” among Muslims in Europe. Their newness, however, does 
not preclude the researcher from taking into account the needs and sensibili-
ties of the parent generation, which was grappling with opposing interests and 
defensiveness long before the recent political claims-making came into view. 
Policymakers may set the scene for their appearance while trying to define 
ways in which Muslims are allowed to differ, strictly discerning between 
“good” and “bad.” But caught in between hurt feelings and the political 
class’s power of definition, the new Muslim actors work with emancipation 
concepts of their own. Their business is the creation of new methods that 
further the peaceful establishment of Islam in EU member states and open up 




The Structure  o f  This  Vo lume 
 
Based on unpublished data that have been collected in seven Western Euro-
pean countries between August 2003 and July 2005, the contributions take 
into consideration Muslim actors who in recent years have entered the public 
sphere of their country of residence. Some contributions focus on individual 
actors, whereas others examine a whole professional stratum (imams and 
imam training), a “young” organization, or young people in “old” organiza-
tions. All contributions describe the specifics of national and urban frame-
works, forms of differentiation, and the choice of public arena. They address 
the different forms of claims-making, which are anchored in the specificity of 
national and local contexts, and, whenever possible, relate these to parallel 
patterns of development among Muslims elsewhere.  
Valérie Amiraux (France) follows five average French citizens who do not 
engage in any association but who nonetheless claim the right to a private 
religious identity. She analyzes the ways in which these people relate to their 
self-identification as a Muslim while confronted with the fact that its legiti-
macy is denied in a public space that respects laïcité only. How can they 
speak both as a believer and as a citizen? Supported with very rich field notes, 
this chapter portrays five individuals who are committed to making their 
voices heard on the subject of being a Muslim within a society that has 
institutionalized patterns of hostility towards religiosity.  
Nadia Fadil (Belgium) pursues a somewhat similar direction, though she 
takes a different angle in her description of a form of claims-making that is 
widely considered to be specific to the Islamic religious tradition—namely, 
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how Muslims should behave as “good” Muslims. Having done extensive 
fieldwork in a local Antwerp association, she explores the link that young 
Muslim activists constantly describe in order to relate their religious identifi-
cation to political action. According to Fadil, performance as an Islamic 
political subject is a constellation of attitudes, ranging from resistance to a 
quest for recognition, which provides us with alternative interpretations of the 
role of associations in the political socialization of Muslims in Europe.  
Annalisa Frisina (Italy) opens up a window on the claims-making of a 
genuine (religious) Muslim citizenship and a likewise genuine (secular) 
European citizenship. Focusing on an association founded by the children of 
immigrants, Frisina observes the formation of an active and above all 
autonomous citizenship anchored in local and everyday policy initiatives, 
which aim at individual self-realization yet at the same time seek access to 
larger public debates on Italian politics.  
Welmoet Boender (the Netherlands) studies how the emergence of a 
European Islamic authority could possibly become institutionalized. Her 
account brings to light the precarious claims of “import” and “homegrown” 
imams. She also describes the precarious situation of religious students in 
private Islamic vocational institutions who navigate their future role as 
mediators between religious communities and secular society—aptly summa-
rized as “something of a minefield.”  
Gerdien Jonker (Germany) opens another minefield as she discusses reli-
gious responses to political measures. In her analysis, the asymmetry between 
the partners becomes especially clear. Whereas policymakers want to control 
the “threat” that Muslims in Germany present, Muslim communities lay claim 
to the ability to cure the German “illness” resulting from the secularization of 
European societies.  
Gökçe Yurdakul (Germany), through her analysis of the headscarf debate 
in Germany, uncovers the intensive claims-making among the children of 
Turkish migrants in Germany about the way a woman should appear in the 
public sphere. Her chapter demonstrates the centrality of the tense ties 
binding secular and Islamist groups to the representation they have of their 
coexistence in a pluralistic non-Muslim society.  
Philip Lewis (Great Britain) brings us back to interfaith channels and to 
the many inroads to partnerships which imams in this country contribute to in 
order to stabilize the “one nation, many faiths” ideology of British politics. 
Preachers have to answer to the demands of at least two sides, however, a 
tension that sometimes bears very strange fruits.  
Hamad Abdel-Samad (Germany) analyzes the specific framework in 
which young Muslims in Germany become isolated from society, radicalize, 
or even opt for violence. His contribution accurately reflects the voices that 
demand respect, the power of self-definition, and inclusion, as opposed to the 
marginalization and nonrecognition that these interviewees usually experi-
ence. Abdel-Samad’s account opens a window on choices: denouncement, 
resignation, anger, and outrage.  
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Valérie Amiraux 
SPEAKING AS A MUSLIM: 
AVOIDING RELIGION IN FRENCH PUBLIC SPACE
1
 
Introduct ion   
 
Three main ways of studying Muslims living in France have developed in the 
French social science literature over the last two decades (Amiraux 2004; 
Cesari 1994). The first gives priority to a reading of the public regulation of 
religious pluralism and of Islam as culte (worship; Frégosi 1998; Basdevant-
Gaudemet 1996; Galembert and Belbah 2005). A second approach focuses on 
observing the articulation of “being a Muslim” and acting as a citizen (Babès 
1997; Tietze 2002; Venel 2004). The third, intermediary trend considers the 
living conditions of Muslims in France with respect to the impact of certain 
constraints (la laïcité) and the requirement that both Muslim individuals and 
Muslim groups adhere to the limits set by these republican principles (Roy 
2005). Within this third segment of the social science literature, one also finds 
volumes focusing on the ways in which Muslims address specific living 
conditions, such as differences between generations (Khosrokhavar 1997), 
conditions in public institutions (Geisser and Mohsen-Finan 2001; Khosrok-
havar 2004), and, last but not least, the headscarf controversies (Gaspard and 
Khosrokhavar 1995; Lorcerie 2005; Babès 2005; Nordmann 2004; Baubérot, 
Costa-Lascoux, and Bouzar 2004). In addition, recent developments in 
sociology and political science emphasize the emerging profiles of religious 
authorities and leadership in France and Europe, or activists’ socialization, in 
particular among Salafi and Tabligh movements (Amghar 2005; Khedimellah 
2001). 
In these works, being a Muslim in France is no longer discussed as a mi-
gration issue but instead as an issue tied to the politics of citizenship. It is also 
conceived as an individual choice—emancipated from any type of coercion—
not simply as an inheritance.2 To identify as a Muslim does not imply an 
unchanging identity, and there are many ways to express these identifications. 
Most of the literature has concentrated on organized forms of religious 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Daniel Cefaï, Gerdien Jonker, Anne-Sophie Lamine, and 
Daniel Sabbagh for their careful reading of first drafts of this chapter and their 
stimulating comments. 
2  This development corresponds to what other studies of different populations of 
believers also identify as a major change, in Europe and beyond (see Laermans, 
Wilson, and Billiet 1998). 
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identification and practices (thus privileging fieldwork on associations, 
mosques, and institutions), on organized forms of religious life. The inter-
views that constitute the core of this empirical data have been conducted with 
persons embedded in practices of exclusion or in conflicts (e.g., the building 
of places of worship, access to education, the wearing of the veil, the choice 
of a representative institution for Muslims) or persons sharing similar associa-
tive commitments. However, the majority of these publications emphasize the 
need to distinguish between Muslims committed to a life of worship and the 
anonymous ones, those individuals one hardly ever meets because they do not 
make an argument of their religious belief. This chapter attempts to elaborate 
on this point. It broadens and constructively criticizes the French tradition of 
knowledge by asking the following questions: Do Muslims have a life inde-
pendent of their belief and their supposed belonging to a religious community 
in the French context? To what extent do Muslims cease to be Muslims when 
they are not addressed as such?3 In other words, do Muslims (both men and 
women) exist outside of worship, and what kind of life do they lead as 
everyday citizens?4 
It became difficult to identify who and what is at stake when people—
including social scientists, but also journalists, policymakers, and the general 
public—talk about Muslims in France. This chapter offers a very personal 
attempt to be more focused in this process of defining Muslims as objects and 
subjects of social science research. At the same time, it retains as core mate-
rial the personal experiences and narratives of five individuals who all 
identified themselves as Muslim believers in their discussions with me. In 
general in this volume, the authors offer a transversal analysis of various 
European contexts on the basis of empirical findings revealing the different 
performances of individuals who define themselves as Islamic political 
subjects in multiple domains (e.g., training, preaching, political commitment). 
The contributions also present a multiplicity of voices anchored in specific 
experiences but strongly tied to each other in that they raise similar questions 
(e.g., access to public space, conditions of participation, control of visibility, 
production of authority).  
To take into account anonymous voices means to find one’s way to 
women who do not wear a headscarf, men who do not wear distinctive signs 
(like a beard or certain clothing), and people who do not speak under an 
Islamic label. It means trying to take into account the daily contingencies and 
individual trajectories, the fears, emotions, troubles, and concerns that may 
                                                 
3  This question follows up on the hypothesis that a public exists only by virtue of 
its being addressed and therefore must claim some degree of attention from its 
members (Warner 2002, 60–61). 
4  How do Muslims live when they are not being examined by journalists, politi-
cians, or social scientists? As Michael Warner (2002, 60) has argued, “Most 
social classes and groups are understood to encompass their members all the 
time, no matter what. A nation, for example, includes its members whether they 
are awake or asleep, sober or drunk, sane or deranged, alert or comatose.”  
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motivate some Muslims to keep silent and others to speak out. During our 
face-to-face meetings, my discussion partners in France told me their personal 
stories and anecdotes; they spoke of their experiences, the tests they have been 
going through, and the situations in which they felt directly questioned about 
their personal beliefs about what it means to be a Muslim. This chapter is thus 
grounded in specific micro experiences that I learned about through exchanges 
with individuals.5 I met them while doing fieldwork, but they were at the 
periphery of that research. We met either through a joint project supervised by 
others (Yasmina and Larbi) or when I asked for their expertise from previous 
research projects (Kenza, Morad, and Lila).6 On other occasions, they asked 
me to help them publicize their work, to give expert advice, or just to partici-
pate in events they were organizing. I found them as much as they found me. 
Through the course of these meetings we discussed various topics, and I came 
to know them better as individuals. I finally considered that their different 
trajectories might be presented in this chapter as illustrations of the different 
modalities of going public as a Muslim in French public space.7 Of course, 
this material does not stand for the 3.5 to 7 million Muslims thought to be 
living in France.8 It is a tiny, detailed sample that does not fit the usual 
definition of what a legitimate sample should consist of. They cannot be said 
                                                 
5  As Berger and Luckmann (1967, 43) have noted, the face-to-face situation 
makes the other’s subjectivity available through “a maximum of symptoms. In 
the face-to-face situation, the other is fully real.” It allows the sociologist to at 
least move away from the anonymity inherit in typifications.  
6  Names have been changed for Kenza and Morad. Larbi, Lila, and Yasmina have 
given me permission to use their real names when referring to our discussions. 
7  I had several meetings which each of them except for Lila, whom I met at public 
events and once individually for a long interview. Some of the quotations in this 
text come from taped interviews, others from notes that I was taking during in-
formal conversation. The conditions for gathering the data thus justify consider-
ing the encounters to be talks rather than formal interviews. I personally do not 
consider interviews to differ from conversations: both consist of meetings be-
tween two persons. This perspective is one of the important legacies of ethnog-
raphy, as compared with the more formal position of political science and soci-
ology towards conducting interviews (see Althabe 1990). 
8  Since 1872 the French census has not included questions on religious belief. 
Public statistics have never properly covered the issue of faith among migrants. 
Since the 1980s some private surveys have been published; they deal with “the 
Muslim opinion” on issues such as the Gulf War in 1991, the first veil contro-
versies in 1989 and 1994, and, more recently, the attacks on the World Trade 
Center. For most of these surveys, these figures are based on the definition of a 
Muslim as a “person of Muslim culture,” basically referring to the nationality of 
origin of the parents or grandparents. To make a long story short, when people 
wish to trace back Muslims in France, they ask for the “home country” of the 
first migrants or look at the family name (if you have an Arab name, there is a 
good probability that statistics will consider you a Muslim). Thus, these statistics 
do not reflect actual practices, which obviously vary according to age, country 
of origin, and social background. 
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to represent a specific type of activism, nor a typical profile of second- or 
third-generation Muslims.  
On the basis of these five cases and in reference to the current framing of 
the public discourse on Muslims in France, this chapter invites the reader to 
consider the “swing to commitment” (Boltanski 1999) of Muslim individuals 
from the position of spectator to one of actor on a public stage. During our 
conversations, these five individuals mostly emphasized their desire to care 
about people rather than about politics (see Eliasoph 1998, 23–31). In France 
today, there is no French Muslim community, no unique voice speaking in the 
name of all Muslims in the country. The public discourse on them is, however, 
framed by dominant narratives that have emerged in particular since 9/11.9 
The chapter opens with an analysis of the way in which this written produc-
tion contributed to defining the type of social trajectories that Muslims living 
in France are allowed to follow. In examining this aspect I refer to the grow-
ing number of biographies, testimonies, and narratives of suffering published 
recently, which have become true commercial successes. These personal 
histories published by men and women have become part of the public 
domain. They have defined patterns of attitudes and thereby helped to demar-
cate the boundaries separating good behaviors from bad ones. How do the five 
interviewees relate to this public image of their own community of belief? In 
the next section I discuss, on the basis of specific experiences of my five 
discussion partners, the way in which public speech by Muslims is grounded 
in the French context (Goffman 1981). As in the preceding section, it relates 
the production of discourses to the individual experiences of my interviewees: 
To what extent do they feel empathy with or reject this highly audible voice? 
How does it affect their own “coming out” as Muslims? In the section that 
follows, I elaborate on the notion of going public, as rooted in the life trajecto-
ries and narratives of my discussion partners.  
 
 
Condit ions  of  Speech  for  Musl im Cit izens:  
Publ ic  Demands and Dominant  Narrat ives   
 
Who are these individuals with whom I have been talking for the past two 
years? Larbi is a local imam in the second biggest mosque in Paris. He is the 
only one I knew before the events of 9/11. Morad is a businessman involved 
in local political activities in a city north of Paris. I met him in early 2002 
while conducting research on discrimination against Muslims in France. I then 
happened to meet him regularly as I was following the implementation of the 
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council for Muslim Worship; 
                                                 
9  In the French context, 9/11 opened space for public deliberation and discussion 
of Islam-related topics, in a positive as well as a negative sense. On the one 
hand, it became easier for Muslims to be heard in certain arenas; on the other, 
racist statements about Islam and Muslims are more explicit and easier to ex-
press than ever. 
SPEAKING AS A MUSLIM 
 25
hereafter CFCM). I met Kenza during research on discrimination against 
Muslims in the European Union. She is trained as a sociologist. She worked 
for different nongovernmental organizations and public agencies in charge of 
“immigration affairs” before she started to work for a Catholic charity founda-
tion, where she has been in charge of international affairs since mid-2004. Lila 
has been wearing a veil since Ramadan 2004, two weeks before I met her as 
she was organizing the press release of the work done by her association on 
Islamophobia in France. At that time she had just resigned from her position 
as a lawyer in order to work for this association fighting against Islamophobia. 
Last but not least, when I first met Yasmina in mid-2002, she had just com-
pleted her master’s thesis in international relations. We collaborated on a 
public exhibition on Muslims in different world cities which took place in 
Paris from May to November of 200410 She is now working at a research 
institute that specializes in Islamic Studies. 
This group of people does not constitute the usual sample for a social sci-
entist working on Islam and Muslims in the European Union. Indeed, they do 
not belong to a common associative network. They do not know each other 
personally, even if they may sometimes visit the same places (e.g., Larbi’s 
mosque) or attend the same conferences. They do not live in the same 
neighborhood, but all do reside in Paris or its immediate surroundings (les 
banlieues or les quartiers). They do not work together or send their kids to the 
same school. They share, however, two things. First, all are of Algerian 
descent and live in France. Second, they all told me that they identify as 
Muslims. The following text based on their personal accounts attempts to 
analyze the conditions framing the access to public speech for Muslim French 
citizens. What are they permitted to do? What type of narratives are they 
entitled to produce? To what extent do they behave as Muslims, and what is 
their perception of that behavior? What makes them speak and act as Muslims 
rather than keep silent? What is their position in the public realm? Who do 
they speak for? What do they say about their situation as Muslim French 
citizens? 
Following Charles Taylor’s suggestion that social imaginaries are what 
enable the practices of a society by making sense of them,11 one can only be 
pessimistic about the dominant perceptions about and representations of 
Muslims held by non-Muslims in France. In the French context, “being a 
Muslim” is indeed framed by dominant narratives—some of them originating 
from Muslims12—which have slowly contributed to the sedimentation and 
reification of public perceptions of the “typical life of Muslims in France,” 
                                                 
10  “Musulmanes, Musulmans au Caire, à Téhéran, Istanbul, Paris, Dakar […]” was 
organized and sponsored by the Parc de la Villette and placed under the scien-
tific codirection of Olivier Roy and myself (see Amiraux and Roy 2004). 
11  “Social imaginaries,” according to Taylor (2002, 106), are “the way ordinary 
people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings […]: it is carried in images, stories, 
legends.”  
12  On specific anti-Muslim discourses by Muslims, see Geisser, 2003. 
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feeding the generation of stereotypical representations of how Muslims think, 
sleep, eat, love, and look.13  
As a matter of fact, anyone willing to improve his or her knowledge of 
Islam and Muslims in France is immediately faced with a difficult choice. One 
could start by reading newspapers and magazines, watching television, and 
buying academic books. One could also rely on the testimonies delivered, in 
the form of either novels or biography, by “French citizens of Arab and 
Muslim descent”—women, men, old, and young. To talk about Muslims in 
France implies that one is also dealing with the dominant typifications of 
Muslims in Western media coverage.14 To generalize about types of Muslims 
(the extremist, the assimilated, the republican, the secular, etc.) implies that 
one is considering the actors without touching upon the persons.15 At the same 
time, however, to take this distinction between types of Muslims as a starting 
point may facilitate discussion and reflection. Indeed, it provides one with an 
opportunity to speak to groups of persons that end up to being aggregated 
together on the basis of an external manifestation of what seems to be com-
mon to all of them. Ultimately, the public discourse circulating in the media is 
caught between the hammer of horrible and tragic storytelling and the anvil of 
religious moral propositions.  
The publications that I have in mind are for the most part books and writ-
ten statements published as life stories and then publicized through the 
appearance of the authors on television shows. These appearances and the 
proliferation of their stories in the press and media at large (Gamson 1998) 
arouse pity and eventually involve the spectator, compelling him or her to act 
(Boltanski 1999, 32). The messages and images address first and foremost 
non-Muslims. Between rumors and gossip, urban legend and invented stories, 
this uncontrolled public discourse on Islam has found an audience (Pew 
                                                 
13  There has been a tendency to make aesthetic comments about the beauty of good 
and bad Muslims, which I have described elsewhere as Neo-Orientalist (Amir-
aux 2005). Chaddhort Djavann, an Iranian living in France, was one of the few 
Muslim women interviewed by the Stasi commission, which was given the 
mandate by French President Jacques Chirac to write a report on laïcité in 
France. Most of the comments on her hearing only mentioned that “she [was] 
beautiful.” Interestingly, the same comment always comes to the fore when 
Tariq Ramadan is being discussed, as if it would add to the suspicions of radical-
ism. Olivier Roy begins his last book by discussing Tariq Ramadan’s beauty 
(2005, 1). 
14  Typification here refers to the conventions determining what characteristics help 
to identify persons: “The social reality of everyday life is thus apprehended in a 
continuum of typifications, which are progressively anonymous as they are re-
moved from the ‘here and now’ of the face-to-face situation” (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967, 47–48). 
15  This is, for instance, how Nacira Guénif and Eric Macé analyzed the headscarf 
controversies in France. What did the headscarf say? What did it perform? By 
the end, the headscarf talked of individuals, but individuals were kept silent 
(Guénif and Macé 2004; Tarraud 2005). 
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Research Center 2005). In a climate in which the perceptions of Muslims in 
France remain largely negative, commentators assert that Muslims demand to 
keep a distinct way of life and remain separate from the mainstream. In this 
light, their alienation is seen as a direct result of the cultural isolation of some 
Islamic enclaves in the heart of Western Europe (Stokes 2005), of which 
young veiled women serve as the living embodiment. In a recent survey, 70 % 
of the French interviewed for a Pew Research report said that they feel 
concerned about the increasing sense of Islamic identity developed by Mus-
lims living in France, and 59 % said that they think Muslims want to remain 
distinct. It is no surprise, then, that 78 % of the French respondents believe 
that banning Muslim headscarves was a good idea (Pew Research Center 
2005). 
A pattern of public discourse on the situation of Muslims has thus 
emerged more explicitly in the last five years. In addition to social science 
discourses, the dominance of individual experience in narratives is now 
accepted as representative in the public sphere. The proliferation of books 
based on individual testimonies reflects several changes in the way French 
citizens of Arab and/or Muslim descent have been asked or have decided to 
speak out about their own trajectories. The published personal stories I am 
referring to are, for instance, those by Samira Bellil (2002) on sexual violence 
and collective rape (les tournantes), Loubna Meliane (2003) on political 
commitment, Abd al Malik (2004) on conversion to “good” Islam, Farid 
Abdelkrim (2002) on his perception of the abusive French “model of integra-
tion,” Razika Zitouni (2005) on her upward social mobility, and Lila and 
Alma Levy (2004) on their exclusion from public schools because of their 
headscarves. Personal history works in these cases as proof, a demonstration, 
a manifestation.  
In the public debates on Islam that center on secular issues, the expert be-
comes marginal and the individual, having directly experienced personally 
difficult situations, becomes the referee.16 Religion is never the only focus of 
these authors, but they present themselves as “originating” from a Muslim 
family or background, and thus as having a voice to be heard and the legiti-
macy to speak up. So even when not mentioning religion at all in their works, 
these authors nevertheless have contributed to the promotion of their lifestyles 
as particular modalities of being Muslim in France. A good illustration of this 
is the process that contributed to the emergence of two images of the enemy 
among Muslim women during the last veil controversy in 2003/2004, which 
led to the vote on legislation passed in March 2004. On the one hand, a young 
Muslim girl alienated by men and forced by older people (mostly men) to 
                                                 
16  A parallel can be drawn with studies focusing on, for instance, the way in which 
private and sensitive topics (in particular those dealing with sexual life, violence, 
and harassment), which nowadays constitute the standard on many television 
and radio shows, also can be considered to open access to speech to citizens who 
are normally excluded (e.g., gays and lesbians, women, blacks, and, more gener-
ally, all visible minorities). See Cardon, 1995; Gamson, 1998. 
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wear a headscarf. On the other hand, a young, beautiful, and sexy girl from a 
migrant family, denouncing the headscarf as a major threat to women’s 
emancipation in France’s suburbs.17 Suddenly, after fifteen years of intense 
discussion and fluctuation between total silence and intensely passionate 
public drama, hundreds of girls wearing an Islamic headscarf became a public 
problem for the nation. A consensus quickly became clear among the usual 
host of political groups and talk shows: only a law could rescue the poor girls 
wearing a headscarf. Nothing in Samira Bellil’s book relates to Islam. Never-
theless, journalists explicitly drew a link: “It is a history of collective rape, of 
tournantes. These mechanisms do not date back to yesterday, but are an 
archaic and miserable madness, based on machismo, Islam, immigration, and 
disoriented parents who disorient children.”18 
This art of storytelling is not based only on pathological and extreme 
situations; rather, it also presents “common experiences”: episodes of normal 
life in the French peripheries which can be paralleled with other trajectories in 
similar settings. Kenza, one of my discussion partners, is in her forties. She 
refers to this literature as books that speak to white French citizens. It is a 
necessary path to information for those who do not live in these neighbor-
hoods (“les quartiers”). “Real life is not what they think it is. But, after all, 
everything is politics: all these women who wrote about their lives, whether 
Meliane or Bellil, they ended up being used by politicians” (Kenza, informal 
discussion in a Paris coffee shop, June 2005). 
It is everybody’s daily life made available, and comparable, to others’ 
lives. This aspect helps the broader audience to identify with and be touched 
by these stories. Indeed, the expression of intense and authentic suffering, 
such as that in Samira Bellil’s book, appears to be a way to tell one’s story 
while respecting diversity and accepting others’ lifestyles. Her book played a 
key role in the generation of a dominant framework for understanding rela-
tions between boys and girls in specific urban ghettos. As pointed out by 
Dominique Mehl (2003), the accumulation of situations as diverse as possible 
and marked by extremes is one way to organize the liberalization of public 
space. Individuals come with their personal trajectories and cannot be judged 
on that basis.19 The literature fixes the scenario of paradigmatic lives: it 
establishes the official representation of how one lives as a Muslim woman 
(with a migrant background) in France (Mucchielli 2005, 111). This represen-
tation enters the political realm if it is defined as “a struggle over people’s 
                                                 
17  Vincent Geisser has a label for each of these figures: beurette voilée for the 
veiled girl, and beurette libérée for the good, emancipated Muslim French citi-
zen. See http://lmsi.net/impression.php3?id_article=215. 
18  “C’est une histoire de viol collectif, de tournantes. Ce sont des mécanismes qui 
ne datent pas d’hier, une folie archaïque et misérable, sur fond de machisme, 
d’islam, d’immigration et de parents déboussolés, déboussoleurs” (Libération, 
October 7, 2002; quoted in Mucchielli 2005, 26; my translation into English). 
19  In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, many women wrote books to testify 
about male oppression.  
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imaginations, a competition over the meaning of symbols” (Eickelman 2000, 
123). 
These books based on personal trajectories deal with issues that previously 
were not considered to be of interest to the public or were considered to be too 
private and intimate.20 Their existence, however, opens up the Pandora’s box 
of the role of symbolic figures and models to follow. “I am here to testify and 
this is for free. I don’t want anybody to follow me,” explains Abd al Malik 
(2004) in his autobiography. When a person gains social legitimacy by 
publishing his or her individual story, there can be no criticism of the narra-
tive: the way an individual tells his or her story is never put into question, 
though the author can be criticized for his or her conclusions, the analysis of 
the story, and/or the eventual impact it had (Guénif and Macé 2004). Bellil’s 
story became the symbol of women’s daily tragic life for the entire nation.  
The targeted audience includes different components, characterized by 
direct knowledge of similar experiences (the nominal addressees), possible 
empathy with the situation (the implied addressees), and general ignorance of 
the topic (the targeted public of circulation) (Warner 2002, 54). Public 
visibility in television talk shows and magazines of these (presumed) Muslims 
speaking for themselves results in a somewhat disruptive and invasive pres-
ence. It also has collateral effects; in the case of Bellil, for example, she was 
quickly associated with the movement led by Fadela Amara (Ni Putes Ni 
Soumises, or “Neither Whores Nor Submissives”), which in the same period 
organized a national march all around the country, which ended in Paris on 
March 8, 2003 (Amara 2003).21 In this context, a movement such as Ni Putes 
Ni Soumises, of which Loubna Meliane is a member, also contributed to the 
emergence of a new aesthetic of what a good, young, emancipated, and 
republican Muslim French citizen should look like, and how she should 
conduct her sex life.  
It is probably one of the least savory aspects of this recent French contro-
versy over the headscarf that it was less concerned with religion or with belief 
than with the stigmatization of good and bad behavior, particularly as it 
                                                 
20  Some words can be pronounced in public, others cannot. In public situations 
such as conferences and interviews, a number of Muslim leaders would prefer to 
speak of the “NPNS” (using the initial letters) rather than of the “Ni Putes Ni 
Soumises,” just to avoid saying the “bad words” of the association’s name, 
which means “Neither Whores Nor Submissives.”  
21  Amara’s book (2003) is to a great extent an autobiography, as well as a presenta-
tion of the movement. The Ni Putes Ni Soumises movement began in February 
2003 after a young girl (19-year-old Sohane) was burned alive in Vitry sur Seine 
in her housing estate’s garbage area. The movement started with a march by five 
girls and two boys, who for five weeks walked across France in order to de-
nounce the terrible living conditions of women in the quartiers. Following this 
Marche des femmes contre les ghettos et pour l’égalité, the Ni Putes Ni Sou-
mises have been engaged in different initiatives but were in particular extremely 
important in the debate surrounding the discussion of the law banning religious 
symbols from public schools. 
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pertained to the relationship between men and women. The idea that women 
might wear a headscarf because they believed in its meaning and its symbol-
ism simply never arose. And this perception of it had a strong political impact. 
The uniform reading of the Islamic headscarf in terms of oppression, alien-
ation, and male domination played a key role in shaping people’s imaginations 
and increasing the consensus in favor of the ban. The competition over the 
meaning of symbols opposed the “good,” emancipated Muslim women (under 
the somewhat neocolonial supervision of central feminist figures) and the 
dominated ones. By considering the headscarf a symbol of women’s oppres-
sion, most of the French historical feminist leadership adopted a neocolonial 
attitude towards veiled Muslim girls: “If you don’t know why you should take 
off your headscarf, I’ll tell you.” To some extent, Orientalist typifications 
became the hallmark of institutional French feminism on the headscarf issue: 
Women of Muslim descent are beautiful; the veiled ones should definitely be 
emancipated from patriarchal domination and be given autonomous manage-
ment of their entire body. This neocolonial representation of what Muslim 
women should do for themselves even led to the idea that they may not be 
able to defend themselves.22 Moreover, both Muslim men and women must 
confront the patriarchal attitude of the French state, which attempts to impose 
certain behavior and rules, as if Muslims in France are not able to decide for 
themselves what is best for them. “May we think on our own?” Morad once 
asked me in February of 2003, while he was still involved in the preparatory 
work that ended up with the election of the CFCM. His decision to join the 
members of the preparatory group for the CFCM stemmed from his desire to 
be physically present in a room where  
 
“all representatives are addressing the minister as if we were still in the colonial 
period. They barely speak correct French, and they just go there to be in the pictures 
with President Chirac. They are not interested in being heard or listened to. They 
just want to be there. With their names on the official documents and the header of 
the minister.”  
 
Morad and Kenza belong to the same age cohort (in their forties). Morad came 
to France in the 1980s to study mathematics at a university. Kenza was born 
in France. Notwithstanding their different trajectories in the French political 
system, they share a cynical view of the way French public space produces 
leading figures with whom Muslims and the children of migrants should 
identify. They also share a very cautious attitude towards the way politicians 
view these public figures as potential to gain votes. Yasmina and Lila belong 
to the same age cohort (late twenties). Both were born in France. When they 
consider the dominant narratives in the media, they adopt a more tolerant 
attitude, a mixture of forgiveness and compassion. Like Larbi, the imam in the 
north of Paris, they do not contest the validity of the testimonies, and they 
                                                 
22  A good illustration is the Elle magazine launch of the petition addressed to 
President Chirac (see Tarraud 2005). 
SPEAKING AS A MUSLIM 
 31
insist on the positive effect that the publication of such sufferings must have 
had on their victims. All five, however, distance themselves from the potential 
for identification and minimize their own potential for becoming a model for 
other Muslims. This is completely unlike the discourse of, for instance, 
Muslim student organizations such as Étudiants Musulmans de France (asso-
ciated with the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France), which con-
tinue to insist on the importance of being a perfect Muslim, a “role model,” a 
source of inspiration for younger Muslims, and not a source of criticism by 
non-Muslims.23 
The nature of these testimonies affects its audience at different levels. 
Most important, it ceases to be impersonal. As Yasmina explained when 
speaking about her situation as a guide for groups and individuals visiting the 
La Villette exhibition on Muslims in different cities, the presence of a public 
imposes constraints on speech. She elaborated on her uneasiness as she was, 
on the one hand, working on the organization of the exhibition and, on the 
other hand, part of the exhibition (as a member of the Muslim community and 
as a participant in a video of the exhibition, in which she explains the meaning 
of being a Muslim in Paris today on a 4 x 4 m screen).24 She felt like she was 
serving as a representative of something she never thought she would have to 
talk about outside of her circle of relatives and friends. As Taylor (2002) has 
argued, the way a public is addressed says much about the footing every 
participant to the interaction stands in with the addressees. As a matter of fact, 
Yasmina was also in a relationship with these strangers—not understood as 
wandering outsiders but as already belonging to her world, as a “normal 
feature of the social” (Warner 2002, 56). The call to publicly share one’s 
views may be experienced as a moment of intense vulnerability or as an 
occasion for strongly defending positions. During the six months of the 
exhibition, Yasmina met “a great sample of the Muslim population living in 
France.” She stated that she felt “a lot of emotions doing this job as a guide 
and mediator. For instance, a Muslim woman, a convert, came several times to 
visit and asked me to go with her on pilgrimage.” 
Actual situations of conflict were difficult and sometimes violent (not 
physically violent), though she immediately added that they were quite rare.25 
Most of the questions and intense discussions were related to women in Islam; 
this was the case for both Muslim and non-Muslim visitors who  
 
                                                 
23  This comment is based on different interviews conducted among students of the 
Étudiants Musulmans de France movements in Paris and Bordeaux between 
November 2004 and July 2005. 
24  The exhibition began with television screens showing different Muslims in 
different contexts of the exhibit and explaining what it means to him or her to be 
a Muslim in the context in which he or she lives. The visitor could thus first lis-
ten to Yasmina on television and then meet her in the exhibition. 
25  In all, 65,000 people visited the exhibition. Yasmina remembers not more than 
seven very tense situations. 
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“were all continuously asking me about the Quran: What does it say on the veil, on 
marriage, on sex, on adultery […]. Oh, you cannot imagine how people, Muslims or 
not, think of the Quran. As if it were a recipe book! But on the other hand, it means 
they all are looking for more information and want to improve their knowledge. It 
forced me to get back to books and to prepare for all these questions. […] In some 
situations, people came to ask me advice. I also had to respond to very aggressive 
Muslim boys who told me I was not a good Muslim because I was not wearing a 
headscarf.”  
 
When she started the job, Yasmina had a clear idea of how she would person-
ally relate to her work: 
 
“I thought, ‘OK, I am a Muslim, but people do not need to know what I do as a 
Muslim.’ In the course of my job, I felt more and more an urgent need to act and to 
commit myself to helping people improve knowledge of their religion and helping 
non-Muslims to stop reducing us to a community of fanatics.” 
 
In particular, she felt an urgent need for more information about and commu-
nication with young men and women whom she saw as   
 
“abandoned to the authority of incompetent so-called imams and who say stupid and 
untrue things. I remember this young guy, in his twenties. He came to me with very 
aggressive comments about my way of being a Muslim. He had seen me on the TV 
screen, and he accused me of giving a bad image of Muslim women. Again it was 
about me not wearing a headscarf.” 
 
After discussing the Quran and the hadith with him, Yasmina ended up talking 
about more personal matters: 
 
“I told him directly: Don’t you think you have a problem with your desire and your 
sexual attraction for women? You should do your ijtihad … At the end of it, I 
thought, ‘My goodness, mothers should really educate their sons about the way they 
look at women.’”  
 
Because she was constantly asked, in particular by young men, to justify her 
behavior, the way she dressed, what she ate, her makeup, the imperative 
action appeared to Yasmina to be  
 
“the next step in my life as a Muslim. It is as if I were told: OK now, act! Think of 
others instead of reading books and going alone to conferences. This job and the 
exhibition definitely changed my views on the situation and on my potential 
contribution to improving it.”  
 
Yasmina’s experience expresses many things, but the most striking one is 
perhaps related to her discovery of the suffering and moral abandon of the 
persons who accused her of not properly behaving according to standards 
defined by local self-declared authorities. Albeit differently, Lila, trained as a 
lawyer, is also concerned about “racism and discrimination motivated by the 
fact that you are a Muslim.” During her studies at law school, she decided to 
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contribute professionally to the fight against discrimination in the framework 
of a small local association, the Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France,26 
which was created in 2003 in Saint Denis in the suburbs of Paris. Up to 
Ramadan 2004, she had not worn the headscarf. 
 
“Indeed, ironically, I had no direct experience of discrimination caused by my belief 
in Islam. The only experience I had took place when I was still unveiled. I had just 
finished with a job interview in the 16th arrondissement of Paris and was on my way 
back to the city when I crossed paths with a man who told me: ‘What are you doing 
here, you with your Arab curly hairs?’ What surprised me at that time was the 
‘normal look’ of this guy. I would rather have expected it from a skinhead or 
somebody of that type. Clearly, since 9/11, if you show that you belong to Islam it 
triggers negative comments.” 
 
By showing her concern for unfortunate people without having been a victim 
of such acts herself, Lila reoriented her whole life. She quit her job as a 
lawyer, which may represent some sacrifice in terms of earnings. (She is now 
paid by the legal aid association that works together with the Collectif Contre 
l’Islamophobie en France.) Whereas Yasmina was a spectator of the suffering 
of others, Lila frames the suffering of an individual person into a legal 
argument, making it a “case.” Lila, as a spectator, nevertheless “can point 
towards action by putting herself in the position of having to report” on what 
the victims tells her (Boltanski 1999, 19). The metaphor of the theater for 
public space is extended with the figure of the spectator, with the position of 
those who observe and act (e.g., Yasmina and Lila), on the one hand, and, on 
the other, with those who observe without being willing to be seen as Muslims 
(e.g., Kenza), who act as a representative for the CFCM (e.g., Larbi), or who 
choose to play a “clandestine” role, pretending to be a representative of an 
association of which he is not a member (Morad).  
They all related to me individually that they had suffered from the specta-
cle made of Islam and Muslims in France, on television talk shows, in books, 
in politicians’ discourses, in their daily interactions with actors in the public 
sphere. Kenza’s phone conversation with the director of her daughter’s school 
is a good example of situations in which the meaning attributed to being 
Muslim reaches a level that comprehends “community concerns.” Kenza’s 
daughter goes to a public school in the center of Paris. Once, while working at 
home, Kenza received a phone call from the director of the school, precisely 
at the moment of the parliamentary discussion preceding the vote in March 
2004 on the law on laïcité. 
 
“‘Why is your daughter excused from gym course, and why is she not going to the 
swimming pool with the rest of her classmates?’ When I heard this question, I 
immediately thought, ‘This woman has never seen me, she cannot imagine that my 
daughter is not going to these lessons because of medical problems, and she cer-
tainly has the image of me wearing a burnous! Or a headscarf.’ … That was con-
                                                 
26  For more details on the association, see the Web site http://islamophobie.net. 
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firmed when, after having explained the reason why my daughter had the medical 
certificates for exempting her from sports training at school, the head of the school 
started to speak about her last trip to Morocco. Through this discussion, I just 
realized how unnatural it is for my daughter to be good at school.” 
 
Kenza’s choice about how she directs her discourse on being a Muslim in 
France differs from those made by Lila and Yasmina. While she was studying 
sociology and working in public offices dealing with migrant populations, she 
tried as much as she could to draw publicity to issues and to act against certain 
forms of racism or in support of policy aimed at helping Muslim populations. 
She felt close to socialist party proposals. Her itinerary is now one of a 
frustrated activist, focusing exclusively on protecting her privacy (and her 
daughter’s life) from external aggressions. In these three cases, decisions 
about and motivations for discourse are anchored in the individuals’ emotions. 
What makes people act or react to injustice, racism, or unfair treatment is 
based on their position as spectators of this injustice and racism. But even as 
simple spectators, people cannot avoid being emotionally invested, even by 
proxy, in the suffering of others. They are not strategic options in a rational-
choice perspective.  
 
 
Performances  or  Ascript ions?  
 
A scientific silence still seems to surround the so-called invisible majority of 
Muslims. Indeed, a common feature of the five individuals discussed in this 
chapter is the contingency of their commitment to accomplish something good 
and therefore help others (both Muslims and non-Muslims). Circumstances 
affect individuals’ trajectories of commitment: a particular event may change 
its course, be it an event of a strictly private nature or one by proxy (e.g., 9/11, 
racism). Moreover, when it comes to the public expression of one’s private 
religious convictions, the French context is especially difficult. This difficulty 
is not so much embedded in the principle of laïcité as it is anchored in the 
perceptions that individuals have of its meanings. One positive aspect of the 
discussions preceding the vote on the law banning conspicuous religious 
symbols from public schools, which was passed on March 15, 2004, lies in the 
improved knowledge of its content among French citizens at large (Baubérot 
2004; Gresh 2004). 
When it comes to religious belief, the dominant representation of laïcité is 
articulated in the notion that nobody knows who you are or who you believe 
in (or whether you believe at all). As one young interviewee told me as I was 
holding a collective round of discussions at an occupational high school: 
“That’s laïcité, Madam. You shouldn’t know what people believe in. You 
don’t know it. And you don’t even see it.”27 So how can we identify Muslims 
                                                 
27  “C’est ça la laïcité m’dame, c’est q’tu dois pas savoir c’que les gens y croient. 
Tu peux pas l’savoir, en plus tu l’vois même pas” (Muslim girl born in France, 
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if they are not visible? Does being visible necessarily make one a public 
actor? 
A common development has emerged over the last two decades: Islam and 
Muslims are said to have become more visible. They certainly have received 
rather negative publicity; but although this process has been accelerated since 
9/11, it was not instigated by it.28 Morad kept telling me that his main motiva-
tion for abandoning his position as a teacher in a public school was that he 
wished to help his own community find jobs and training opportunities. He 
therefore switched to working with computers and opened his own company. 
How do Muslims living in non-Muslim contexts experience such movement? 
What does visibility refer to in their case? What is public in all that?  
Visibility and publicity have become fashionable words. But where do 
they become visible, and what makes them visible? Beards and veils are 
perhaps the most easy markers for recognizing Muslims walking in the 
street—just as membership in an Islamic association or one’s presence in a 
mosque makes one a Muslim in the eyes of French sociologists. Yet this does 
not mean they are the only Muslims we should consider. Can belief be traced 
in behavior? If one fasts, is one then a Muslim?29 What about money and 
religion, economy and religious belief?30 If one does not eat pork, is one then 
a Muslim?31 The practices linked with religious beliefs are social acts that 
give a sociological dimension to belief. This connects practices not only with 
rituals, but with making decisions, raising the children, being part of a work 
environment, socializing, voting, and so forth; that is, religious beliefs should 
be traced in situations other than exclusively denominational ones, even if as 
motives they are always inferred rather than observed (Lenclud 1990). No one 
believes in the same way as another, even within the same realm of significa-
tions and symbols. Moreover, as in the case of the five persons at the core of 
this research, practice and convictions vary from one individual to another, 
even though such variations are not always well accepted. So investigating 
beliefs as part of the social positioning of individuals also means looking at 
the degree of pluralism accepted within a given community of belief.  
                                                                                                                                               
18 years old, Malian parents, during a focus group in a classroom, professional 
high school, Mantes la ville, April 5, 2005).  
28  Some events appear to be more central than others in sustaining the emergence 
of specific representations in European public opinion. The Iranian revolution 
was one of these central episodes, launching in particular a specific iconography 
of how Muslims look. This process of “publicization” continued through other 
events, wars, terrorist attacks, and suicide bombings; 9/11 was just one of them.  
29  In certain neighborhoods, non-Muslims fast during Ramadan (see Ville 2004). 
30  For an ethnographic and more anthropological point of view on the halal 
business, see the study by Laurence Bergeaud-Blackler, 2004. 
31  In a study I am conducting in public schools and public services providing the 
people with catering services, the emergence of the category of sans porc or pas 
de porc kids.  
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The reference to the notion of “visibility” has some methodological con-
sequences. The identification and localization of Muslims remain almost 
exclusively associated with the existence of organized (institutionalized) 
visible structures, mostly based on authoritative relationships. When visiting 
these places, individuals perform as Muslims, for insiders and outsiders. Of 
my five discussion partners, three have been or are still members or such 
structures. Larbi is a leading imam in a mosque and the head of a cultural-
religious center. Morad was for six years the president of a local association of 
Muslims that he helped to create. Lila is a founding member of the association 
against Islamophobia. Yet, neither Yasmina neither Kenza go to mosque in 
Paris. Both prefer to visit churches. One’s profession to be a Muslim and 
one’s performance do not correspond to similar identifications. Indeed, 
identifying Muslims on the basis of their membership in a Muslim association 
does not give much information about the nature of their commitment. It 
rather ascribes people an identification to a religious group. On the one hand, 
it gives priority to organized forms of belonging that of course trace the 
existence of the belief in the real world. On the other hand, it focuses only on 
the margins of European Muslims’ performances as Muslims. Thus, one 
important issue is the relation between performing as a believer (showing 
one’s belonging to a religious community) and declaring one’s faith (believ-
ing). Second, is it possible for religion to exist outside its institutional defini-
tion? In other words, is a Muslim in France allowed to follow other paths to 
exist as a citizen than the one performed by the visible institutional sites 
linked to his or her religion? 
Moreover, visibility is an interactive phenomenon. A person becomes 
visible to others in a context in which the codes of behavior and patterns of 
attitudes are quite precisely determined. Wearing a headscarf makes one 
visible to people who do not share its meaning, in a society where it does not 
refer to common cultural and religious values. By wearing a headscarf, 
Muslims girls perform as Muslims.32 But wearing a Muslim headscarf in 
public schools makes one visible in France in a different way than it does in 
the United Kingdom.33 It also makes one visible in a Muslim society in which 
                                                 
32  Here I should add that most of the veiled Muslims interviewed about their 
experience of wearing the headscarf in non-Muslim contexts expressed a wish 
for an “invisible headscarf,” meaning one not noticed by others and not produc-
ing a distinction. I thank Anne-Sophie Lamine for having reminded me of this 
paradox.  
33  For instance, since April 2001 the Metropolitan Police in London have accepted 
hijab as a uniform option for Muslim women serving in the police force as part 
of a broader message that Muslim values are valued within the force. This may 
be different since the terrorist bombings in July 2005, but it also depends on 
local appreciation. In Nottingham, for instance, a police chief asked his four 
thousand officers to wear green ribbons (“good fair ribbons”) to express solidar-
ity with Muslims fearing persecution after the July bombings in London (see 
Times, August 12, 2005).  
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the public status of religion has come under the control of the political world 
and in which, therefore, symbols that deviate from state-defined orthodoxy in 
terms of religious behavior are publicly stigmatized. This is the case in 
Turkey, for instance. In the post-9/11 (and post-3/1 and post-7/7) context, 
most Muslims living in Europe insist on discretion and respect for their belief 
in the private sphere: they do not want to be visible. The gap between those 
who are effectively visible and those who are not is growing. The majority of 
Muslims living outside Muslim societies prefer invisibility and silence, 
whereas a minority engages on the path to visible, somewhat spectacular (in a 
horrific sense), and noisy actions.34 In itself, this does not reveal any specific-
ity of Islam and Muslims: generally speaking, the activists engaged in defense 
of a cause or the promotion of interests are always a minority. The fact that a 
majority of Muslims do not wish to make of their religious identification 
anything special beyond privacy informs about the discrepancy with the 
public media and political discourse overemphasizing religious determination 
for explaining actions and discourses of “Muslim populations.” 
The emphasis on institutions to understand religion is certainly related to 
two factors: the specificity of the French context of secularization and the way 
the theoretical discussion on public space was shaped. Public space cannot 
only be conceived of as a pure site for deliberation on abstract issues. Its 
theatrical dimension, the dramatic dimensions of some scenes that occur on 
public stage is something that should be taken into consideration when 
thinking about the division between intimacy, private life, and the public 
positioning of Muslims. The fact that in some situations, one may be invited 
to play a role that is not related to one’s convictions and political stance may 
well happen. For instance, in November 2002 my discussion partner Morad 
decided to accept the proposal made by one Islamic Tabligh association to 
take part as their representative in the group sessions preparing the implemen-
tation of the CFCM. In private, Morad describes himself as a “normal Mus-
lim”: “I have values, I believe in certain principles, I want to raise my kids as 
Muslims. But I would find it difficult if my wife would say she wished to 
wear the veil. I just feel that things need to be done by persons who have 
skills, not by the usual illiterates” (interview in Saint Denis, December 2002). 
Morad is not a follower of the Tabligh, nor did he join them in order to sit as 
their representative. He just considered it an opportunity to be present and 
active within the negotiation process. A charismatic speaker, a good specialist 
of the juridical aspects related to the discussion on Islam in France, he also 
felt “the moral obligation not to leave people who would not have been able to 
make their voice heard because they don’t have the knowledge or just because 
they don’t speak French well enough.” 
                                                 
34  In generational terms, both categories include young men and women, better 
educated than their parents, using new languages, having developed skills in 
different domains of knowledge and technology, and having access to the media 
and the political realm (see the chapter by Annalisa Frisina in this volume). 
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Morad played his part, following both his own personal agenda (getting to 
know the minister of the interior, becoming an insider) and defending the 
position of the association. This idea of putting oneself on a stage to perform a 
role and play a scene was the reason why Kenza decided to withdraw from 
politics. Her decision intervened in a very tense context emerging after the 
election of the first CFCM in 2003. Many choruses started to sing in the name 
of the “unrepresented Muslims” in public space, the most active ones being 
the musulmans laïcs.35 These new voices demand a clear distinction between 
politics and religion, but one that does not require sacrificing one’s private 
religious convictions. These profiles of activist are not radically new in the 
French context.36 What is new is their wish to come back as central actors, 
including “Muslim” in their label. To them, religion is not an obligation, but 
rather a free option that any individual, male or female, can choose to adopt or 
to abandon in the course of his or her life. My five discussion partners share 
this sentiment. From the outside, this secular/religious distinction resembles 
the private/public one. It appeals to the idea that going public imposes con-
straints and rules to be respected (e.g., conventions, laws, codes, and symbols 
specific to the French context), while at the same time not canceling all 
cultural peculiarities of the individuals nor reducing believers to the ritual 
dimensions of their faith.  
Kenza’s recent choice (2003) to retreat from any form of political com-
mitment is the result of a multifaceted decision. She had experiences in 
different political forums, right and left, with similar outcomes in both cases: 
 
“I agree to be an activist if I am entitled to talk. The problem people of my genera-
tion are facing is that we are not accepted in the competition, whether it be political 
                                                 
35  Many initiatives were launched under this label: the Conseil Français des 
Musulmans Laïcs (the French Council for Laïc Muslims), led by Amo Ferhati 
and Tokia Saïfi (the latter used to be a minister in a previous Chirac government, 
both are members of the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire [UMP] party); 
the Convention laïque pour l’égalité des droits et la participation des musulmans 
de France (Laïc Convention for Equality of Rights and Participation of Muslims 
from France), under the presidency of Yazid Sabeg, another prominent figure of 
the UMP and a businessman who in 2004 authored a report on affirmative action 
and discrimination in employment (directly inspired by the Jewish Representa-
tive Council for Jewish Institutions in France [i.e., the Conseil représentatif is-
raélite de France]); the Mouvement des musulmans laïcs de France (Movement 
of Laïc Muslims from France), founded by Rachid Kaci and Djida Tazaït. Kaci 
belongs to the ultra-liberal side of the UMP party. Tazaït was an activist for the 
Green Party and for a time was elected to a European deputy position for the 
same party. She created a local association for young Arabs based in Lyon, the 
Independent Laïc Movement, and the Coordination for Democrat Muslims. See 
Frégosi 2004, 2005. 
36  Earlier in the 1970s and 1980s, similar profiles could be found in civic move-
ments, human rights and antiracist associations, leftist organizations. What is 
more surprising is their rightist orientation while they would have been rather 
committed in left parties in the 1980s (see Geisser 1997). 
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or social. So long as we stayed in our cellars and our neighborhoods, we were 
tolerated as citizens. Now that we want to speak up, now that we have skills and 
competencies, and equality finally amounts to something, we are labeled as Muslims 
to make us feel that we are not yet there. In particular when it comes to public 
agencies: they see Muslims everywhere! One should stop that. People need to be 
looked at differently.”  (Kenza, discussion in May 2004)  
 
The articulation between religious self-definition (regardless of how regularly 
one practices) and politics can take various forms. In some cases, it serves the 
interests of an individual willing to be elected or chosen as a representative 
within political parties. It also can be purely strategic and opportunistic. 
Morad explains his decision to take on a Tabligh disguise also as his desire to 
promote his personal interests in getting access to prominent figures of the 
ruling party (e.g., Nicolas Sarkozy and the members of his cabinet). His main 
motivation remains his local political career (“I will end up as a mayor”). 
Morad plays the gambler’s game. He went up to the office of the minister, 
negotiating with him a position at the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(UMP), “frightening him. In his department [a neighborhood of Paris], I told 
him: ‘Mister Minister, you’d better not treat us badly. We can make a differ-
ence with the ethnic electorate! You have to deal with us now’” (discussion in 
Le Bourget, April 2003). 
But it can also reflect general discomfort related to the public stigmatiza-
tion of Muslims, to the greater tendency to see an Islamist behind every 
Muslim, or even to the difference of treatment between Jews and Muslims. 
The omnipresence of an unhappy public discourse on Islam and Muslims 
interferes with positioning oneself as a Muslim in a network of activism, 
among Muslims as well as in other types of civic and political activities. In 
that sense, expressing oneself as a Muslim on public occasions depends also 
upon the existence of positive or negative perceptions in the immediate 
surroundings. 
The desire to act as a laic Muslim in the French public sphere is common 
to the generation that is around forty to fifty years old, and can be summarily 
described as the former “beur generations” (the ones that went to the streets in 
the 1980s to defend equality for the children of immigrants and mostly kept 
away from mobilization in religious terms).37 They have strong anti-Islamist 
positions and denounce all associations and initiatives that can be suspected of 
having links with Muslim Brotherhood or radical movements. In that sense, 
they can be compared to the secular/Muslim line that divides the Turkish 
communities living in Germany (see the chapter by Gökçe Yurdakul in this 
volume). To them, religion should not be made a visible sign for recognition 
and distinction. It should be kept a private choice. They position themselves as 
representative of an elite that wish to get recognition for its competence, 
speaking out their religious feelings more in cultural terms. They consider 
                                                 




themselves as the voices of the silent majority of Muslims in France, those 
who do not feel attached to the newly created CFCM. On the French scene, 
they demand an increase in the number of antidiscriminatory practices and 
policies, but also improved protection of the public image of Muslims and an 
active fight against all forms of Islamism and radicalism (most of them were 
in favor of the March 2004 law on religious symbols). They also claim to 
represent the common and anonymous Muslim, the one who is never shown 
on television because his or her life does not correspond to the dominant 
stereotypes. The emergence of this new category of Muslims has attracted 
attention: they indeed represent the alliance of supposedly antithetic identities 
(i.e., Muslim and republican), and claim the right to live this identity publicly, 
making no secret of it (Morad), but also without using it systematically as an 
entry ticket to politics (Kenza).  
This positioning, defended in particular by Morad and Kenza, questions 
the coexistence of plural forms of believing and belonging to a religious 
family. Grace Davie’s famous distinction, elaborated on the basis of her study 
of British society, perfectly conveys the tensions that each of my five speakers 
experienced at certain stages: You may believe, but not belong. This is 
illustrated by Kenza’s life history. She defines herself first as an Arab and a 
Muslim, and has an unusual family history. Her family has lived in France 
since the end of the nineteenth century. She was born in Marseille. Her mother 
died when she was six years old, and she was raised by the second wife of her 
father (“my second mother,” as she calls her). She has three brothers and was 
educated in a private Catholic school. 
 
“My father kept telling me not to go to the Arab part of Marseille. He said Arab men 
make no distinction between streetlamps and women. We lived in a part of Marseille 
where we were alone in our situation. The women of my family have always been 
extremely committed politically. My mother joined the resistance against the French 
military in Algeria. All of the women in her family went to school and university, 
married whomever they wanted to. So when I started my studies in sociology, I was 
not perceived as an eccentric but as a very normal girl.”  
 
Living in Paris, raising her child alone—“You know how men are. My 
daughter’s father got tired all of a sudden when she was born. So I told him: ‘I 
don’t need you.’”—she defines her belonging to Islam not in terms of prac-
tice.  
 
“I never enter a mosque. I hate those places. I’d rather go to churches. And I take my 
daughter with me. That’s where I pray. They are to me normal places for praying. 
After all, I spent my entire education in Catholic institutions, so I could not betray 
those who have contributed to my education! So I tell my daughter that we are 
visiting these places out of courtesy.”  (Paris, June 2004) 
 
Assuming a clear distance from the institutions of the religious Muslim 
community in France, Yasmina, coming from a very different background, 
shares a similar relationship to other denominations, in particular to parochial 
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Catholic communities. During Christmas of 2004, while she was earning 
money wrapping up gifts in a luxury shop in Paris, she had her lunch everyday 
beside the chapel of the closest church. Talking about how she came to be 
interested in getting to know her religion better, she spoke of the various 
encounters she had with people from other faiths (including Buddhists and 
Jews) who helped her to move towards more spirituality in her daily life. 
Working in the center of Paris, she goes to the closest church during Ramadan 
to sit, pray, and meditate during her lunch break. She wears a medallion 
representing Maria, which she always hides when visiting her family. 
  
“They would ask me too many questions and would not be able to understand me. 
They are not that spiritual, even as Muslims. They would all think I’m weird. But I 
bring my nephew [age four] to church, and I explain to him the meanings of the 
architecture, of the paintings.” 
  
In France, at a strictly institutional level, there can be no doubt about the 
primacy of the polity and the marginal character of the public role of religion. 
As an individual, one’s choice of worldview becomes optional, with religion 
being pushed out of the political center. But at a personal level, it is also 
anchored in emotions and affects that may connect an individual to other 
traditions and cultures (Yasmina and Kenza), without pushing them out of 
their community of belief. Kenza constantly repeats to her daughter that she is 
not like her classmates. When dealing with religious beliefs, institutions 
appear to be the way to domesticate a system of symbols, practices, and 
messages that otherwise would escape (Favret-Saada 1994). It is true that the 
institutionalization of Islam in France through the creation of the CFCM 
makes it socially viable and politically acceptable. But at the same time, the 
public visibility of Islam becomes a problem in French society not so much in 
terms of its institutional existence, as when it is “carried by corporeal per-
formances and self-presentations rather than by textualized forms of subjectiv-
ities and discursive practices” (Göle 2002, 183).  
 
 
Going Publ ic  as  an  Everyday Cit izen   
 
Is there a path that enables one to consider Muslims as participating, as being 
excluded, as elaborating strategies in order to gain access to the public sphere, 
independent of institutional structures? International frameworks of course 
interfere with national and local representations of Muslims. Since 9/11, for 
instance, the dichotomy between good and bad Muslims as competing catego-
ries has emerged more strongly as a central archetypal construction dominat-
ing the political international arena (Bonnefoy 2003) and determining policy-
makers’ decision-making.38 Nationally, non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslims 
                                                 
38  The categorization of “good and bad Muslims” may remind one of “good and 
bad nationalism.” “At the core of each instance, as it is generally understood, is 
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are very much influenced by the way specific controversies unfold. In France, 
since 1989 the headscarf controversies have constituted the epicenter for the 
pattern of conflicts involving Muslims. The notion of a “public” therefore has 
to be considered in its complexity and as encompassing at least three levels of 
meaning. First, it refers to the idea of a concrete audience. In our case, a 
legitimate question could be to inquire about the existence of a “Muslim 
public.” This is the audience Yasmina met during her job at La Villette, the 
persons whom Lila is trying to defend and protect. Second, the notion of a 
public entails a reference to a social totality (e.g., France as a nation). This is 
the political space in which Morad projects his future career as mayor of a city 
north of Paris, where he lives. Third, it refers to a public coming into being in 
relation with the circulation of discourses (written or not). For instance, public 
space is also a space where different discourses of identity circulate, compete, 
and sometimes clash with each other (Bayart 1996; Calhoun 1991). It is a 
space where some collective identities are accepted and tolerated more easily 
than others. Some are never accepted. In this respect, Kenza explains that 
 
“one day, my daughter returned home, saying somebody at school told her she was a 
‘dirty Arab’ (sale arabe). Some weeks before, a boy at school told another one that 
he was a ‘dirty Jew’ (sale juif). In the latter case, the school administration and the 
parents demanded that the boy be punished; he was sent to the discipline committee. 
In the former, they just asked me not to say anything.”  
 
In their perspective, being a Muslim and expressing it in public has a cost, 
sometimes with social and economic consequences, and even physical ones. 
Larbi was arrested in August 1994 on the order of the then minister of the 
interior, Charles Pasqua. He was charged with threatening the republic and 
supporting Groupe Islamique Armé and Front Islamique du Salut activists in 
France. He was sent to jail, where he stayed one month. Soon, an important 
campaign of support was organized by scholars, academics, and journalists 
who were familiar with his activities in the mosque. Once he regained his 
freedom, he was asked not to leave the neighborhood for five months. In that 
context, he launched his social and cultural activities, adding to the ritual 
religious activities an array of conferences to take place once a month on 
Saturdays. Over the last ten years the Saturday afternoon conferences of the 
Rue de Tanger mosques have become an institutional gathering where Mus-
lims and non-Muslims, religious authorities, academics, and opinion-makers 
make presentations and hold discussions in front of an audience of men and 
women, younger and older persons, whether French-speaking or not. The 
                                                                                                                                               
an ethnic solidarity that triumphs over civility and liberal values and ultimately 
turns to horrific violence.” Nationalism could be replaced by Islamism. Calhoun 
(2002, 150) continues: “To treat nationalism as a relic of an earlier order, a sort 
of irrational expression, or a kind of moral mistake is to fail to see both the con-
tinuing power of nationalism as a discursive formation and the work—
‘sometimes positive’—that nationalist solidarities continue to do in the world.” 
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topics covered are as varied as the protection of youngsters from drugs, 
equality and justice in democratic societies, what can be done against AIDS, 
the reform of Islam, and solidarity in a global world. Larbi usually acts as the 
host and stays out of the discussion, which lasts most of the afternoon; he 
reintegrates his role of imam in the very last minutes in order to make con-
cluding remarks. Larbi has created his own, sometimes extremely controver-
sial, public forum of discussion, in which he appears at the beginning and the 
end of the meeting to perform a sermon.  
 
“What my time in jail changed for me was my relation to politics. Not to culture or 
French civilization. I have asked myself, ‘Why did France do that to me?’ I think the 
answer is pretty much linked with reciprocal ignorance. I often say to my fellows 
that France and Islam coexist only geographically. The challenge to all of us, 
Muslims and non-Muslims, is to transform this geographical proximity into a 
historical proximity. That is to say, building up something together. To produce 
history. Giving a true meaning to history. And that can only happen with meetings, 
opportunities to come together and discuss. Otherwise, you stay in your tiny little 
corner, and I’ll never know you. And if you don’t know me, you’ll end up having 
wrong ideas and projections of who you think I am.” 
  
There are, of course, different ways of showing one’s identity as a Muslim. It 
may be done in the framework of recognition of a faith-oriented perspective: 
“We Muslims demand our rights as believers.” The discourse is in this case a 
plea for the equality of all citizens. This is pretty much the position assumed 
by Larbi within his mosque, which was first accommodated in the 1970s in a 
small Paris church (Ménilmontant). Another type of discourse among Mus-
lims in France insists on the right to be treated free of stigmatization: “You 
don’t need to address my Muslim identity.” Morad, for instance, defends his 
right to be treated as a citizen with no marker. Laughing, he mentioned once 
on the phone a comment by his son (five years old at that time), refusing to go 
to Arabic courses and arguing, “Papa, I am not an Arab!” This position is 
grounded in the interaction with a secular and republican laic tradition. A third 
position is the one held by individuals who are sometimes also members of 
associations and who defend the standpoint of “We are not the same as you.” 
They articulate a will to have their rights as believers recognized, but argue in 
favor of recognition by state authorities and non-Muslim French citizens of 
the specificity of their history and moral values. In the more radical version, it 
may even end up with a minority community discourse. None of my discus-
sion partners is defending that position, even if Lila’s activism can be related 
to it. The commitment behind the banner of “fight against Islamophobia” 
belongs to a strategy of denunciation, accusation, claims-making, naming of 
adversaries, and a definition of the self that gives meaning to the actions of the 
Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France. In parallel, the decision to act as a 
collective should be conceived of as part of the institution of a specific public 
order. In this perspective, going public means that one accepts to perform on a 
stage, a theater where dramas are shown and where actors accept to perform 
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according to certain rules. In the fight against Islamophobia and religious 
discrimination, the case is easy as it is mostly a discourse based on a strong 
dichotomy between victims and criminals articulated along a line of acts that 
goes from injuries to murder. The fact that discrimination is mostly defined in 
legal terms seems at first to be a facilitator. But as Lila says, “We cannot limit 
our activities to the legal arena. It is also a political fight” (interview, Novem-
ber 2004).  
The ability to share grievances with other communities, other groups of 
victims remains in fact open and for now unsolved. The “fight against Islamo-
phobia” discourse remains quite isolated, in the field of the broader antiracism 
discourse (Lila keeps saying that SOS Racisme, a key nongovernmental 
organization in the fight against racism, demonstrated hostility towards the 
Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France on many public occasions, accus-
ing them of being fascists), but also more largely in the television and press 
arena. For instance, no alliance or even comparative perspectives have for the 
moment been elaborated with anti-Semitism and the situation of Jews in 
France. On the contrary, Lila but also Kenza and Larbi pointed out, albeit 
differently, their frustration about seeing Muslims and Jews considered 
differently when the issues of racism and exclusion for religious reasons come 
to the fore.39 
Going public is also made possible by the opportunities offered by the 
context and the institutional landscape. Therefore, the notion of public space 
needs to be explored by keeping in mind at least two dimensions. It is first a 
public space for visibility where social actors play their public role, represent 
themselves in front of the others. In a way, it is the sensitive dimension of 
public space, the one that gives opportunity to all participants to consider 
otherness. The experience of pluralism is indeed central in debating Muslim 
identity in non-Muslim societies where social control on religion-related 
practices is relatively smooth. Pluralism among Muslims is something hardly 
discussed among Muslims themselves. Yasmina, for instance, had the follow-
ing experience when she was organizing a visit to the Grande Mosquée de 
Paris with a guided tour provided by the Algerian mosque administration: 
 
“The man who was guiding the group of persons I had brought to the mosque was 
not very well prepared. Among the visitors, I had brought some particularly difficult 
students almost excluded from school, and they gave him a hard time during the 
visit by being noisy and making stupid comments. But I felt offended when he told 
me in front of them that I was not a good Muslim because I had just said to one of 
the students—who then repeated it to him—that eating halal food was not an 
obligation.”  
 
                                                 
39  This is a central postcolonial issue in the current French context. On the “victims 
competition,” see Chaumont, 1997. On the postcolonial context, see Liauzu, 
2005. 
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The debate over being a good or a bad Muslim is seen by my discussion 
partners less in terms of theological good and bad behavior than in relation to 
a broader assessment of what effects on others good practices can produce. It 
therefore appears to be extremely difficult to precisely assess the deep signifi-
cance of the decision to work as a lawyer in a Muslim association: Is the 
motivation based on the sense of community and can it be at the same time 
related to a commitment to social justice, therefore carrying a political 
meaning? Here the reader should not be confused between what my discus-
sion partners say about their own commitment (whether it is Muslim, whether 
it is public) and what the sociologist qualifies as such. In most of the inter-
views, they make no distinction between what seems to be conceived of as 
irreconcilable proposals in the French republican context. The same question 
remains open while trying to identify the motives of Larbi’s preaching, the 
reason why Morad prefers to employ Muslims and the children of migrants, or 
when Yasmina helps to organize interreligious dialogue conferences. Acting 
backstage, my five discussion partners avoid politics and even proclaim their 
inability to affect others’ life courses. Even when they express their awareness 
of the broader public debate on Islam in France, their remain at a distance 
from it or at least minimize their potential effect on it. Nina Eliasoph’s work 
on parents volunteering in anti-drugs groups is enlightening here, as she 
evokes similar attitudes of “silencing public-spirited political conversation” 
that she considers to be a paradoxical  
 
“way of looking out for the common good. […] Volunteers work embodied, above 
all, an effort aimed at convincing themselves and others that the world makes sense, 
and that regular people can really make a difference. […] Community-spirited 
citizens judged that by avoiding ‘big’ problems, they could better buoy their 
optimism. But by excluding politics from their group concerns, they kept their 
enormous, overflowing reservoir of concern and empathy, compassion and altruism, 
out of circulation, limiting its contribution to the common good.”  (Eliasoph 1998, 63)  
 
In the French context, some Muslim associations try to organize their own 
arena for discussing the articulation between being a Muslim and being a 
citizen of a non-Muslim society. The Union des Organisations Islamiques de 
France is one of these; Tariq Ramadan’s networks also act in a similar 
manner. But in the eyes of my discussion partners, these initiatives are 
excessively based on the interested motivations of leaders. In a way, they do 
not take it for genuine.  
In considering individual, everyday citizens, I share Calhoun’s perspective 
on “the people” in his critique of Habermas’s constitutional patriotism: “It is 
crucial to understand not simply which constitutional arrangements are in 
some abstract sense good, but what makes them have force for specific 
people” (Calhoun 2002, 153). It is also a question of individual identity, 
which produces passions that escape conventional categories of the political. 
The situations in which individuals experience injustice (Lila and Kenza by 
proxy, Larbi more directly) evoke anguish and hardship, which possibly will 
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lead them to commit to somebody or some cause (Morad for the “commu-
nity,” Yasmina for improved understanding of Islam and Muslims). Situated 
arrangements poses as a starting point the claims made by individuals (Bol-
tanski and Thévenot 2000). For the Muslims quoted in this chapter, public 
space or the public sphere is essentially about discourse and interaction. 
Members of a society may join together in the public sphere, performing 
through debates and conversations (Calhoun 2002). Participation is therefore 
not exclusively based on personal connections, and remains open to every-
body. It is supposed to include everyone within the field at stake (Warner 
2002). Public space is thus a scene of performance, a stage where individuals 
perform a role that may be composed of several profiles. This refers to 
situated practices: working on the coming to public of Muslims takes as point 
of departure the observation of situated practices. Public space is an arena 
where one fights for the defense of one’s identity and its related positions, but 
it is also a place where one performs in front of a public (Cefaï 2003)—as 
Yasmina did during the exhibition at La Villette and Larbi does during the 
Saturday conferences he organizes in his mosque. Leaving the floor open to 
people whose views he may not share, Larbi nevertheless keeps for himself 
the concluding remark and plays his authoritative role of preacher and moral 
guide for the Muslims sitting in the conference room, encouraging them to be 
“active citizens and active, enlightened Muslims” (personal observation 
during a conference in June 2003). This towering position does not systemati-
cally result in communication between divergent voices or opinions expressed 
in different registers (e.g., religion, faith, and theology facing political and 
secular questions). The absence of communication among Muslims them-
selves is absolutely dominating the public dimension of the debate, not only in 
Larbi’s mosque. “People may live side by side and have no sense of closeness 
fostered through privileged knowledge of everyday details […]. Rather they 
may feel trapped together as strangers who know nothing of each other’s inner 
worlds” (Jamieson 1998, 8). 
Connecting these remarks with the dominant narratives mentioned earlier, 
I would argue that the borders delimitating what is private and what can be 
publicized seem to have been displaced. Dominique Mehl (2003) evokes a 
process through which social deliberation is defined by the private space of 
personal conversation. Society speaks to itself in this articulation between 
private and public. This is facilitated by the increasing number of discussions 
touching upon personal stories, upon affective and emotional episodes. 
Everybody knows the other exists. However, the direct confrontation of minds 
and divergent opinions never takes place. Comparison is made possible 
between different lifestyles (Bouzar and Kada 2003) and modes of behavior, 
thereby rejecting or establishing norms. These singular narratives speak and 
echo each other. Public space appears as a space for experiencing and testing 
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difference in the way one lives as a Muslim.40 Public presence brings value to 
singular voices, illustrating various paths of authentic ways of living. This 
“extreme individualization of examples” (Mehl 2003, 492) takes place in a 
moment of unprecedented exposure to public stories through the mass media 
(Jamieson 1998). The idea behind this narrative form is, “I am not the only 
one in this case. My life is the same as hundreds and thousands of others.” 
The content is thus considered to be representative. But on the question of 
knowing whether the discussion encourages reflection among Muslims in 
France, the answer is rather that it facilitates the superimposition of opinions. 
“In these public spaces, identities and lifestyles are performed, contested and 
implemented” (Yavuz 2004, 223).41 
 
 
Conclus ion:  Invis ib le  but  Publ ic ly  Act ive  Musl ims  
 
Based on the life experiences and challenges that Larbi, Morad, Kenza, Lila, 
and Yasmina related to me, this chapter focused on individual voices. Hap-
hazard as such a choice must remain, it helps to describe the many forms 
taken in a process of commitment as Muslims in France. Insisting on particu-
larities, on snapshots, rather than relying on the feeling of security that comes 
from working on association, is of course a slippery option for an author. 
Highlighting the silent Muslim majority occurred to me a necessity, even if it 
remains difficult to grasp. I thus do not want to generalize my findings. 
Rather, I make a claim for singular experiences, for the need to describe 
individual itineraries. 
In public space that remains fundamentally secular, four aspects are cen-
tral in the five itineraries. The first one is that the classic division of social 
worlds into private and public is insufficient to gain an understanding of the 
multiple and fragmented aspects of individuals’ everyday lives, even though 
reading public space as a theater and emphasizing the notion of stage and 
performance remain of relevance in case studies. The second one stems from 
the observation that public engagement cannot be limited and restricted to an 
associative membership. From one moment to the next, through changing 
one’s place or situation, the meanings given by individuals to their self-
definition as Muslims vary. Each of them is able to articulate different means 
to become engaged. They may have as an objective for discourse and action 
the “Muslim public” (e.g., Larbi when he is preaching, Yasmina when she is 
                                                 
40  Pluralism does not exist unless it is concretely experienced, such as on the day 
of Eid ul-Adha, when different communities of Muslims meet for the first time 
in front of the slaughtering house, and do not bring all the same animals to 
slaughter.  
41  This point recalls Mehl’s observation (2003) about the nature of discussion in 
television programs dealing with intimate issues. Rather than a proper discussion 
including divergent views on different ways of life, the shows explicitly rely on 
a superimposition of different opinions and lifestyles.  
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explaining what Islam is to youngsters visiting the exhibition, Lila fighting 
against Islamophobia), non-Muslims (Kenza arguing with her daughter’s 
teachers, Yasmina organizing interreligious conferences), or a local commu-
nity (Morad employing Arab Muslims from the area in which he lives when 
he launched his firm) as a framework for justifying their commitment. The 
ways each of them define the representation of his or her commitment do not 
end in a unique imaginary, even if in linguistic terms Islam may appear to the 
external observer to be a similar link to a common social and cultural imagi-
nary.42 In these diverse situations, being a Muslim and acting and speaking as 
such do not mean the same thing from one person to the next, from one place 
to the next, from one moment to the next. The third aspect regards the need to 
take a broader view of the activist’s individual trajectory, seeing it not so 
much as a linear career, but rather as an experience primarily developed on the 
basis of interactions that may create breaks, generate affects (in all directions), 
or provoke a shift from one type of discourse to another, from commitment to 
silence (Kenza), or the other way around (Yasmina and Lila). The fourth 
aspect concerns biographical dimensions and the need for careful description 
in order to map the complexity of the repertoires and discourses that an 
individual can draw from to tell his or her story. 
This chapter reflects an ambiguous configuration in which Muslims in 
France currently find themselves. On the one hand, they have made their 
coming out in the sense of demonstrating their ability to make their voices 
heard in a context of political interest in their involvement.43 This develop-
ment is not restricted to the French context, but can be seen in the so-called 
growing international visibility of Islam on the international and national 
scenes: “Islamic social movements represent the ‘coming out’ of private 
Muslim identity in public spaces” (Yavuz 2004, 223). On the other hand, 
hostility towards Islam is growing; the public discourse relayed by the media 
is ill-informed and contributes to the diffusion of stereotypes and reductionist 
views of the religion and its believers. In this context, a focus on individuals is 
the only level that enables a description of situations where one can pose the 
question “What does it mean to be a Muslim?” 
The silent majority, the invisible Muslims, those who “do adapt without 
problems” (Roy 2005, 166), should not be too quickly reduced to “absentees 
of public space” just because they have no words and no organization to 
represent them (Mehl 2003, 495). In this chapter, I illustrated how some 
individuals have chosen different forms of commitment that do not follow the 
expected associative structures. They represent other ways of having a voice. 
By the end of this chapter, some echoes of the silent majority of Muslims 
                                                 
42  The idea of Islam playing the role of a link for an imaginary bond is advanced 
by Nilüfer Göle, for instance, when she speaks about the tie between “sozial 
entwurtzelten Muslimen,” or “socially uprooted Muslims” (2004, 17). 
43  I used the wording “coming out” once in an interview for the newspaper 
Libération and received a phone call from Larbi the next day, congratulating me 
on the adapted wording. 
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living in France have reached us. How do individuals autonomous from the 
sphere of institutionalized religion have their intimate and private convictions 
go public? The sample at the core of this text was supposed to open up 
readings about Muslims in France which escape organized, institutional, and 
visible frameworks, illustrating how one comes to terms with plurality within 
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Nadia Fadil 
“WE SHOULD BE WALKING QURANS”: 
THE MAKING OF AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL SUBJECT 
Introduct ion   
 
Recent events and developments such as the attacks in New York and Ma-
drid, the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, the Islamic terrorist 
threat, and the emergence of Islam in the Western European public sphere 
have led to an increased interest in Islam in the Western world, which is 
seeking explanations for what is going on. While many have turned to 
polarizing, Huntingtonian visions in which Islam and Muslims are framed as 
the new enemy, others, in the hope of avoiding such polarization, have hoped 
to find “new” Islamic leaders who are able to offer “new” discourses and 
approaches to Islam and citizenship. Questions of representation and leader-
ship are important not only for a broader Western European public; they are 
crucial for Muslims themselves.  
In this chapter I focus on a group of young Muslim professionals who are 
actively engaged in issues of representation and citizenship. Three years ago, 
some younger members of the Union of Mosque and Islamic Organisations of 
Antwerp (UMIVA) decided to organize a conference in response to the 
negative representation of Islam in the aftermath of 9/11. Faced with an 
increasing level of Islamophobia and stereotypical representations of Islam, 
they came up with the idea of organizing “Treasures of Islam,” a conference 
on the scientific contributions of medieval Islam. In the process of preparation 
for the conference, new members—both men and women—were attracted, 
resulting in the establishment of a stable group of young professionals within 
the existing umbrella organization.  
This chapter focuses on how some of the members frame their political 
and religious involvement in this working group. The working group is 
characterized by its explicit references to Islam, which plays a prominent role 
in both a normative framework and a framework for defining identity. I 
attempt to describe and analyze how the engagement of the members of the 
working group is an expression of the creation and performance of an Islamic 
political subject. By questioning the existing and dominant representations of 
Muslims on the one hand, and by articulating an alternative, politicized 
discourse on the self on the other, the members of the working group process 
and construct a particular vision of their identity. Identity politics refers to 
collective actions that aim not only at accessing equal rights but also at 
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questioning and refusing imposed or prescribed identities (Calhoun 1994, 21). 
After briefly situating and presenting the working group, I discuss how the 
challenging of dominant essentialist discourses on Muslims involves the 
articulation of and reliance on alternative, but equally essentialist, accounts. 
In the third section I focus in more detail on the group’s discourse of active 
citizenship and how it relates to dominant accounts of this issue.  
 
 
The UMIVA Working  Group  
 
In 1974 Islam was recognized as the third official religion in Belgium. This 
year also ushered in both the end of the large-scale Belgian labor immigration 
policy, which attracted workers from North Africa, Turkey, and the southern 
Mediterranean, and the worldwide oil crisis. It is estimated that around 
400,000 Muslims now live in Belgium, and that this group is mainly com-
posed of Moroccan and Turkish nationals (Landman 2002, 100). Initially, 
most Muslim immigrants were located in the coal-mining regions of Le 
Borinage, Liege, and Limburg. Bigger cities like Brussels and Antwerp also 
attracted a large number of Muslims in the early 1970s, when alternative 
industries such as metallurgy and car assembly were developed in these 
regions. The working group upon which this chapter focuses is situated in the 




Institutional and Political Setting 
 
The city of Antwerp has a history of migration and international contacts due 
to its international port and diamond trade (Bousetta 2001, 144). Moroccans 
make up the highest share of non-nationals among the overall average of 
13.3 % for non-nationals (4.6 % for Moroccans; 1.5 % for Turks). Due to the 
increasing number of naturalizations, however, it is difficult to estimate the 
number of Moroccan Muslims actually residing in the city (Peleman 2002, 
115).2 Antwerp is home to a variety of contradictory political and sociological 
trends, making the city an interesting setting for observing multicultural 
developments.  
One striking characteristic of the city is the presence of an extreme right-
wing political party, previously called Vlaams Blok and recently renamed 
Vlaams Belang. With its 33 % of the votes in the last municipal elections 
                                                 
1  DIA-Antwerp, November 2004, http://www.antwerpen.be/feitenencijfers/diver-
siteit//. 
2  Estimates vary between 20 % and 25 %. According to the city of Antwerp, “new 
Belgians” (naturalized Belgians) and non-nationals represented 22.1 % of the 
city’s population in 2005 (http://www.antwerpen.be/feitenencijfers/demografie/ 
diversiteit.htm).  
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(2000), it is the largest party in Antwerp.3 After its major electoral break-
through in 1994, a cordon sanitaire was formed around Vlaams Blok, 
obliging all other elected political parties to form a “monster coalition” and 
thereby obtain the majority of seats needed to govern.4 Although kept out of 
the local administration, Vlaams Belang clearly has a great impact on this 
political constellation. To begin with, the composition of divergent political 
parties in city government hampers smooth operation of the coalition, result-
ing in regular crises between the coalition partners, which Vlaams Belang, as 
the only opposition party, eagerly exploits. In addition, the strong presence of 
Vlaams Belang since its political breakthrough in the late 1980s has influ-
enced the political positions and measures proposed and taken up by estab-
lished parties and institutions. Hassan Bousetta has pointed, for instance, to 
the difficulties of building new mosques and the propositions of the Antwerp 
mayor in 1990 to create immigrant-exclusive neighborhoods (2001: 154). 
More recently, knowledge of Dutch has become a criterion in the allocation of 
social housing in Antwerp.5  
As mentioned, the presence of a strong extreme-right party goes hand in 
hand with the broad spectrum of ethnic and economic diversity in the city, 
which has a major port and is one of the leading capitals in the global dia-
mond trade. Among the city’s diverse mix of ethnic and cultural minorities, 
the presence of a strong and visible Chassidic Jewish community is particu-
larly noteworthy.  
As noted, there is also a sizable Islamic community, with Moroccans rep-
resenting the largest ethnic minority from outside the European Union. This 
group is characterized by a weak socioeconomic position and a strong 
concentration in neighborhoods like Borgerhout, where 25 % to 30 % of 
Moroccan nationals live (Peleman 2002, 120).6 This concentration coincides 
with a high level of unemployment, low levels of education, and poor hous-
ing. The highest Flemish unemployment rate is in the city of Antwerp, with 
32 % of the unemployed 18- to 29-year-olds of Moroccan origin.7 A majority 
of pupils of Moroccan origin do not finish their secondary schooling, and 
                                                 
3  The last regional elections of June 13, 2004, only confirmed its leading position, 
with 34 % of the votes in the city of Antwerp.  
4  This coalition included the SP, VLD, Agalev, CVP, and VU. Only the small 
party Waardig Oud Worden (WOW), with its one seat on the council, was not 
included (Bousetta 2001, 153).  
5  The newspaper De Standaard reported on December 30, 2004, on agreements 
made between several social-housing companies to refuse social housing to peo-
ple who do not speak Dutch.  
6  Borgerhout is often cynically called “Borgerokko,” in reference to the consider-
able Moroccan community in this neighborhood.  





persons of Moroccan origin are only marginally present in higher education.8 
Moreover, only 1.6 % of the Moroccans in Belgium live in houses of good 
quality (Bousetta 2001, 102).  
 
 
Snapshots of Moroccan Civil Society 
 
These weak social conditions are combined with relatively active and diverse 
social and political activities. Four types of organizations within Moroccan 
civil society in Antwerp can be differentiated.9 The first is small-scale and 
locally based ethnic organizations, often established for concrete needs and 
purposes: Arabic/Dutch language courses, homework tutoring, sewing 
lessons, and so forth. These organizations are often gender-segregated and are 
mainly composed of first-generation Moroccans (with the exception of 
homework tutoring). They have no explicit “political agenda,”10 and tend to 
be integrated in the neighborhood.11  
A second type consists of Islamic organizations whose clear aim is da’wa, 
the religious duty of each Muslim to spread the message of Islam.12 They tend 
to organize Arabic language courses, lessons in Islamic history or fiqh, and 
                                                 
8  Data from research carried out at the University of Brussels and the University 
of Antwerp. Further information is available at the following Web site (in 
Dutch): http://www.studentfocus.be/UA%20onderzoek%202004.pdf.  
9  These descriptions are based on observations from my fieldwork for a doctoral 
research project with the working title Secularisation and Individualisation Proc-
esses in the Religiosity of Organised and Non-Organised Moroccan Muslims in 
Antwerp and Brussels (2002–2006). This rough typology does not include 
mosques, but instead is oriented to organizations whose primary function is not 
the organization of Islamic rituals such as prayer. Furthermore, this typology 
focuses only on what Bousetta calls “ethnic organisations,” that is, organizations 
established and run mainly by and for members of the Moroccan community 
(2001, 352). Other ethnic groups or “mixed organizations” are not included.  
10  I use the term “political agenda” to refer to organizations that, among other 
things, act as pressure groups through their interactions and/or their interventions 
in the public sphere and that negotiate with political officials. I am aware of the 
restrictiveness of this definition and concept of what is political (see Mahmood 
2005).  
11  Examples of the first type in the neighborhood of Borgerhout are Nibras (Islamic 
organizations for religious and leisure activities, primarily for women and chil-
dren), El Moustaqbal (a first-generation women’s organization offering sporting 
activities, Dutch classes, and the like), Safina (a first-generation, mainly men’s 
organization, arranging Arabic courses for children and lectures and debates on 
different social topics), and Al Kitaab (a homework tutoring organization, 
mainly run by highly educated second-generation Moroccan Muslims).  
12  This is not to say that the first type of organization is not Islamic. The difference 
lies in their explicit purpose of spreading knowledge about Islam and orienting 
all their activities to this purpose.  
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lectures on various religious themes. They reach a large number of people—
mainly young persons and sometimes people from outside Antwerp—and are 
not involved in the political scene.13  
Third, there are the federations and umbrella organizations with a clear 
political agenda embedded in an institutional logic.14 Established in reaction 
to the paternalistic approach of Belgian integration policies and the political 
interference of Moroccan authorities, these organizations seek more auton-
omy in community affairs. They not only act as unofficial representatives of 
the community in dealing with city officials, but also are called upon during 
times of conflict (Bousetta 2001). In the Ramadan period of November 2002, 
when riots broke out after the racist murder of a locally well-known Islamic 
teacher by his Flemish neighbor, the different federations and umbrella 
organizations were called together to act as intermediaries with the city 
officials and to prepare the teacher’s funeral.  
The last type of organization is an outsider in the Belgian political scene 
because of its outspoken political positions and radical discourse on multicul-
turalism: the Arab European League (AEL). Its noninstitutional logic and 
grassroots approach also differentiate it from the other organization types: 
through its emphasis on popular mobilization and its strategy of pursuing its 
own network of organizations (e.g., in media, scouting, and schooling) within 
the pillared structure of Belgian society, the AEL challenges the established 
institutions as well as the strategies of other Moroccan ethnic organizations.15 
The visibility of the organization reached a national level with the organiza-
tion of civil patrols to check and document the alleged racist behavior of the 
Antwerp police force, as well as with its political positions on Belgian 
integration policy. It gained international attention in November 2002, when 
the leader of the movement, Dyab Abou Jahjah, was held responsible and 
imprisoned for the outburst of riots following the murder of the Islamic 
teacher, only to be released soon afterwards because the case against him was 
weak.16 After a tumultuous year characterized by extensive media coverage, 
                                                 
13  The most prominent example of this type for Antwerp is the Islamic organization 
Jongeren Voor Islam (Youth for Islam). 
14  Three umbrella organizations representing mainly Moroccan ethnic organiza-
tions are based in the city of Antwerp: Federatie van Marokkaanse Vereniging, 
Vereniging voor Ontwikkeling en Emancipatie van de Moslims, and Unie van de 
Moskeeën en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen (UMIVA).  
15  Here I am borrowing from McAdam’s definition of social movements, which 
limits it to “those organized efforts, on the part of the excluded groups, to pro-
mote or resist changes in the structure of society that involve resource to nonin-
stitutional forms of political participation” (1999, 25).  
16  Abou Jahjah’s imprisonment was highly contested not only because the evidence 
against him was weak, but also because of a suspicious entanglement of political 
and judiciary powers: Abou Jahjah’s arrest was preceded by a heated parliamen-
tary debate in which the minister of the interior and the prime minister insisted 
on the need to immediately stop the activities of the AEL.  
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offensive political attacks on the movement, and poor election results,17 the 
AEL was weakened and marginalized in the public arena (see Abou Jahjah 
2003; Jacobs 2003; Fadil 2003; De Witte 2004).  
I stress the importance of this movement because of the impact that its 
discourse, activities, and actions in November 2002 had on the local Antwerp 
setting and on ethnic associations. The rise of the AEL and the climactic 
events in the fall of 2002 led to a number of proposals, formulated by local 
and regional officials, on the different social problems that the Moroccan 
community was facing. Some political parties even spoke of a “Marshall 
Plan” for Borgerhout.18 Moreover, the presence of the AEL had a direct and 
indirect impact on other ethnic organizations and the larger Moroccan 
community. Organizations and Muslims were asked to take a position on (and 
preferably against) the AEL. The organization’s rise led to a stronger political 
and social consciousness among the Moroccan community, which was 
evident both in the increasing number of public debates on socioeconomic 




The UMIVA Working Group: Description and Presentation  
 
Established in 1995, UMIVA brings together mainly Arab-language mosques 
and strives for an active partnership with local and regional officials by acting 
as a representative and mediator for the Moroccan Islamic community.20 The 
members work on themes ranging from issues related to Islamic worship to 
youth issues and social problems. UMIVA also joins other regional mosque 
                                                 
17  The AEL ran in two elections: in the federal elections of May 2003 under the 
open list “RESIST!”, which was an alliance primarily between the AEL and the 
far-left party Partij Van De Arbeid, and in the regional elections of June 2004, 
for which it established the Muslim Democratic Party. The results of both elec-
tions were weak, with 2.32 % in 2003 and only 0.62 % in 2004 for the city of 
Antwerp.  
18  G. Timmerman “Agalev wil een Marshallplan voor Borgerhout,” De Morgen, 
December 2, 2002.  
19  The presence and positions of the AEL also influenced the activities of the 
UMIVA working group. An example is the intervention of UMIVA members in 
the Carim Bouziane affair, a politician of the Green Party. Bouziane announced 
in September 2003, in a documentary on homosexuality in the Islamic commu-
nity, his intention to distribute posters depicting covered Muslim girls kissing 
each other; he planned to distribute these posters in neighborhoods where many 
Muslims live. After the AEL’s sharp reaction and condemnation, which led to a 
small public riot, the group of young UMIVA professionals contacted Bouziane 
in order to convince him to abandon the plan. In the end, however, it was inter-
nal problems in the Green Party which prevented the plan from going through. 
20  The union brings together thirty-five mosques; most of these are Moroccan, with 
the exception of a Chechnyan, a Bosnian, an Afghan, and a Roma mosque.  
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unions in a larger structure that interacts with Flemish and federal officials.21 
The working group presented in this chapter acts within this larger structure, 
but has a quasi-autonomous status. Meetings take place in UMIVA’s meeting 
room and are often attended by the union’s secretary. There is, however, no 
explicit interference of the UMIVA board in the activities and decision-
making of the working group.  
Most male members were already active within UMIVA before the work-
ing group came into being. Informally called “the group of young people” 
(groupes de jeunes in French, or jongerengroep in Dutch), the working group 
began in 2003 as an organizational committee for the conference Treasures of 
Islam. Female members and new external members were attracted to support 
preparations for the conference. What started as an ad hoc working group 
soon became a stable group of professional volunteers meeting on a regular 
basis, discussing societal developments, and organizing activities and pro-
jects. The group is composed mainly of higher educated people and includes 
both sexes. Whereas the women are all second-generation Moroccans born in 
Belgium, the male members comprise second-generation Moroccans as well 
as recently arrived first-generation Moroccans and one converted Muslim. 
There is no official structure within the group, which does not mean that there 
are no key figures.  
The material presented in this chapter was gathered during the months of 
October, November, and December of 2003. At that time, the group had 
existed for almost a year and was busy preparing a large Islamic fair and 
making public interventions on different social and political matters. The 
ethnographic material includes notes taken during three group meetings (on 
October 16, 2003; October 19, 2003; and December 14, 2003), one group 
interview (on November 13, 2003), and individual interviews with five 
members of the group.22 The following description of the group is based 
mainly on the accounts of Fouad, Amina, and Nora. Fouad could be described 
as the “informal” president of the working group. Ever since his migration 
from Morocco to France, and later to Belgium, in order to pursue his studies, 
Fouad has been involved in different Islamic organizations. He was one of the 
main sources of inspiration for the organization of the conference as well as 
for the enlargement of the working group to include female members and 
external members. The second member presented is Amina; born in Belgium, 
she holds a university degree and is currently working as a civil servant. Her 
professional and educational career was always accompanied with civic 
engagement, first in student affairs and later in women’s issues. For several 
years she headed a Muslim women’s organization aimed at deconstructing the 
media’s stereotypical representation of Muslim women and at promoting 
                                                 
21  Umivel (for the province of Limburg) and Umivow (for the province of Eastern 
and Western Flanders).  
22  Although the “strict” gathering of information took place in October, November, 
and December of 2003, some relevant events that occurred after this period also 
will be discussed.  
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equal rights within an Islamic framework. Two other members mentioned are 
Nora, an Islam teacher, and Ahmed, an engineer; both are second-generation 
Moroccans.  
My interviews with the working-group members attempted to trace the 
motivations and reasons for their engagement. The Treasures of Islam 
conference and the plan to organize an Islamic fair reflect the two main lines 
of their engagement: to work against negative and stereotypical representa-
tions of Muslims and to empower Muslims who too often find themselves in 
weak socioeconomic conditions and without a strong sense of identity. The 
common thread for all members of the working group is an active reference to 
an Islamic framework. In what follows, I shall show how this active use of 
and reference to Islam is a means to resist and challenge existing stereotypes 
about Muslims and Islam, and how their active discourse on Islamic identity 
constructs and reflects a certain vision of the Islamic subject and its relation to 
the political sphere.  
 
 
Recogni t ion  through New  Representa t ion  
 
One of the main features of identity movements, as Craig Calhoun explains, is 
resistance to imposed identities and the search for recognition and legitimacy 
(1994, 21). Dominant discourses about and representations of particular 
groups are not abstract, but affect and influence the identity formation of the 
concerned subjects and the relationship to outsiders. Hence, questioning and 
challenging dominant representations is of fundamental importance (Jordan 
and Weedon 2000, 170). In this section I show how the conference Treasures 
of Islam, which featured scientific discoveries and advancements made by 
Muslims in the Middle Ages,23 served to deconstruct dominant and stereo-
typical representations of Islam and Muslims.  
 
 
In Search of a New Essence 
 
Nora described the problem of negative representation as follows:  
 
“After 9/11 everything was observed from a negative perspective … Most people, 
whether they have a PhD or a university degree, know Islam only through books or 
the media. And generally it’s only from one specific perspective that things are 
reported. So it’s not real Islam, but more extreme variations of Islam, like the attacks 
that were committed in Bali and America … So they only know that Islam.”  (Nora, 
Islam teacher)  
 
                                                 
23  More information on the conference can be found at the conference Web site: 
http://users.pandora.be/abdelhay/favorite.htm.  
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The problem, according to Nora, is that Islam is systematically considered 
from a negative point of view. To illustrate the reach and dominance of this 
negative representation, she uses two references: “most people” and “people 
with PhDs.” “Most people” stands for broader public opinion, presumably 
non-Islamic, whereas “people with PhDs” counters the idea that this negative 
representation is a matter of ignorance, hence emphasizing that it is a vision 
widely shared by groups with quite different educational backgrounds.  
In order to deconstruct this general idea, she describes existing stereotypes 
as “extreme variations,” which contrast with what she calls “real Islam.” In 
this juxtaposition of real versus extreme, Nora’s account is situated on the 
side of the “real,” whereas “other” accounts of Islam, notably media represen-
tations, are dismissed as being marginal and extreme versions of Islam to 
which only a small group of people adhere.  
Fouad also pursues this line of describing dominant accounts of Islam as 
nonrepresentative and false. The following quotation illustrates how this 
deconstruction of dominant discourse goes together with the establishment of 
an alternative essence and narrative for contemporary Islam, namely, science.  
 
“We thought the best answer was through science. This science was the essence, the 
soul of Islamic civilization. By showing Islam through this perspective … we could 
show people that Islam is not the WTC [World Trade Center], but it’s algorithms, 
it’s Avicenna, it’s people who weaved a whole Islamic civilization lasting for 
centuries and centuries, at the source of a European civilization. Therefore, in a way 
we have our roots in Europe, and we have something in common … On the other 
hand, this scientific approach could also describe our contribution to European 
civilization, which is marginalized in all the educational programs. There are fifteen 
hundred years within the history of humanity which are called the Dark Ages, but for 
us they were enlightened years.”  (Fouad, scientist) 
 
For Fouad, the main aim of the conference was to present Islam through a 
new narrative, and in particular a scientific one. Algorithms and philosophy 
provide Islam with an essence, not 9/11. A major advantage of using science 
as a “new” account for the presentation of the self is that it allows the integra-
tion of Islam into one of the main narratives of modernity. This becomes 
explicit when Fouad contrasts the history of the Middle Ages, also called the 
Dark Ages, with the simultaneous developments in Islamic civilization in 
science, culture, and philosophy. By arguing “for us they were enlightened 
years,” Fouad not only points at a Western-biased and ethnocentric vision of 
history; his use of the term “enlightenment” also insists on the compatibil-
ity—or even causality—between Islam and (Western) modernity.  
Consequently, the use of science as an alternative narrative allows Fouad 
to deconstruct the opposition between the West and the Orient and to insist on 
the connection between Europe and Islam. This strategy is also evident in 
sentences like “We have our roots in Europe,” which allows Fouad to counter 
the Orientalizing discourse of Islam as the ultimate other, as the alien outsider 
(see Said 1995).  
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In Search of Legitimacy 
 
The deconstruction of dominant representations of collective identities is not 
only about challenging stereotypical representations; it also involves a quest 
for legitimacy. Calhoun links identity politics to the question of recognition: 
identity is constructed not only through self-recognition but also through 
recognition by the other. Hence, the relationship with this “constitutive other” 
remains central in the process of acquiring an autonomous and legitimate self 
(Hall 1996). This need for recognition emerged again and again in the 
accounts of several members of the group as a reason to organize the confer-
ence and, more generally, as a reason to present alternative accounts of their 
identity.  
 
“They say that a silent person is someone who consents. We wanted to break that 
vicious circle [of polarization] by letting ourselves be heard, and we have done so by 
organizing a conference to make clear to the outside world, to policymakers, 
politicians, youth workers, and all organizations in civil society, to show them that 
there is no clash of civilizations and that Islam is not at all a foreign relig-
ion.”  (Amina, civil servant)  
 
When Amina speaks of the outside world, she speaks of politicians and actors 
in civil society. The target audience of the conference were people active in 
the field and involved in political topics. The political purpose of the confer-
ence was thus explicit: the conference was intended to inform and—more 
important—to establish an alternative form of recognition, and thus an 
alternative societal discourse on Islam and Muslims.  
The need for an alternative form of recognition of Muslims and Islam is 
also linked to daily interactions with the mainstream—in this case, non-
Muslims—and the wish to be recognized, as Amina puts it, as a “normal 
citizen”:  
 
“My main motivation is to prove by doing it, through my engagement in the union, 
that Muslims are normal people … The main aim is to stop the abnormalization so 
that Muslims, like any other citizen, can participate and be seen as a normal citi-
zen.”  (Amina, civil servant) 
 
Amina frames the negative and stereotypical discourses on Muslims as a 
process of “abnormalization,” a process through which the category of 
Muslim gradually becomes deviant. Being a Muslim thus becomes a stigma, 
which limits Muslims’ ability to participate in broader society. Nilüfer Göle 
(2003) describes the process of celebrating and actively referring to Islamic 
discourses and using embodied practices (like the Islamic headscarf) in the 
public sphere as the voluntary adoption of stigma symbols in order to achieve 
a reversal of their meanings. The domestication of such stigmatic practices 
and symbols and their inclusion in the secular public sphere are, according to 
Göle, not only acts of self-empowerment and self-definition (2003, 820). 
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They are also a form of cultural resistance to dominant and hegemonic 
(Western) cultural models of modernity that oppose the idea of modernity and 
Islam (or religion in general): they become both Muslim and modern (2003, 
818, 824).  
 
“It [working on representation] is a priority. Why? At school, I teach in four schools, 
I always get the same questions. They come from what they see on TV. So if the 
representation was positive, they won’t ask that number of questions … I mean, of 
course there will be questions, but not the questions about an inexistent Islam … It is 
also a duty of a Muslim to … Religion is, Islam is not like a job or something you 
only do at home. You live according to it: at work and everything. So it’s normal 
that as a Muslim you talk about your religion to non-Muslims … Da’wa, preaching 
the religion, is a duty of any Muslim. Every Muslim knows it’s a duty to do some-
thing about it.”  (Nora, Islam teacher)  
 
In this last quotation Nora illustrates how she, as a Muslim, is always con-
fronted with the same questions related to negative media representations, 
questions, she emphasizes, about “an inexistent Islam.” She also repeats the 
distinction between the false Islam, that is, the one conveyed through the 
media, and her Islam, which she considers the real one. In the second part of 
the quotation she also introduces a new motivation to work towards a more 
positive representation of Islam. She frames this task of offering new, more 
positive accounts as “da’wa,” or the religious duty that each Muslim has in 
terms of spreading the message of Islam. Hence, to work towards a more 
positive representation is not only about deconstructing stereotypes and being 
recognized; it is also simply a religious practice and part of being a devout 
Muslim. In the next section I show how this discourse on religious duty is 
linked to the larger question of citizenship.  
 
 
Empow ering  the  I s lamic  Community   
 
So far I have observed how Treasures of Islam aimed at challenging main-
stream representations while offering alternative accounts of Islam and 
Muslims. In this section I continue to explore this formation of a political 
Islamic subject and show both how questions of identity and citizenship are 
interrelated and how a particular discourse and vision of the Islamic subject 
are performed. I explore this question on the basis of the motivations of the 
working-group members to plan the second major project, namely, an Islamic 
fair organized by and for the Muslim community of Flanders, inspired by Le 





Becoming an Active, but Anonymous, Citizen 
 
Each spring about three hundred French Islamic organizations and over 
seventy-five thousand participants gather in the exposition halls of Le Bour-
get, a few kilometers outside Paris, in order to present their associations, to 
network, to buy or sell literature, and to discuss contemporary issues. Started 
in 1983 with nearly two hundred participants under the banner of the Union 
des Organisations Islamiques de France, the yearly gatherings in Le Bourget 
have become one of the largest and most important mass events of and for 
Muslims in France (see Amghar 2003). The gatherings in Le Bourget at-
tracted publicity throughout France in 2003, when Minister of the Interior 
Nikolas Sarkozy was booed at during a speech in which he positioned himself 
against the possibility of wearing the headscarf in pictures for official docu-
ments.24  
Inspired by the success and importance of Le Bourget, the members of 
UMIVA wished to organize similar gatherings for Belgian and Flemish 
Muslims.  
 
“The idea is to answer, to start from zero in order to build a dynamic of associations. 
When you go to the Bourget, there is a life, an Islamic model: there are people who 
sleep, people who cry, it’s a society. We would like to create that climate here, to 
export it at the level of the community here. To tell others that we exist: there is an 
Islamic presence. And that’s what is lacking here in Flanders, in a very basic 
way.”  (Fouad, scientist)  
 
Fouad describes the main motivation for organizing such a gathering: he 
speaks of the importance of networking, but also of creating and affirming an 
“Islamic model.” Le Bourget shows that Muslims are present, that they can 
and do organize themselves, and that they are more than only passive sub-
jects. This idea of making the Islamic presence visible—almost of proving 
that Muslims are organized and alive—is one of the main themes in dealing 
with the question of citizenship.  
As I have shown in the previous section, the quest for visibility is closely 
linked to the question of recognition. Invisibility in the public sphere is 
tantamount to inexistence, which explains the importance of a quest for active 
citizenship, for visibility, for recognition. Becoming visible, however, is not 
the end; it is a means to this process of normalization. The final aim is to 
remain unnoticed but visible. The political claim is thus paradoxical: the 
ultimate ambition of identity movements in their struggle for recognition and 
visibility is to be unnoticed while being part of the picture.  
                                                 
24  This was the first time that a French official was invited and present at this 
gathering. Moreover, it was one of the major events that relaunched the head-
scarf debate on a national level in France, which eventually led to the creation of 
the Stasi commission and the law prohibiting religious symbols in public 
schools.  
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This section illustrates how this question of visibility in the public sphere 
also entails a certain vision and articulation of the collective identity. The 
point of departure for most members of the group is an existential question 
about who they are. Making the Islamic presence visible therefore is not only 
about a certain vision of citizenship, it is also about fostering and shaping an 
Islamic subject.  
 
 
Forging a Muslim Identity  
 
“It is precisely due to our concern about the negative representations, and the 
identity crisis of Muslims, that we want to dedicate our second conference entirely to 
Muslims, to the community, in order to make clear to Muslims that Islam is present 
here in a manifest way, and that we can proudly tell Muslims in a constructive and 
playful way that Muslims are starting to organize themselves in a very good 
way.”  (Amina, civil servant)  
 
For Amina, the first function of visibility is to empower people by showing 
their positive presence. Moreover, she presents an Islamic framework as a 
way out of the identity crisis that she identifies. By referring to the negative 
representations, Amina acknowledges that the image of the self is highly 
influenced by dominant negative discourses. Consequently, making “the 
Islamic presence” visible is not only about countering stereotypical images of 
Muslims but also about offering new, alternative, and positive messages about 
and images of their identity. This becomes clear when Amina refers to the 
question of pride and emphasizes the need to show in a “constructive” and 
“playful” way what Muslims are doing: they not only are there; their presence 
is also a positive and constructive contribution to society at large.  
The lack of an assumed and positive identity among Muslim youth ap-
peared to be one of the main problems identified by the group.  
 
“I have always said that the young people here are the result of street culture, 
television, and education at school and at home. At home things are seen in a certain 
way; on the street another image of life is offered; television offers a different image; 
school offers an ideal of another way of life. Young people are the result of all this, 
and there is no compatibility … When you ask a kid, ‘Are you Moroccan or Bel-
gian?’, he answers, ‘Neither.’ This is the problem: Who is he?”  (Fouad, scientist)  
 
To Fouad, the root of the problem lies in the scattered identity that most 
youngsters of the second generation have to cope with. He enumerates 
different frames of reference that young people encounter, each with its own 
expectations, visions of the world, and normative values. The incompatibility 
of these frames leads to incomplete identifications. Hence, for Fouad one of 
the main challenges is to find an answer to these existential questions about a 
cultural identity that is neither Moroccan nor Belgian.  
The members of the working group find in Islam a way to deal with the 
question of identification. This observation corresponds with much of the 
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literature, which describes Islam as a new, alternative identity that transcends 
ethnic and cultural dilemmas, thereby allowing youngsters to fully find their 
place in the European context (Khosrokhavar 1997; Cesari 1994; Vertovec 
and Rogers 1998; Roy 2002; Amiraux 2001; Kanmaz 2003). Terms such as 
the “ethnicisation of Islam” (Modood and Werbner 1997) refer to this process 
of differentiation between a cultural and a religious identity, with the latter 
developing into a new ethnic identity: “European Muslim” is the new and 
preferred self-appellation. This religious framework, however, is more than 
merely a cultural resource for identity claims; it is also a normative frame-
work that deals with questions of meaning and life orientation (Beyer 2000, 
67). Yet within the literature on the Islamic revival and Islam as an identity, 
this second dimension—the normative framework—is often overlooked.25  
In my conversations with members of the working group, the normative 
implications linked to an Islamic identity were clearly evident. As Amina 
explained, when asked why it is important to emphasize the presence of 
Islam:   
 
“To Muslims, religion is an important part of life, in the sense that the Islamic value 
system is a component of a Muslim’s daily life. You already see it, for instance, 
during the year; Ramadan—clearly visible—shows for instance how Muslims fast 
for a month, and are busy with Islam for at least one month each year. Also, the fact 
remains that people go actively to the mosques. Muslims don’t really have a process 
of de-churchification. Quite the contrary: Islam remains an important part of 
life.”  (Amina, civil servant)  
 
For Amina, Islam is more than just a cultural resource: when she states that 
“to Muslims, religion is an important part of life,” she first associates Islam 
with religion, and describes Islam as a normative framework and “value 
system” with a dominant place in and influence on daily life. When speaking 
about Islam, the members of the working group speak not only about the 
cultural resources but also—and more important—about the normative 
framework behind it. Fouad not only confirms this observation; his words 
also reveal an important implication of the normative dimension of Islamic 
identity.  
 
“For a Muslim, it is that: if he doesn’t have an ideal, a clear vision, if he doesn’t have 
a goal, whether it is an intermediary goal, or a final goal, he is always disoriented … 
Where are we going? Even the philosophy of the Quran always speaks about a clear 
set of goals. What is this goal? Judgment Day. And if you lose this reference, you 
lose all references. The molding of your life changes in such a way that you are 
destabilized. Why? Because you don’t have a clear set of goals. And, by the way, 
this is human nature. If I tell you, ‘In a week you have an exam,’ you will make a 
                                                 
25  When the “normative” dimension of Islamic identity is assessed in the literature, 
its compatibility with the citizenship issue tends to be explored (see, for instance, 
Roy 2002 and Cesari 1994), whereas other dimensions remain relatively unex-
plored or receive little recognition (see also Asad 2003; Mahmood 2005).  
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plan, you will change your life to achieve that goal, which in this case is passing the 
exam. This means that you will take two hours to study, two hours to eat … You will 
organize yourself in order to achieve that goal and pass the exam. So it’s about that. 
Even Ramadan is about that. What is Ramadan? It’s about having well-defined 
behavior for thirty days, and about being in a specific psychological state of mind in 
order to achieve that goal, which is the end of Ramadan. There is even a hadith that 
says that life is like Ramadan. Ramadan is life, and during this life we have to 
abstain from things, we have to do other things, we have to behave in a specific way. 
It’s in fact the Muslim’s ideal. And the end of Ramadan is the triumph, it’s the gift, 
it’s al-Jahana [paradise], it’s that … Hence, life for a Muslim is about reaching an 
ideal, achieving a goal, which is: to satisfy Allah. Soebhana-wa-Ta’ala [Praise Allah 
the great/all-knowing]. And if this goal is disrupted, everything is disrupted … I 
always say: The shari’a Islamiya [Islamic path] is a positive means of integration 
into society.”  (Fouad, scientist) 
 
In this quotation, Fouad tells us that Islam is about having a clear set of goals 
and orienting one’s life towards these goals. The ultimate goal he identifies is 
Judgment Day: the moment when all actions of earthly life will be assessed 
and the ultimate verdict will follow. The view that civic (or other) activities 
are a means to achieving a larger religious purpose—Judgment Day and/or 
satisfying Allah—was frequently expressed by other members of the group as 
well. It was also observable when Nora presented the need to work on the 
representation of Muslims as a form of da’wa, the religious duty of each 
Muslim to spread the message of Islam. By using concepts such as da’wa or, 
in this case, Judgment Day, Fouad and Nora frame their actions within the 
realm of religious duties and obligations. Furthermore, Fouad’s reference to 
the “final goal,” or Judgment Day, is not merely allegorical; rather, it is 
consistent with a strong insistence on disciplinary actions. God’s blessing is 
not something that one acquires by longing for it; it is something that one 
must work for by “molding” one’s personality and actions in that direction.  
These insights converge with Saba Mahmood’s observations and analysis 
of women active in pious movements in Cairo (2001, 2005). She argues that 
the literature on pious and Islamist movements tends to overlook and under-
value existing discourses on the moral subject and the way in which this 
moral subject is actively constructed and transformed. When religious 
practice is included in the analysis, it is often framed as something functional 
to nationalistic claims and/or claims about identity.26 The respondents’ 
accounts, which situate these practices within a “religious logic,” are rarely 
included in the broader analytical framework or are only viewed as “phantom 
imaginings of the hegemonized” (Mahmood 2001, 209).  
Mahmood has analyzed the religious discourse of women active in 
“nonliberal” women’s movements in order to understand their relation to 
                                                 
26  Mahmood gives the example of the veil, which is often described as a nationalis-
tic symbol or a means of resistance, but rarely as a religious practice.  
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religious practices and the notion of subject implicitly involved.27 She 
discovered a seeming “paradox”: a discourse of submission to prescriptions, 
combined with active agency in performing this submission. For many of the 
women with whom she worked, the attainment of religious virtues (e.g., 
patience, shyness, modesty) was not considered something “natural,” but 
rather something one had to work on. Mahmood has recounted the efforts of 
these women to acquire these virtues, and how this process went together 
with a conscious and active drilling and molding of their subjectivities and 
bodies. The activities of these women are not aimed at resisting certain norms 
or prescriptions but rather at actively disciplining subjectivity in order to 
make it compatible with a discursive tradition, that is, the Islamic moral and 
ethical subject.28  
My emphasis on Mahmood’s writings is prompted by similar observations 
about what Fouad tells us in the last quotation, which is crucial in this respect, 
as well as about other conversations with members of the working group. The 
members’ introduction of the Islamic subject as a means to frame their 
identity was not only about having a cultural resource; it also fits with a larger 
discourse on the moral subject and its compliance with an ethical and discur-
sive tradition, namely, Islam.29 The reference to an Islamic identity and 
religious practice not only points to the larger goal—Judgment Day—but also 
to the necessity of forging and molding a certain subjectivity, one in which 
religious practice is not only a means to reach an ultimate goal but also a 
means to perform and shape a specific kind of subjectivity. Religious practice 
therefore becomes “the means to both being and becoming a certain kind of 
person” (Mahmood 2001, 215; italics in original).  
Fouad not only describes this Islamic identity as a “mold” for forging 
one’s subjectivity in a certain way; he also strengthens this claim by describ-
ing this process in secular terms. He does so by arguing, first, that it is a 
normal thing, proper to the way that society is organized, and, second, that it 
is present in all aspects of religious life, even in its most elementary forms. 
This normalization takes place in three steps: making the process seem 
                                                 
27  Mahmood uses the word “nonliberal” to refer to movements with a conception of 
selfhood and subjectivity which contrast with the liberal tradition.  
28  Mahmood asserts that, from a poststructural perspective, this insight is compati-
ble with descriptions and observations of any subject formation. She refers to 
Judith Butler’s paradox of subjectivation: the active subject acquires its agency 
(and its potential to resist) by paradoxically inscribing itself in and submitting 
itself to a discursive tradition. Thus, the subject is always formed through the 
obedience to certain norms, and it is precisely this obedience to (and acquiring 
of) these norms which makes resistance possible. This leads Mahmood to argue 
for a conception of agency not solely as a “synonym for resistance to a relation 
of domination, but as a capacity for action that historically specific relations of 
subordination enable and create” (2001, 203).  
29  Or, to be more precise, compliance with a specific ethical and discursive 
tradition within Islam.  
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natural, referring to the example of taking exams, and relating the process to 
Ramadan. The first step in normalizing the process is to describe it as part of 
“human nature.” Second, the reference to taking exams serves as a “secular” 
example that illustrates the broadness and validity of his claims and dissoci-
ates it from the religious sphere. Fouad concludes by arguing that this method 
of disciplining the subject is also present in the most elementary forms of 
religious practice, such as Ramadan. Thus, this disciplining of the subject is 
not something exceptional, nor something limited to extremely pious Mus-
lims; it is something natural, general, and present in all aspects of society, in 
both religious and secular life.  
To conclude, and in line with Mahmood (2001, 2005), I argue that this 
quest for and/or reference to a framework for an Islamic identity coincides 
with the construction and disciplining of an Islamic ethical and moral subject. 
When people like Fouad refer to Islam as an alternative framework, they also 
refer to and perform a certain moral and ethical subject. Hence, identity 
movements—in this case Islamic ones—are not only about seeking and 
establishing an alternative narrative about the self, but also about constructing 
and disciplining the self in order to make it compatible with a specific Islamic 
tradition. In the following subsection I illustrate how the working-group 
members view a relationship with the political sphere as a vital aspect of this 
moral and ethical subject.  
 
 
Active Citizenship as Part of Religious Practice 
 
Active citizenship is viewed by all members in the working group as a worthy 
objective. They all support the idea that political involvement in society at 
large is a sign not only of good citizenship but also of being a good Muslim. 
Furthermore, active citizenship includes reaching out to non-Muslims and 
striving together for shared political aims. It is therefore not surprising that 
members of the group appreciate an intellectual like Tariq Ramadan. His 
vision and ideas were often mentioned, and one of the ambitions of the 
working group was to organize discussion seminars on citizenship issues with 
Tariq Ramadan.  
 
“And that’s where we come to the new discourse of Tariq Ramadan; it is about 
active involvement in society. The idea of the social contract, the idea of testimony: 
the shahada. He is revolutionizing, he is leading a silent revolution of the second 
generation. And that’s what youngsters like; they recognize themselves in a way in 
Tariq Ramadan. And al-hamdu-lilah, it works, even in different communities, even 
if he is French-speaking, because it is an Islamic discourse.” (Fouad, scientist)  
 
According to Fouad, many Muslims, regardless of their origin, recognize 
themselves in Tariq Ramadan’s discourse through the universal weight of the 
Islamic message. This discourse calls upon Muslims to fulfill their prime 
responsibility, the first pillar, the shahada: to testify that God exists and that 
NADIA FADIL 
 70
Muhammad is his prophet. By equating the idea of the social contract with the 
first pillar, Fouad inscribes the political sphere within the Islamic engagement 
and prime duties of Muslims, thus clearly challenging and rearticulating 
secular-liberal notions of citizenship and its relation to religion. In the dis-
course of Fouad, both become interlinked: active citizenship stands for being 
a good Muslim, and being a good Muslim becomes synonymous with active 
involvement in society.  
 
“Even the act of taking a stone from the street is part of our religion, is part of laïcité 
[being an active citizen in a secular environment]. And this should be understood … 
Our duty, the effort we have to make, is to present a positive image of Islam … 
Efforts should be made from both sides. We always talk about the internal effort we 
have to make to go to the others. I forgot to say something: Even if we spend one 
thousand or twenty-four hundred hours telling people about Muslims and Islam, if 
each one of us is not a walking Quran, we will always have problems explaining 
things to others. They see Islam, but don’t see the Muslims.”  (Fouad, scientist)  
 
Fouad expresses a vision of political and religious engagement in which both 
are interlinked, if not equated. In the first sentence of the quotation, he not 
only links civic involvement with religious duty but also insists on their 
compatibility: it “is part of laïcité.” These last words indicate that he is aware 
that his approach—linking religious duty to civic duty—could be considered 
deviant when compared to the “common” secular-liberal separation of 
religious duty from civic duty. But Fouad seeks a way out of what might 
appear to be an inconsistency by arguing that his vision is perfectly compati-
ble with the concept of laïcité. He thus dissociates the definition of laïcité 
from a secular-liberal tradition and makes it compatible with a vision in which 
religion and politics are interlinked.  
 
“If the existing rules are in contradiction with your rules, then you have to adapt 
your rules to those of the community, to the rules of the country … and it is possible 
to do so. Our religion is a very flexible one. The goal of each religion is to guarantee 
the internal stability of human beings; it’s to live in harmony with others. Certainly 
for the Islamic religion. Seventy percent of the Quranic verses are about social 
relations; at least thirty percent are about the spiritual aspects of faith. And all the 
’ibadaat, they are about good behavior towards others: ahlaq. Why do we pray? To 
be good with others. We fast to feel the hunger of others. We do the hadj [the 
pilgrimage to Mecca] in order to meet people from all over the world. Zakat is about 
helping others, to have a sense of social responsibility. Hence, our religion is made 
to live in society.”  (Fouad, scientist)  
 
This quotation illustrates once more how Fouad links religious and civic 
engagement. Hence, his discourse on active citizenship is related not only to 
the question of identity but also to his religious practice. On several occa-
sions, and with reference to various examples, Fouad emphasized the intrinsi-
cally social and civic dimensions of Islam. In his conciliation of Islamic and 
civic engagement, however, he tries to remain within the boundaries of a 
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“mainstream” understanding of citizenship. He does not fundamentally 
question the way in which larger society conceives of political citizenship; a 
telling indication of this is his emphasis on the flexibility and adaptability of 
religious rules to society’s expectations.  
This observation has already been made by other authors analyzing active 
citizenship, especially those focusing on Tariq Ramadan’s discourse (Frégosi 
2000; Mohsen-Finan 2002). Khadija Mohsen-Finan, for instance, describes 
Ramadan’s discourse as the development of a faith-based citizenship that 
questions the strict French separation of state and religion and calls for a 
middle way between the British communitarian model and the French model 
of assimilation (2002, 139). Franck Frégosi (2000), on the other hand, 
maintains that the success of the “Ramadanian verbs” derives from the 
combination of presenting active citizenship as part of religious practice—as a 
message of Islam—while fully embracing the dominant discourse on citizen-
ship, and simultaneously opening up possibilities for changes to and adapta-
tion of some Islamic rulings.30 A call for flexibility and openness is also 
evident in Fouad’s discourse.  
One could, however, also construe Fouad’s emphasis on the flexibility of 
his religion as a defensive stance, almost as if to avoid accusations of being 
“fundamentalist” or a “threat to society.” The hegemonic discourse on 
secularism and citizenship, certainly when dealing with Islam, is such that any 
public appearance of religion is quickly viewed as an illegitimate interference, 
as “‘inflecting’ the secular domain or as replicating within it the structure of 
theological concepts” (Asad 2003, 191). This becomes explicit in Fouad’s 
answer to my question about how far this flexibility can go and whether it 
also would have implications for prescriptions such as the headscarf. 
 
“But concerning the headscarf issue, the secular context in which we live allows it 
since it respects the religion and faith of everyone among us. Hence, by wearing the 
headscarf we have to—and this is also our responsibility, of our community—we 
need to say that for us, that we do not practice Islam but we live Islam. And this we 
have to make clear to people. But how can you explain that in a context that always 
stigmatizes Islam, in a context that always says, ‘What’s this covered woman, this 
guru coming to invade us?’ There is a fear fed by the media, which remains unex-
plained.”  (Fouad, scientist) 
 
Clearly, flexibility to Fouad does not mean the alienation or far-reaching 
adaptation of religious prescriptions; his position on the Islamic headscarf 
illustrates this. In order to resist the suggestion of simply adapting or aban-
doning religious prescriptions, he frames prescriptions such as the Islamic 
headscarf within the liberal principle of freedom of religion, which, according 
to him, is characteristic of the secular organization of society. Furthermore, he 
                                                 
30  The most well-known adaptation, popularized by Tariq Ramadan, is without a 
doubt the abolition of the theological categories dar-al-harb/dar-al-islam (house 
of war/house of Islam), thus enabling theologically the full participation of Mus-
lims in a non-Islamic setting (Ramadan 1999, 202–204).  
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argues that it is the responsibility of Muslims to make clear that to them 
religion is not practiced but lived. This sentence supports my earlier observa-
tion about a strong articulation of both the political subject and the religious 
subject. Hence, and certainly when reading the sentences in which Fouad 
describes the “stigmatization” that persists towards Muslims, I argue that the 
need to legitimize Islamic discourse within the “mainstream” liberal frame-
work is also motivated by a defensive approach, and does not strictly deviate 
from a vision in which religious practice is framed within liberal and secular 
political accounts.  
Frégosi observed a similar mechanism in Tariq Ramadan’s discourse, 
which he described as a “paradox”: although Ramadan states that he does not 
claim a “special status” for Muslims and that he embraces the existing 
concept of citizenship, he nevertheless describes religion as a way of life, as a 
civilization and culture (2000, 211). My position differs from Frégosi in that I 
do not observe this “ambivalence” as a paradox, but rather as an illustration of 
the difficulties inherent in an approach to religion as a political subject which 
differs from those prescribed by dominant secular-liberal frameworks. The 
reason these claims appear to be “ambiguous” is mainly linked with the need 
and urge of people like Fouad to remain within the boundaries of accepted 
consensus and not be marginalized because of their approach and vision. 
Fouad’s reference in this quotation to suspicions towards Muslims illustrates 
this claim. Hence, I argue that what appears to be an “ambivalence” is rather 
the articulation of the difficulty of reconciling an “imposed” secular-
modernist vision of the religious and political subject with an alternative 
vision in which the political and religious subject are more interlinked. What 
appears to be a “paradox” thus not only reveals the tension between the two 
visions; more important, it unveils the particularity of the dominant frame-
work, its implicit definition of and approach to religion, and its effect on other 
approaches to religion.  
Hence, I argue that the interpretation of this ambivalence as a “paradox” is 
linked to the use of analytical frameworks that rely on a secular opposition 
between “the religious” and “the political.” Consequently, when one departs 
from analytical concepts that reproduce a sharp differentiation between the 
“religious” and the “secular” spheres, interactions between the two tend to 
appear paradoxical or at least inconsistent. I argue that it is not enough to 
observe the interaction between “the secular” and “the religious”; rather, one 
also needs to be reflexive about the assumptions and a priori conclusions on 
which both concepts rest. Not doing this will hinder social scientists from 
tracing the complexity of existing dynamics and will lead them to reproduce 
too quickly the normative differentiation between “the religious” and “the 
secular,” which is implicitly present when one speaks of the “paradoxical” 
combination of a religious and a civic discourse.  
On this point I rely heavily on Talal Asad’s Formations of the Secular 
(2003), in which he urges scholars to scrutinize and question the traditional 
concept of secularization, which opposes a “religious sphere” with a “secular 
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sphere.” The latter is described as the space in which human freedom and 
individual rights prevail; in contrast, the religious sphere is where authoritar-
ian obedience to rules is said to dominate. Asad questions this equation: “I am 
arguing that ‘the secular’ should not be thought of as the space in which real 
human life gradually emancipates itself from the controlling power of ‘relig-
ion’ and thus achieves the latter’s relocation” (191). Hence, when one ques-
tions the way in which secularity is traditionally defined, one’s analytical 
conception of the world also needs to be revised. This also entails examining 
how “politics” and “religion” have come to be defined and how the two “turn 
out to implicate each other more profoundly than we thought” (200). The 
concept of religion is not only opposed to the secular, it is also produced by it 
(193; see also Smith 1968).  
Discourses like those of Fouad enable one to see how this process of con-
structing “the religious” through “the secular” takes place. Fouad’s active, 
though “subversive” (with respect to religion), engagement with the notion of 
citizenship shows how a dominant definition of citizenship relies on a particu-
lar relationship between religion and politics, one which only allows religion 
as a discourse and not as a practice, one which defines religion in a specific 
way and recognizes it as long as it does not transgress prescribed limits (Asad 
2003, 199). In Fouad’s description of his civic and religious engagement, one 
can see how a specific “secular” articulation of religion (i.e., religion as a 
discourse and a private practice) conflicts with his vision of religion (i.e., 
religion as a way of life and a total practice), and how an equilibrium is 
sought to conciliate both visions.31 It is too early to know what the end result 
of such negotiation will be, but one thing can be said: discourses like those of 
Fouad reveal the dynamics behind societal narratives and challenge “us” (i.e., 
social scientists) to unpack the normative, a priori conclusions of these 
narratives (see also Bracke 2004).  
 
 
The Process of Internal Negotiations 
 
The internal difficulties encountered in promoting a vision of citizenship were 
another recurrent element in the way members of the working group framed 
their engagement.  
 
                                                 
31  This point constitutes the main difference between Islamic movements that 
reproduce discourses on “active citizenship” and “pious movements” that do not 
actively intervene in the political sphere, like those described by Saba Mahmood 
(2005). Although both are “political” in the sense that they actively reshape the 
way society is organized through an Islamic ethical framework, discourses like 
Fouad’s actively seek to negotiate an approach to citizenship with the dominant 
secular framework, whereas pious movements consciously withdraw from this 
kind of negotiation and do not seek compromise.  
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“We first need an internal debate; we should harmonize the different opinions. 
Within the Islamic community there are too many differences … There are those 
who say that the environment is haram [illicit], that we are in dar-al-harb.32 There is 
the Shi’i fraction; there is the hizb-a-tahrir. They have different views on Islam, and 
this makes the task more difficult on the intracommunitarian and intercommunitarian 
levels … That’s why we need time. We first have to agree among ourselves, before 
being able to bring things to the outside world. It is a major challenge, and I think we 
can do it. The means are there for it, we just need the will to live together.”  (Fouad, 
scientist)  
 
According to Fouad, divergent opinions must be harmonized before Muslims 
can act within society at large. In this quotation Fouad refers to the existing 
ideological and sectarian divisions within the Islamic community not only to 
illustrate its diversity, but also to show the difficulty of reaching a consensus 
over citizenship issues. To strengthen his argument, he refers to the disagree-
ments over the use of concepts such as dar-al-harb when referring to Western 
Europe. Fouad views this diversity as problematic because it hampers his 
political aim of constructing a strong and internally coherent political subject 
in order to achieve certain political goals.33 Thus, what is needed is the 
creation of a stable ground, a consensus, in order to be able to engage at the 
political level. Internal debate is a way to achieve this vision of citizenship 
and to harmonize opinions on this matter.  
Not all Muslims, however, were included in these discussions about har-
monizing existing differences. One of the most recurrent divisions referred to 
by members of the working group was that of generational difference. Most 
members saw a clear difference in approach to the citizenship issue between 
the second and the first generations. As a group operating within a union of 
mosques, it also specifically targeted the mosques, with the aim of opening 
them up to larger segments of society.  
 
“I always say that the first generation was a generation of mosque builders … It then 
falls to the second generation to get involved in mosques, to make the mosque come 
to the outside. That is, I think, the challenge for the coming five to ten years. The 
second generation has to enter into mosques in order to make them come outside 
through open-house days, cultural activities … to show that mosques are not only a 
place to pray, but also a place to meet, a place of interaction between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. This is in a way our challenge for the coming five to ten 
years.”  (Fouad, scientist)  
                                                 
32  Some traditional scholars divide the world into dar-al-harb (the house of war) 
and dar-al-islam (the house of Islam) in order to differentiate an Islamic from a 
non-Islamic region. Muslims in a non-Islamic region are considered a minority 
and have special rules and prescriptions. Lately, however, this traditional dichot-
omy has increasingly been called into question. Several scholars, including Tariq 
Ramadan, have called for abandoning this outdated differentiation.  
33  The need for and dangers of essentialism in the construction of a political 
identity have been extensively debated in poststructuralist feminist theory (Cal-
houn 1994; Fuss 1989).  
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Fouad’s notion of the role of mosques reflects his conception of citizenship. 
Mosques should be not only a place to pray, but also a space for interaction, a 
new public sphere for Muslims and non-Muslims. Hence, two shifts are made 
in his conception of the mosque: first, by adding to it alternative functions 
such as meetings and cultural activities and, second, by opening it up to non-
Muslims. In addition, Fouad clearly frames this new approach as something 
befitting the second generation. This generational dynamic has been observed 
by several researchers (Kanmaz and Mokhless 2002; Sunier 1996).  
Generation thus becomes the ultimate factor for explaining differences in 
orientation. Without disputing this claim or observation, I would argue that 
this insistence on the generational factor can also be viewed in terms of its 
functional capacities of constructing a stable and coherent Islamic political 
subject. By locating the existing disagreements mainly within a generational 
framework, rather than a framework of ideological or sectarian difference, 
one presumably has better control over the identified internal differences, as 
there is an underlying conviction that these differences will be “solved” in the 
long term. An emphasis on sectarian or ideological differences, on the other 
hand, would hamper the smooth construction of a stable political subject.  
As for the observed generational differences, it was striking to note how 
the working-group members avoided a confrontational approach with the first 
generation. They instead called for patience and acceptance of this difference.  
 
“Most of them are stubborn. If you try to explain something like that to a first 
generation, they don’t always understand you … There are people of the first 
generation who understand us and can follow us, but the majority doesn’t want any 
contact with the outside world. They just want to stay separated in their mosques. 
It’s up to us, the second generations, and converted Muslims, to have contact with 
the outside world.”  (Ahmed, engineer)  
 
Ahmed describes a generational rift, without arguing for change. By using the 
word “stubborn,” he characterizes the disagreements in terms of personal 
traits and features of the first generation, rather than differences in point of 
view. Consequently, Ahmed argues that both the second generation and 
converted Muslims should lead the way to active citizenship.  
 
 
Conclus ion:  Which  Space  for  Po l i t i ca l  Interact ions  and 
Negot ia t ions  o f  Re l ig ious  Subjects?   
 
One of the most frequent topics in the literature and in mainstream media is 
the recent upheaval of Islamic identity among second-generation youths in 
Western Europe. Labels such as European Muslims and the “ethnicisation of 
Islam” indicate a shift: Islam is becoming a new identity for participation in 
the European public opinion. This reference to and use of the Islamic label is 
often analyzed as a dual process. On the one hand, there is a differentiation 
and distancing from ethnic identity, which enables young Muslims to position 
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themselves in Western Europe; on the other hand, this practice can be read as 
a defensive identification with Islam in reaction to the negative stereotypes 
about Muslims and Islam (Roy 2002; Göle 2003). In this chapter I have 
observed and analyzed how a group of young professionals frames and uses 
Islamic identity in their political engagement.  
The two main threads running through their involvement are representa-
tion and empowerment. Challenging stereotypical discourses on Islam and 
offering alternative representations not only are ways to frame their identity in 
a different—and to them, more accurate—light; they also are ways to achieve 
recognition. The ability to influence public opinion about Muslims is felt to 
be crucial, as public opinion affects their daily interactions and contributes to 
their societal marginalization. A second thread in their involvement focuses 
on the empowerment of Muslims in the light of their weak socioeconomic 
integration. In this case, Islam is presented as a solution for these weak 
conditions, which are linked to a lack of an assumed and positive identity.  
This chapter has examined how an active reference to and use of an Is-
lamic framework also entails and performs an Islamic ethical, moral, and 
political subject. Referring to positive representation as da’wa, building a 
strong Islamic identity through religious discipline, considering citizenship a 
religious duty—such perspectives and strategies imply that Islam is not only 
an identity but also a religious and normative framework. In addition to a 
“new” identity, Islam is, above all, a religion with prescriptions for and 
expectations of the moral and ethical subject (Asad 2003; Mahmood 2001, 
2005).  
This is also evident in the relationship between citizenship and religion: 
religious identity is not only inscribed within a discourse on citizenship; civic 
involvement is also framed as a religious duty. The difference between the 
two formulations is important, for the latter stresses that Islamic citizenship 
not only adapts to the secular expectations and norms of modern life, it also 
interacts with it and questions it. The “subject” implicitly assumed in secular 
modernity is a subject for whom religious and political life are clearly differ-
entiated, for whom there is no problem adapting to the expectations of secular 
social life. People like Fouad, for whom religious, political, and other ele-
ments are largely interwoven, do not simply try to conform to the implicit 
expectations of modern life; they also try to find a compromise with the 
explicit and implicit expectations of society as a whole. Hence, to seek a 
compromise is something other than “adapting” to the expectations of modern 
life, and the limits of “flexibility” are not endless. The balancing act remains 
difficult and fragile, with people like Fouad in a weak position for negotia-
tion, particularly in the current political climate, in which every public 
manifestation of Islam (or other religions) is suspiciously observed or even 
hysterically and repressively attacked.  
 
 




Abou Jahjah, D. 2003. Tussen twee werelden. De roots van een vrij-
heidsstrijd. Antwerp, Belgium: Meulenhoff.  
Amghar, S. 2003. Le congrès du Bourget: une ‘fête de l’Humanité’ islamique. 
Confluences Méditerranées 46 (summer).  
Amiraux, V. 2001. Acteurs de l’Islam entre Allemagne et Turquie. Parcours 
militants et expériences religieuses. Paris: L’Harmattan.  
Asad, T. 2003. Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.  
Beyer, P. 2000 [1994]. Religion and globalization. London: Sage.  
Bousetta, H. 2001. Immigration, post-immigration politics and the political 
mobilisation of ethnic minorities: A comparative case-study of Moroccans 
in four European cities. Brussels: KUB.  
Bracke, S. 2004. Women resisting secularisation in an age of globalisation: 
Four case studies in a European perspective. Ph.D. dissertation, Utrecht 
University, the Netherlands.  
Calhoun, C. 1994. Social theory and the politics of identity. In Social theory 
and the politics of identity, ed. C. Calhoun, 9–36. London: Blackwell.  
Cesari, J. 1994. Être Musulman En France. Paris: Karthala/Iremam.  
De Witte, L. 2004. Wie is bang voor moslims? Aantekeningen over Abou 
Jahjah, etnocentrisme en islamofobie. Leuven, Belgium: Van Halewyck.  
Fadil, N. 2003. Débat sur l’intégration de l’Autre, débat sur la définition de 
Soi. Nouvelle-Tribune: Quand la Belgique intègre 31/32 (March/May): 
123–127.  
Frégosi, F. 2000. Les contours discursifs d’une religiosité citoyenne: laïcité et 
identité islamique chez Tariq Ramadan. In Paroles d’islam. Individus, so-
ciétés et discours dans l’islam européen contemporain, ed. F. Dassetto, 
205–221. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose.  
Fuss, D. 1989. Essentially speaking: Feminism, nature and difference. 
London: Routledge.  
Göle, N. 2003. The voluntary adoption of Islamic stigma symbols. Social 
Research 70 (3): 809–828.  
Hall, S. 1996. Introduction: Who needs ’identity’? In Questions of cultural 
identity, ed. S. Hall and P. Du Gay, 1–17. London: Sage.  
Jacobs, D. 2003. The Arab European League: The rapid growth of a radical 
immigrant movement. Paper prepared for the European Consortium for 
Political Research Conference, Marburg, Germany.  
Jordan, G., and C. Weedon. 2000. When the subaltern speak, what do they 
say? Radical cultural politics in Cardiff Docklands. In Without guaran-
tees: In honour of Stuart Hall, ed. P. Gilroy, L. Grossberg, and 
A. McRobbie, 165–180. London: Verso.  
Kanmaz, M. 2003. Onze nationaliteit is onze godsdienst. Islam als identity 
marker bij jonge Marokkaanse moslims in Gent. In Migratie, zijn wij uw 
NADIA FADIL 
 78
kinderen? Identiteitsbeleving bij allochtone jongeren, ed. E. Cornelis and 
M. C. Foblets, 115–133. Leuven, Belgium: Acco.  
Kanmaz, M., and F. Mokhless. 2002. Sociaal-cultureel werk in de Moskee? 
Vorming, Vaktijdschrift voor volwasseneneducatie en sociaal-cultureel 
werk 17 (October): 425–442. Also available at the following Web site: 
http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/CIE/kanmaz_mokhless1.htm.  
Khosrokhavar, F. 1997. L’Islam des jeunes. Paris: Flammarion.  
Landman, N. 2002. Islam in the Benelux Countries. In Islam, Europe’s 
second religion, ed. S. T. Hunter, 97–120. Westport, CT: Praeger.  
Mahmood, S. 2001. Feminist theory, embodiment, and the docile agent: Some 
reflections on the Egyptian Islamic revival. Cultural Anthropology 16 (2): 
202–236.  
———. 2005. Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
McAdam, D. 1999 [1982]. Political process and the development of Black 
insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Modood, T., and P. Werbner. 1997. The politics of multiculturalism in the 
new Europe: Racism, identity and community. London: Zed Books.  
Mohsen-Finan, K. 2002. Promoting a faith-based citizenship: The case of 
Tariq Ramadan. In New European identity and citizenship, ed. R. Leveau, 
K. Mohsen-Finan, and C. Wihtol de Wenden, 133–139. London: Ashgate.  
Peleman, K. 2002. De rol van de buurt: de maatschappelijke participatie van 
Marokkaanse vrouwen in een ruimtelijk perspectief. Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of Geography and Geology, Catholic University of Leuven, 
Belgium.  
Ramadan, T. 1999. Être un musulman européen. Lyon, France: Tawhid.  
Roy, O. 2002. Vers un Islam européen. Paris: Editions Esprit.  
Said, E. W. 1995 [1978]. Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient. 
London: Penguin.  
Smith, W. C. 1968. The meaning and end of religion. London: SPCK.  
Sunier, T. 1996. Islam in Beweging. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. 
Vertovec, S., and A. Rogers. 1998. Muslim European youth: Reproducing 
ethnicity, religion, culture. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.  
 79
Annalisa Frisina 
THE INVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP  
AMONG YOUNG MUSLIMS IN ITALY
1
 
“Islamophobia” precedes the tragic events of 9/11, but, as in many other 
countries, it was above all after this date that some opinion-makers and 
politicians began to depict Muslims who live in Italy as potentially dangerous 
(Sciortino 2002; Rivera 2002; Schmidt di Friedberg 2001).2 Faced with this 
difficult situation, the Association of Young Italian Muslims (GMI), an active 
group of youths born in and/or raised from infancy in Italy, entered the public 
sphere, participating in various activities involving interreligious and intercul-
tural dialogue at the local and national levels. Through this work the group 
gained extraordinary visibility among the media in a relatively short amount 
of time.  
The main innovation of these youths’ approach was that they did not limit 
themselves to “reversing the stigma” (Sayad 2002), that is to say, they did not 
simply deny the association of Islam to violence, declaring themselves to be 
Muslim pacifists. Their ambitious objective has been to change the frame-
work and shift the discussion about Muslims in Italy from one concerned with 
safety issues to one focusing on citizenship. But what is the meaning of 
citizenship in their speeches and in their practices? What are the outcomes of 
their demands within the public sphere? How have Islamic associations for 
adults reacted to their activism?  
In this chapter I attempt to answer these questions. I first introduce the 
Italian context in which Muslims seem to serve as a screen against which 
some Italians project themselves as a unity, and then show how the Associa-
tion of Young Italian Muslims has opposed a representation of Italian identity 
based on a common Catholic matrix by declaring themselves Italian citizens 
of Islamic faith. Moreover, I analyze their various forms of belonging and 
                                                           
1  This chapter is based on my doctoral thesis in sociology entitled “Difference as 
Opportunity? Young Italian Muslims and Demands for Citizenship” (supervisor: 
Chantal Saint-Blancat). Heartfelt thanks to Stefano Allievi for having introduced 
me to the stimulating research group composed by the authors of this book.  
2  See, for example, the long article “La Rabbia e l’orgoglio” (Rage and Pride) by 
O. Fallaci, which appeared on September 29, 2001, in Corriere della Sera (one of 
the main national newspapers) and later became a best-selling book. With respect 
to political forces, Lega Nord is the main agent of anti-Islamic xenophobia 
(Guolo 2003, 58–80). For the historical origin of the perception of Muslims as 
“enemies,” see Allievi, 2003,143–144, and Khader, 1992. 
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participation, showing that they are Muslim democrats practicing “ordinary 
citizenship” in their everyday life (especially at the local level) and that their 
main feature is their commitment to the legitimation of a public representation 
of Italy as a multicultural and multireligious country. Finally, I illustrate how 
the visibility of this youth association is challenging the “defensive logic” of 
the previous generation.  
 
 
I ta ly :  A  Catho l ic  and  Secu lar  Country?   
 
According to prevailing theories, Italy discovered cultural diversity with the 
arrival of immigrants.3 What had been a nation of emigrants until the 1970s 
became a country of immigration. And according to the collective representa-
tions circulating in the mass media, what was, from a religious point of view, 
a homogeneous country found itself confronted with a problematic alterna-
tive: Islam. And so with the settlement of immigrant families came multicul-
tural policies: for example, there was experimentation with intercultural 
projects in schools, and linguistic and cultural mediators were introduced in 
hospitals and other public institutions.  
Anthropologists Ralph Grillo and Jeff Pratt (2002) tell us a different story, 
maintaining that, basically, the Italian nation was born through a “policy of 
identity.” To quote Massimo d’Azeglio (1861), “We have created Italy, now 
let us create Italians.” In actuality, the country continued to remain plural, 
marked by profound regional differences and above all by differences be-
tween the North and the South, the famous “southern issue.” Jeff Pratt (2002) 
adds that this “hierarchised cultural diversity” in which the North stigmatized 
the South is the principal leitmotif of Italian history.4  
This internal plurality also affects the sphere of religious belief (Garelli, 
Guizzardi, and Pace 2003, 299): for instance, 45.1 % of the Italian population 
believe that religious celibacy should be abolished, and more than half of the 
Italian population maintain that there is something true in all religions and, 
                                                           
3  Since the last regularization campaign launched by the center-right government, 
immigrants in Italy now total about 2,400,000; it is estimated that among them 
about 800,000 are Muslims (Pace 2004b). The original nationalities are ex-
tremely varied, though the most consistent group is that of Moroccans. As re-
gards youths, the Agnelli Foundation gave an early estimate of young Muslims in 
2004: they are thought to amount to around 300,000, of which 140,000 to 
160,000 were born in or grew up in Italy. For a report on the statistics on Mus-
lims and on the process of identity allocation, see Amiraux, 2004. 
4  In Italian history there are other, even more stigmatized differences, such as the 
“racial” differences under the fascist regime. According to historian A. Del Boca 
(1998), up to the present day in Italy there has never been serious public reflec-
tion on Italian colonialism, and the myth of the “good Italian people” survives 
along with racist stereotypes. 
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therefore, that Catholicism cannot be the only true religion.5 Despite all of 
this, Italy continues to represent itself as a homogeneous society from a 
cultural and religious viewpoint. There are those who believe that Italian 
Catholicism might at its base be “a romantic idea” to be shared for the sake of 
unity (Pace 1998, 75–101).  
Nowadays Islam is often socially constructed as the “unassimilable differ-
ence” and as the “internal enemy” against whom “Western values” must be 
defended (Rivera 2003). However, if Islam causes such apprehension in 
Italians, it is perhaps in part because it reopens issues that are controversial 
independent of the presence of Muslim immigrants. Once again, the outsider 
becomes a mirror (Hervieu-Léger 2000; Amiraux 2004) and reveals tensions 
already existent in Italian society, such as secularism versus the Catholic 
Church’s monopoly of cultural values (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Fried-
berg 2005).6 As evidenced during the recent referendum on assisted insemina-
tion (Law 40), when the Church aggressively intervened in the public sphere 
by inviting Catholics to stay away from the polls in order to prevent voter 
turnout from reaching the necessary minimum, the relationship between 
religion and politics is not a specifically Muslim problem but rather a general 
challenge for all Italians (Rusconi 2000, 2005).  
Hence, starting from the hypothesis that Muslims serve as a screen against 
which some Italians project themselves as a unity (i.e., as a “Catholic coun-
try”), and imagining Italy to be modern and secular (as opposed to Muslim 
immigrants, with their “traditionalism” and “incapacity to separate religion 
and politics”7), let us see if and in which manner the Association of Young 
Italian Muslims has managed to question these collective representations, 
which have the effect of excluding them.  
 
 
Why the  Assoc ia t ion  o f  Young I ta l ian  Musl ims?   
 
The Association of Young Italian Muslims (hereafter the “GMI”) is com-
posed of about four hundred children of immigrants. The majority were born 
in Italy or were raised there since primary school. They are between 15 and 
                                                           
5  This internal pluralism within Italian Catholicism is rarely acknowledged. 
However, according to Garelli, Guizzardi, and Pace (2003, 297–298), cultural 
and political differences among Catholics have been present since the foundation 
of Italy: for example, there were papal extremists, but also modernists. These 
variances crossed over class divisions: think of peasant religiosity and of the 
social solidarity inspired by Catholics during the first workers’ movement, or of 
the liberal Catholicism of the enlightened bourgeoisie or of conservative Catholi-
cism among farmers. 
6  According to Sciolla (2005, 316), we are witnessing an increasingly pervasive 
interference of the Italian Church in issues of public or directly political interest 
along with the Church’s growing visibility in Italian mass media. 
7  For the historical roots of these representations, see Said, 1991. 
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17 years of age; the association’s leaders are somewhat older, between 18 and 
24. Girls are both more numerous and more active in the association. The 
majority of GMI members are high-school students; the leaders (both male 
and female) attend university and are majoring in science or the social 
sciences.8  
Most of the parents are Moroccan, but there is also a significant Syrian 
component among parents of the more active members. Other nationalities 
represented in the association are Egyptian, Palestinian, Jordanian, Tunisian, 
and Algerian. The members’ fathers are for the most part factory workers, but 
there is also a significant number of doctors and entrepreneurs.9 Their moth-
ers usually are housewives, but there are also maidservants and cleaners, 
intercultural mediators, social workers, and entrepreneurs.  
The largest local sections of the GMI are those in Lombardy, where it has 
its headquarters in Milan; Emilia Romagna; Piedmont; Trentino Alto-Adige; 
Tuscany; and Umbria. The best organized regions are in northern Italy; in 
many regions of southern Italy there are no local sections of the GMI.  
The social composition of the association mirrors in certain respects the 
population of the children of immigration in Italy: GMI’s members are 
concentrated in northern and central Italy, and the most common nationality 
of origin is Moroccan.10 On the other hand, the association is interesting not 
because of its representativeness,11 but because it is currently the only Islamic 
youth association active in Italy, because it came into being just ten days after 
9/11,12 and because it was able to give a voice to all the youths who are 
continually “called into question” as Muslims. 
                                                           
8  This case study is informed by my doctoral thesis work, for which I conducted 
qualitative research for over three years in the form of participant observation of 
the GMI, fifty in-depth interviews with children of immigrants born or raised in 
Italy (who now live in Milan), and four focus groups with young Muslims (mili-
tant and nonmilitant). My entry in the GMI was facilitated by a friend who be-
came the first secretary general of the association (she answered for my serious-
ness). I met the other young people who were not GMI members in Milan, first 
in high schools and universities and second through “snowball sampling.” 
9  Whereas Syrian parents are doctors, parents of Moroccan origin usually are 
factory workers. 
10  Because the stabilization of immigration in Italy is relatively recent, most 
“foreigners born in Italy” are much younger than GMI members and still attend 
nursery and primary schools.  
11  The reality of young Muslims in Italy is surely much more diversified—one need 
only think of the many different nationalities of origin which are not represented 
in the association.  
12  It was created from the ashes of previously existing Islamic youth associations 
(first, the group Islamic Youth; in 1999, AGESMI; and in 2000, The Mediator); 
with the exception of the latter all were dependent on the Union of Islamic 
Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII), the main Islamic immigrant 
association and one of the organizations that requested a formal accord (intesa) 
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“Nowadays Islam is being bombarded in every sense and thus it is important to be 
practical and to be visible and make yourself understood with your words and 
behaviors … We young Muslims feel extremely responsible because with every 
move we make and every time we speak we feel as if we are being observed. Even at 
school I have to watch every word I say because I feel like I am being watched … I 
do not feel like all the others … You are the only one with a veil at school … you are 
like a reference point … They look at us and say, ‘This is Islam.’”  (Z. K., 17 years 
old, Syrian Italian, GMI member)  
 
Some youths have in fact managed to make the best of a bad situation and to 
change this social pressure into an opportunity. Whereas adult Islamic 
associations still adopted defensive logics (by opposing “us Muslims” to 
“them Italians”), the GMI entered the public sphere and introduced a new, 
more inclusive category: “Italian citizens of Islamic faith.” Participating in 
various public debates and organizing activities for the children of Muslim 
immigrants, they have attempted to reach two main objectives: 
1. An “external” objective: they aim to become involved on the local, 
national, and European levels “for the cause of justice, peace, and defense 
of human rights” (from the statute of the association, Article 3). 
2. An “internal” objective: the GMI work to promote the identity construc-
tion of young “Italian and European” Muslims through educational activi-
ties aimed at promoting and deepening their faith. 
 
 
What  Kind  o f  Ci t izensh ip?  
 
In the course of three years of empirical research (2001–2004), the issue of 
citizenship has progressively assumed greater relevance, on the one hand 
because the GMI has had a central role in the discussions about belonging and 
the practices of participation,13 and on the other because the concept of 
“citizenship” has been invoked often enough by members of the association, 
to the point of becoming one of the slogans of the GMI.14 For instance, the 
fifth convention of the group (in Marina di Massa, December 25–27, 2003) 
was significantly entitled “New Citizens, Good Muslims,” and in the work-
shop in which they discussed what it means to be a Muslim Italian citizen it 
clearly emerged that it was not a “passport issue” but depended on “being part 
of a territory or not.” Also on that occasion diverse stories of discrimination 
and racism were shared, in such great numbers that participants proposed the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
with the Italian government (Allievi 1994; Guolo 1999; Pace and Perocco 2000; 
Elsheikh 2001).  
13  According to Delanty, 2000, belonging and participation are two key dimensions 
in a democratic conception of citizenship, which is based not upon ownership of 
rights, as in the traditional liberal model, but upon the fact of residing in a certain 
territory, feeling that one is part of it, and actively participating in social life. 
14  Another “slogan” of the GMI is that of participation in public life motivated by 
faith, that is to say, to be “protagonists, with the help of God!” 
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creation of a “database on the state of Islamophobia in Italy” through the 
gathering of daily experiences of young Muslims. At the end of the discussion 
different proposals for “becoming citizens” emerged: knowing how to 
compare yourself to others at school and in the workplace, being present in 
the social realm, doing volunteer work,15 and participating in public events 
and organizing meetings and seminars for discussing the challenges facing 
society as a whole.  
For these young people, as for young Muslims in other European coun-
tries such as France (Cesari 1998, 2003; Tietze 2002; Venel 2004), Islam is 
lived as one reference of identification, but not as the only one. Its importance 
is in bringing it to a level equal with other ones. As opposed to what their 
parents did and do, it is no longer simply a matter of claiming “the right to be 
different” (e.g., asking for mosques, Islamic cemeteries) but entails real and 
actual issues of citizenship.  
The GMI’s calls for inclusion come on different levels: local, because 
these youths actively participate in the life of the area in which they live;16 
national, because they feel Italian and want “formal citizenship” in order to be 
officially in possession of rights and duties. Moreover, there are symptoms of 
much larger claims, such as in the first steps that the association has been 
taking on a European level: the GMI is part of the European Federation of 
Young Islamic Associations and of the Youth Forum (which comprises lay 
and religious youth organizations from various European countries).  
The GMI have faced the theme of “formal citizenship” many times, dis-
cussing it both inside and outside the association. For example, in one of the 
constitutive meetings of the National Youth Forum (in Rome on May 30, 
2003), the GMI came up with the idea of starting a “campaign for direct 
access to citizenship for all children of immigrants,”17 in de facto support of a 
“citizenship of residency” (ius soli rather than ius sanguinis) of the sort in 
which civil, social, and political rights await those who are born in or live in a 
particular region or territory. This took a particularly innovative form in that 
the National Youth Forum concerned itself with opening a discussion on a 
European level as well, namely, within the European Youth Forum.  
                                                           
15  Some GMI members related their experience of volunteer work inspired by 
Christian associations. Furthermore, the GMI recently reached an agreement with 
lay environmentalist associations to organize communal activities. 
16  The first GMI candidate (in Reggio Emilia, in the center-left Margherita Party) 
ran for office in the most recent town government elections, and the first public 
appearance of the new mayor of Reggio was organized with the GMI in order to 
strengthen a “pact of citizenship with Muslim youth.” 
17  According to the law on Italian nationality, reformed in 1992, children born in 
Italy to foreign parents acquire the citizenship of their parents. They can request 
Italian citizenship within one year from their eighteenth birthday only if they 
have been continually residing in Italy from their birth up to the date of their 
application. On children of immigrants and citizenship, see Andall, 2003, 289–
294. 
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However, in almost all interviews with GMI members, there is a growing 
conviction that formal acknowledgement is a lengthy procedure and that it 
can instead be constructed “from below,” thanks to the visibility of youths 
who become an active part of society. For instance, Latifa is active in various 
associations, among them the GMI, and works as an intercultural mediator.18 
She participates in the public life of her region, expanding her social network 
as much as possible, in the conviction that this will help her to obtain formal 
recognition of Italian citizenship.  
 
“I’m 22 years old, born in Morocco, and now a student of sociology in Trento. I’d 
like to be a researcher … I try to meet a lot of people and to make myself known … I 
am not an Italian citizen, even if I feel Italian … You need to have a full-time job, 
years of contributions; it takes a long time … I’ve been here for twelve years. I grew 
up here like other young people from Trento, but I have an unstable life … I must 
find a job immediately, before graduation. If I don’t, I can’t study; my parents are 
unable to help me. I have permission to stay for educational reasons, and I don’t 
have a full-time job to make the request … which they can then refuse to grant. 
Without knowing why … It’s a problem that many of us feel; with the GMI we try to 
speak about it, to do something […].” 
 
National identification among GMI members, their “feeling Italian” despite 
their passport, does not exclude other bonds of belonging. As is common 
among many Italians, local identification—above all with the commune in 
which one lives—is very strong (Sciolla 2004, 57–66). There are certain GMI 
members who find motivation for their social commitment in “the love for the 
town in which they live.”  
For example, Badra is 19 years old, of Syrian origin, and lives in Carrara, 
Tuscany. She is known locally because she wears a veil: since she has gone to 
school she has had to answer questions about Islam and international terror-
ism (e.g., “Do you know Bin Laden?”). Growing up she learned how to 
entertain contacts with Christian friends and, with the support of the GMI, to 
participate in local activities on interfaith dialogue and at demonstrations of 
the global peace movement. Badra says, however, that this is not enough for 
her. She wishes “to help society, beginning with her town,” in a very concrete 
way: for example, by achieving the repainting of the station wall. As an 
“active citizen,” she believes that the community can become involved in the 
decisions that affect them and appears to hope that the “participatory 
budget”19 of the town of Porto Alegre, in Brazil, will be implemented in her 
beloved Carrara, too. In the meantime, thanks to the support of her family, she 
is occupied with her studies at the university, because she thinks that without 
that she would end up “accepting things just as they are.” Badra hopes instead 
                                                           
18  “Latifa” is a pseudonym, as are all other names of interviewees and participants 
quoted in this chapter. 
19  See the book by the Chilean sociologist Marta Harnecker, Delegating Power to 
the People, free for download at http://www.verademocrazia.it.  
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to be able to change them, beginning with herself and the region in which she 
lives.  
 
“I think Carrara is very beautiful: the sea, the mountains … I’d like to help society 
beginning with my city, you know? I don’t want to do things on a big scale … That’s 
why demonstrations aren’t enough for me; I want to do something concrete. Because 
the little things can be changed, you can see it. Like with the station: I kept talking 
about it, and, I swear, they finally painted it! Honestly! They painted the whole thing 
and now you can arrive at the station of Carrara and see that it’s decent … These 
things are very important to me. I’d love to know where all this money goes to … 
What in the world is the city government doing? What is it doing for our city? What 
projects are there for improving the city? Because we are going downhill … and this 
makes me sad. I’m interested in the experiences where citizens are aware of the 
expenditures and are given a voice … These are things that affect us. I’d like to be 
informed, to participate … I think they already do that in some other parts of the 
world […].” 
 
Although acting locally, some of the interviewed youths “think globally” and 
express transnational belonging as well, recognizing themselves in the 
composite social universe that has been called “movement of the movements” 
because of its many facets: it is a global movement for peace (Kaldor 2004), it 
is critical of the neoliberal model of development, and it aspires to an “other-
worldliness” (Ramonet et al. 2004), practicing a sort of “globalization from 
below” (Pianta 2001).  
So-called nonconventional participation (i.e., not related to political par-
ties or politics) is in fact their “normal politics,” that is to say, the most 
common form of participation among these youths, as it is for Italians in the 
same age group (Albano 2005). It can take the following forms: participating 
in a procession or demonstration, collecting signatures for petitions, sending 
press releases or letters to newspapers, writing to public authorities, and 
participating in events related to local problems.  
It is a “politics of everyday life” (De Certeau 2001; Ginsborg 2004), in 
which social actors express their power by means of small acts of autonomy: 
for example, by keeping themselves informed about events of public interest 
or by making responsible choices as consumers. Although these forms of 
participation are more common among urban youth (such as those inter-
viewed in Milan), in the course of my empirical research I also found this 
kind of activism among GMI members living in small towns of central Italy. 
Such is the case of Farida, of Sirian origin, who lives in Macerata, a small 
town in central Italy. She is a cyber-activist who finds on the Internet the 
sociality that she misses in her provincial town.  
 
“I’m 24 and I’m about to graduate, God willing … I’d like to leave Macerata and run 
away from the South! I’d like to go to Rome or Milan: there are more people there, 
more things happening … Because I’m an active person, I try to keep myself busy, 
but here it’s pretty hard! … I was at the big demonstration on February 15th … We 
were all there asking for peace, mostly young people … Millions of people, young 
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people from all around the world who were asking for peace and justice! … At 
home, I ask myself, ‘What can be done?’ … So I surf the Internet and try to get a 
better understanding … See, if I say ‘No global,’ you think about people who go 
around destroying ATMs … I try it in a different way … For example, the counterin-
formation I find on the Net, I take it to the university … I really pester everyone to 
boycott products that finance Bush. It isn’t easy … Some of my classmates think that 
they’ll die if they can’t eat Kit-Kat! I’ve never heard of anyone dying from a lack of 
Nutella! But I’ve got some friends who help me make photocopies and hang up 
flyers … On the Net I find advice about how to be active without leaving home … 
There are mailing lists where you can find exchanges of updates about which 
products to boycott. You can even do it from Macerata!”  
 
As we have seen, there can be different levels of belonging (national, local, 
and global) binding these youths to the rest of society. Their commitment is 
above all of a civic nature, and the prevailing form of citizenship emerging 
from what they say and do is democratic citizenship, based on active partici-
pation in the region in which they reside. However, when one observes the 
public initiatives in which GMI members participate as an Islamic youth 
association it becomes clear that the distinctive involvement of this organiza-
tion has been in the domain of intercultural and interreligious dialogue in 
public space.  
GMI activism in this realm has included participation in the following 
events: the annual interfaith meetings organized in Modena by the Associa-
tions of Italian Catholic Workers (ACLI); the “ecumenical days of Christian-
Islamic dialogue,” promoted over the last three years by some Catholic and 
Protestant magazines (Il Dialogo, Confronti, Tempi di Fraternità, Mosaico di 
Pace); the yearly summits of the Secretariat for Ecumenical Activities;20 the 
various interfaith dialogue activities organized on a local level together with 
various Catholic groups (e.g., the Focolarini in Turin, the Giovani Impegno 
Missionario linked to the Combonians in Trento, the Comunità di Sant’Egidio 
in Rome); the “Un calcio alle differenze” project (“A kick in the face of 
differences” project); the “meeting of civilizations in a soccer game” at the 
Tre Fontane Stadium in Rome;21 the day for “positive interdependence in 
memory of 9/11,” proposed by political expert Benjamin Barber and organ-
ized by the city council of Rome; the drafting of a common document with 
the Union of Young Italian Jews (UGEI) and ACLI youths entitled “Different 
Identities, Equal Rights” (2002); and the meeting called “Creators of a Plural 
                                                           
20  See AA.VV, Abitare insieme la terra. Comunità ecumenica e giustizia (Milan: 
Ancora, 2003), in which speeches from the 2002 meeting are collected (among 
them those of GMI’s former president). 
21  Organized to coincide with President Bush’s visit in Rome by the Triciclisti (an 
informal association that sprung up on the Internet) and by GMI members, it had 
the following objectives: “promoting dialogue and constructive cultural exchange 
between peoples of different cultures; proposing new ways to solve international 
controversies.” Among participating associations: the national association of 




Community: Young Italian Muslims, the Union of Young Italian Jews, FUCI 
and ACLI Youths in an Experience of Communal Life on the Themes of 
Politics, Religion, and Brotherhood” (in a Camaldolite cloister in Albano 
Laziale, March 19–21, 2004).  
This last event gained even further significance because it was preceded 
just a week prior by the tragic terror attack in Madrid. The opening press 
release for the meeting stated: “In an age in which any religion risks becom-
ing instrumental and seen as a cause of wars and conflicts, we want to 
reaffirm that communal living, sharing of the same spaces, mutual acceptance, 
and dialogue on an equal level are still possible. Religions are a resource for 
any society: they are society’s possibility for hope.” This experience was an 
important step in the strategy of social inclusion promoted by the association. 
In comparison with the dynamics of other meetings, in this meeting power 
was more equally distributed, and all of the interlocutors met and compared 
their experience and their ideas about the same issues, starting from the 
accepted point that they were unsolved matters for all three faiths. In other 
words, in Albano Laziale GMI members experienced what Baumann (2003) 
calls a process of “convergence,” in which social actors are able to cross 
borders (in this case religious borders), constructed by others and/or them-
selves, in order to reach common objectives: in this case, a transformation of 
the way in which “religions” are present in public space.  
These youths have challenged together the monolithic representation of 
Italy as a Catholic and secular country, discussing thorny issues such as the 
relationship between religion and politics and the meaning of being believers 
and citizens at the same time. To convey the innovative nature of these 
meetings, it is useful to present contributions to a focus group (on March 19, 
2004) involving around twenty young men and women active in Catholic, 
Jewish, and Islamic associations.22 
 
Young man from UGEI: “Where is the secularism of the Italian state? In public 
schools, in religion classes? In public television, where the pope is omnipresent in 
the news? In Parliament, where they are voting for the law on assisted insemina-
tion?” 
 
Young woman from FUCI: “They are different things … and there is independence 
from power structures: you can see it from the position the pope took against the 
war, a position differing from that of the Italian government … which did not seem 
to be much influenced by it […].” 
 
Young man from GMI: “Let us think one step ahead. With the ongoing unification of 
the European Union we will have to consider issues on another level … What will 
                                                           
22  The discussion group comprised two boys and three girls from the ACLI, one 
boy and one girl from the FUCI (University Federation of Italian Catholics), five 
boys and two girls from the UGEI, and three boys and four girls from the GMI. I 
had been sent by the GMI to serve as an observer of the discussion group, which 
was entirely self-managed. 
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secularism be like on a European level? Consider France. They forbid Muslims to 
wear the veil, but they celebrate holidays for everybody. Isn’t it contradictory?” 
 
Young man from UGEI: “We do not want crucifixes in classrooms because institu-
tions have to be secular, but citizens should be allowed to wear the kippah, the 
veil […].” 
 
Young woman from GMI: “Think about Germany. If the teacher wears the veil, what 
should you do? Expel her? It is discriminating because she is not proselytizing!” 
 
Young man from ACLI: “And think also of the issue of the Christian roots of Europe 
… Either we mention everybody, or it is better not to mention any religion.” 
 
Young man from GMI: “I would like a plural society where there is room for all 
points of view, religious or not.” 
 
Young man from UGEI: “Yes, but crucifixes are historically a part of proselytism by 
the Catholic Church. If you want to see a crucifix you should go to church, not to 
schools or public offices. It is OK to respect Italian and European Christian tradi-
tions, but nowadays the Church has to get out of the way of institutions.” 
 
Young man from ACLI: “The European Union is born out of the endeavor to leave 
World War II behind us […].” 
 
Young man from UGEI: “[…] and maybe the Crusades too!” 
 
Young man from GMI: “OK, religions have messed things up a bit … But they can 
help dialogue and change. We at GMI do not want separation; we do not want 
different, separate schools, but common spaces where dialogue is possible.” 
 
The youths participating in this discussion engaged in “social criticism” 
through their religious difference (Colombo 2003): they questioned secular-
ism and the level of democracy of the Italian state, and expressed their wish 
for a society that guarantees to a greater degree the right to religious free-
dom.23 Together they demanded the introduction of a “pluralist teaching of 
religion” in public schools, because “nowadays Italian society no longer is 
only Christian” and because “only public schools can teach believers to also 
be citizens.”24 
But what does it mean for these young believers to be citizens? During the 
same interfaith meeting, the GMI introduced the question to Catholic and 
Jewish participants who were discussing the ties between “religion and 
citizenship,” not knowing that the young Muslims present did not possess 
Italian citizenship. A very interesting discussion developed and was then 
                                                           
23  On the limits of the 1984 agreement between the Catholic Church and the Italian 
state, see Pace 2004a. 
24  This approach is currently being tested in Alsace Lorraine, in northeastern 
France, where different religious teachings are set in a broader framework of 
“education to values and citizenship” (Willaime 2000). 
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more deeply examined thanks to the participation of a young Jewish woman 
in a doctoral program in history at the University of Rome. 
 
Young woman from GMI: “As regards religion and politics, young Muslims are 
working inside democratic states … Yes, well what you hear about us wanting 
theocratic states makes no sense for young European Muslims … We are pluralists 
… It is written in the Koran that God created different tribes and peoples in order for 
them to get to know each other … What is important are the relationships between 
those who are different … That is the policy for a European Muslim and it is 
influenced by religious values, but in the sense that it is important to do good … 
together with others. We are influenced by the way in which we are perceived; it’s 
necessary to move forward, to stop thinking about Islam and about immigration. Let 
us speak as citizens … We must participate more … citizenship is very important 
because it gives the sense of belonging to a country, the desire for its well-being. 
There needs to be a different policy … They rejected my citizenship request three 
times, there is too much discretion involved … It’s hard psychologically. Where 
would they send me? This is my home.” 
 
Young man from FUCI: “Yes, there needs to be a different policy. I didn’t realize 
that you had these problems […].” 
 
Young man from GMI: “It’s not only her … Listen, it’s terrible to be forced to stand 
in that queue en masse for a piece of paper … It makes you feel … inferior. It’s most 
upsetting for those of us who were born here.” 
 
Young man from UGEI: “Well, there is a need for security … With terrorism there is 
a need for … checks … but these are bureaucratic things that will be resolved with 
time.” 
 
Young man from GMI: “Pardon me? I’d like to hear you explain more on this topic 
… Because giving citizenship to young people like us is … is … arbitrary. It 
depends on the city you’re in. There is no general rule […].” 
 
Young man from UGEI: Yes … well I come from Turin, San Salvario … And there 
the Muslims are closed, they’re not like you … There are illegal immigrants; there is 
petty crime […] 
 
Young woman from GMI: “The danger exists … On the other hand, correct policies 
will make the youths more responsible.” 
 
Young man from UGEI: “It’s not like there are only young people in San Sal-
vario […].” 
 
Young woman from GMI: “We began talking about the young people in Turin and 
then it reverberates to the adults … It takes time … These are peripheral prob-
lems […].” 
 
Young man from UGEI: “Yes, actually. Also in France there are problems with 
young Muslims, I think. They are closed … there are problems with anti-
Semitism […].” 
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Young woman from GMI: “We have contacts with other young Muslims in other 
European countries … We compare ourselves … and it is true that there can be 
closure. For instance, the English have a lot of complexes, they keep more to 
themselves … and until just a short time ago they held different meetings for young 
men and young women! … But here the earth is fertile, it can be worked … We’re 
the first generation of young Italian Muslims … We must use the time wisely … 
being here isn’t enough. It takes … an act of conscience … To know our objectives.” 
 
Young man from GMI: “It must be understood that there are Italian Catholics, Italian 
Jews, and Italian Muslims.” 
 
Young man from FUCI: “Like the title of the meeting, “a plural community,” right?” 
 
Young woman from UGEI: “I’ll give you a bit of Italian history that may help this 
discussion. Historically, in Italy religious minorities, the Jews and also the Walden-
sians, were not citizens like the rest (and they helped each other). Because the 
Waldensians were considered heretics they were persecuted by the Holy Inquisition 
… The Jews were seen by the Church as the murderers of Christ and were discrimi-
nated against … It can be said, however, that they were considered citizens, but with 
a few limitations … There’s no need to complicate the issue though: the Church 
sought conversions, but it was only the racism of the twentieth century that at-
tempted extermination … The Jews came out of the ghetto during the Renaissance 
… With the Risorgimento they thought they had participated in the unification of 
Italy … so much so that until the Shoah they felt more Italian than Jewish … The 
Jews were patriots, they couldn’t believe what was happening, with race laws—there 
were even Jewish Fascists! Now … that blind faith in the state doesn’t exist … It is 
important to understand history in order to be citizens.” 
 
Young woman from GMI: “That is also our point: to have the same rights, to be 
Italian Muslims.” 
 
Young woman from UGEI: “But you’ve been here for less time. Not since the birth 
of Rome! Many young Jews ignore history … But they can’t afford to. Because to 
each one of us is asked, ‘Where were you born, in Israel?’”  
 
As opposed to other interfaith meetings in which the emphasis was on 
agreement, on mutual reassurance in the face of wars and other dramatic 
events, these young people were able to go beyond “a pleasant intercultural 
exchange” (Demorgon and Lipiansky 1999) and confront complex issues, 
succeeding in developing and comparing conflicting points of view. What is 
the relationship between Islam and politics? The response that many experts 
give reveals an essentialist vision of Islam, for which any political undertak-
ing by Muslims—because they cannot “distinguish between public and 
private” and they have a “totalizing religious identity”—must be suspect and 
have as its secret agenda the “Islamization of the state.” The young woman 
from the GMI instead talks about democratic participation and a pluralism of 
values which guarantees the collaboration of all citizens for the “common 
good.” For her it is important that young Muslims be more active in the public 
sphere so that they can emancipate themselves from “how they are viewed,” 
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which is to say, as “foreigners.” Although she was born in Italy, she has been 
refused Italian national status, and her case is not isolated. Another member of 
the GMI adds that this is a status shared by “those who have been raised in 
Italy” (but born elsewhere). To not possess documents means, for example, 
having to undergo what seems like a ritual degradation: waiting for hours and 
hours in a queue outside Italian police stations (where residence permits are 
issued), amidst bureaucratic red tape and discretionary margins that have been 
denounced many times, even by Catholic associations.  
Faced with this demand for citizenship, a young Jewish Italian showed his 
concern by saying that not all of the Muslims are like those present at the 
discussion: in his opinion, the checks are necessary in times marked by 
international terrorism and criminality by illegal immigrants. Speaking of his 
experience in a part of Turin where many immigrants live (Semi 2004), the 
young man asserted that the recent political choices that have been made in 
the name of “security” are legitimate. The point of view of the young woman 
from the GMI was that these problems might be better solved through more 
adequate social policies, especially those aimed at young people. The young 
man from the UGEI then proceeded to develop another conflictual point, 
reporting episodes of “anti-Semitism” perpetrated by young Muslims: Can 
what has happened in other countries also happen in Italy? According to a 
young member of the GMI, it is still possible to anticipate those types of slips: 
young Italian Muslims are the first generation in Italy, and the experiences of 
other countries can be useful. Again taking up the “strength” of the associa-
tion (“we are Italian citizens”), a young woman from the GMI stated that the 
main challenge is cultural: it is necessary to understand that nowadays Italians 
no longer are only Catholics, but that there are also Italian citizens of Islamic 
faith. The final discussion with the young woman from the UGEI refers to the 
slower times of development in history: in Italy the Jews and Waldensians 
were not considered to be “citizens like others” for a long time. In order to 
obtain the same rights, they had to follow a path beset by obstacles. Not even 
someone like the young Jewish woman who considers herself autochthonous 
since “the beginnings of Rome” is protected from discussions that can 
exclude her and treat her as “foreign.”  
As we have seen, there is a part of Italian society which continues to 
imagine Italy as a “monoreligious” country, but from below there are those 
who are trying to change this representation and demand citizenship in a 
secular, multicultural, and multireligious country. GMI members are Muslim 
democrats, and together with young Catholic and Jewish leaders they are 
challenging the strong resistance to change, not only from the outside but 
from the inside too. All of the youths from religious organizations who 
participated in the Albano Laziale meeting in fact declared that in their 
experience “intracommunity” dialogue is often more difficult than dialogue 
between “peers of different faiths” (that is to say, among youths from the 
ACLI, GMI, and UGEI). Moreover, they expected difficulties in “reporting to 
headquarters” the discussions that they had amongst each other. Let us 
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therefore consider the difficulties that GMI members are facing, above all 
with the previous generation and with adult Islamic associations. 
 
 
Breaking  Defens ive  Log ics  
 
Relations with institutions and the media have elicited lively debate both 
within the association and with other institutions representing Islam in Italy, 
particularly with the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in 
Italy (UCOII). Young Muslims have, in fact, often met with opposition in the 
“control mechanisms which operate as guardians of the access to public 
space,” intended both as a space of representation and as a site of normative 
and institutional regulation (Amiraux 2004, 125). But what can be done when 
faced with this censorship, with the “framework shifts” and the imposition of 
the “security framework”? GMI’s approach is to continue to act as active 
citizens, though one consequence of this approach is to face phases of deep 
crisis on the “home front.”  
In January 2003 Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu publicly appealed to 
Muslims to make “a covenant with Muslim moderates,” declaring that “Italian 
Islam cannot be left to the mercy of its different souls” (La Repubblica, 
January 21, 2003). At first, GMI members tried to reframe Pisanu’s proposal 
in an interpretive framework in which Muslims are first of all “citizens.”  
 
“We believe that the only way to accomplish a real “Italian Islam” is through the 
new concept of Islam and Italian Muslims as actual and complete citizens, although 
with a different faith … We will be able to really say that Islam is well established 
when mosques are considered by all to be a part of the cultural legacy of towns and 
cities, as has already happened in other European countries. When Muslim citizens 
are subjects and not only objects of debate.”  (La Repubblica, February 9, 2003).  
 
In the same interview, the journalist obtained the following answer to the 
question of “who represents Italian Muslims”: “Parliament, beyond a doubt. 
For us ‘new citizens,’ the state and its institutions are the guarantors of our 
rights, of the rights of the community.” In a press release of May 24, 2003, in 
response to a new appeal by Pisanu, GMI members not only condemned 
violence but also declared that it is necessary to create “a society in which all 
can feel like citizens,” “based on equal rights and duties for all, in observance 
of individual freedoms and under the supreme guardianship of the Italian 
constitution.” In other words, GMI statements abandon the “security frame-
work” and the “reactive” and “defensive” position of “Muslim moderates,” 
and instead take up a democratic perspective, demanding, along with an end 
to violence, an acknowledgment by the state of equality of rights and duties. 
But with what results?  
Almost one year later, Pisanu once again talked about the representation 
of Italian Islam and, as always, he did so by using an interpretive framework 
of “safety” and “war against terrorism.” Members of the “Council of Moder-
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ates,” said the minister, would not be elected, but would be chosen for their 
“reputation as moderates” (Corriere della Sera, February 13, 2004). GMI 
members were among the “chosen ones.” Some months later, as a conse-
quence of the Beslan slaughter, GMI members signed a “manifesto for life 
and against terrorism” together with other “Muslim moderates” (Corriere 
della Sera, September 2, 2004).25 His signing of this document is one of the 
reasons that led former GMI president Anouar to turn in his resignation on 
December 11, 2004.26  
To understand what was at stake, it is useful to refer to the national con-
vention “Young Muslims and the New Europe” (in Chianciano Terme; 
December 27–29, 2004) by means of a brief ethnographic account. After 
three years of participant observation, during which I had followed the 
development of national conventions and the gradual acquisition of autonomy 
by the youth association, I noticed that there was a strong tendency towards 
lack of leadership in adult associations. The resignation of their president 
certainly brought confusion in the higher ranks of the GMI—so much so that 
up to the last moment the program for the three days had been suspended. For 
example, the program was supposed to include the participation of “profes-
sors external to the Islamic community” and the organization of workshops in 
order to provide the youths with more room for discussion. In the end there 
was no time for group work, and it was always the same persons who spoke 
from the stage (and from the audience): the vice president of the Association 
for Islamic Culture and Education (ACEI) and the president and vice presi-
dent of the UCOII—that is to say, three fathers of sons and daughters who 
also were participating.  
Conflict was “tamed” through continual official declarations of “frater-
nity”: not only between generations, but also among the youths themselves. 
Even when new elections were called, the candidates felt the need to make a 
communal public statement: “We are not competitors, we are brothers.” 
Afterwards they had pictures taken of them embracing each other. In the face 
of an event that the media had presented in dire tones (e.g., the daily newspa-
per Libero interpreted the resignation of GMI’s president as the result of 
“Islamist threats”), the young leaders chose an approach that seemed to me to 
be aimed at “playing down the tones” and reassuring the very young partici-
pants (as at the other conventions, the majority of participants were in the 15- 
to 16-year-old age group).  
I consider the following to be the most salient moments of the convention: 
(a) the speech by the ex-president on the reasons for his resignation and the 
                                                           
25  The text of the manifesto can be found at http://www.stranieriinitalia.it.   
26  Here, too, a pseudonym is used, even though it is easy to identify him because of 
his popularity (e.g., through frequent appearances on television, especially on a 
popular evening talk-show). He is 21 years old, comes from Casablanca, and 
grew up in Reggio Emilia. He recently moved to Naples, where he is pursuing a 
degree in Arabic Studies at the university. He writes articles for local newspapers 
and is very active in volunteer work (and has been since high school). 
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new elections; (b) the showing of the film East is East and the ensuing debate 
on “Muslim families”; (c) the round table between various leaders of Italian 
Islamic associations and the difficult “intracommunity” dialogue.  
 
 
GMI: One of the Many Paths for Young Muslims?  
 
Anouar resigned after one year as president, retracing the steps taken by the 
youth association (“We began within the UCOII, and then we sought more 
autonomy and founded the GMI”). According to Anouar, crucial points were 
“the process of taking responsibility and reaching self-awareness” among 
youths who want to “feel like protagonists” and the ability to “give a voice to 
those who did not have one.” Anouar was embittered because he felt that he 
had undergone a “campaign of pure defamation” and that he had received 
little support from within the association. Moreover, he wanted to stress that 
being a citizen means engaging in criticism and participating actively in social 
life. This is exactly what he tried to do. 
 
“We can never be full citizens if we are not aware of the fact that we are. Dialogue is 
not a strategy or a tactic for interaction. Believing in the values of pluralism, 
freedom, and democracy means living by them. It means we are within society and 
we participate. We communicate with the media not to be in the spotlight, but 
because we really believe that we are citizens.” 
 
The implicit reference is to the “fathers” who still adopt defensive logics 
towards Italian society and who blame the youth of having gone “too far” for 
personal ambition. Anouar invited all participating youths to feel free to “see 
it differently,” reminding them that in Islam there are four different juridical 
schools and that internal divergence runs deep. Only then, he argued, is it 
possible to discuss the problems they are facing without fear of betraying 
someone. “If there can be no confrontation and comparison, only defamation 
is left … Islamic Brotherhood? Yeah, right!” Anouar did not spare his peers 
from criticism either:  
 
“I thought that our vision was to become a launching pad to become full citizens … 
Our internal debate is fundamental. Otherwise, we will not have the strength to be 
autonomous and drive our decisions home … I will continue my commitment, I will 
try to be a critical mind and to support the GMI in another manner … as one of the 
many possible paths for young Muslims … May Allah accept and bless our journey. 
I hope that the brothers I am referring to will not feel offended but will instead take 
my words as a starting point to reflect together.” 
 
Anouar believes that one can be a “good Muslim” outside Islamic associa-
tions as well, and he views his participation in and contribution to the GMI in 
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this new light: he will try to contribute to the good of his brothers by means of 
cultural criticism.27  
Although Anouar’s speech definitely was disturbing, nobody took up the 
issues he had presented in order to challenge him. Some members of the 
leadership were evidently moved, though it seemed the interpretation circulat-
ing among them was that it was a matter of Anouar’s “personal problems.” 
By calling new elections, the leadership did not explicitly face the issues that 
had been raised, but it did express generic gratitude for what the former 
president had done. The central issue of autonomy from adult associations 
returned in the speeches of the three candidates, but in effect the conflict was 
passed over in silence. All were just concerned to declare themselves 
“autonomous”—though in full respect of their parents.  
But how is autonomy practiced? For example, one of the candidates (the 
son of the UCOII vice president) said that he wanted to invest more in 
religious training—which in recent years was quite limited, as the association 
was more occupied with external issues. He suggested that they … follow 
ACEI directives. Another candidate raised the issue of funding the association 
and he sought help … from the associations of the fathers. In other words, the 
presence of the previous generation made clear that independence has not yet 
been fully attained. The speeches of the youths also revealed a reluctance to 
pursue actual autonomy by creating the necessary conditions to practice it.  
The election was won by a 21-year-old man of Tunisian origin who stud-
ies political science at Padova University. His slogan (“Strong with our 
principles, positive in our society”) seems to have pleased many of the 
participating youths: it made a twofold claim (as Muslims and Italians) in 
continuity with the history of the association. Perhaps what helped the new 
president the most was the emphasis he placed on the participation of youths 
at the local and regional levels to re-establish from the ground up the priori-
ties and activities of the GMI. 
 
 
GMI: A Nonhostile Space to Express Oneself and Discuss Freely?  
 
East is East is an ironic cinematic tale (Ferro 2005) about the intergenera-
tional conflicts within a British Muslim family (the father originates from 
Pakistan). The showing was accompanied by strong opposition and criticism 
by those who saw the film as a provocation. According to them it was a “dirty 
film” containing obscenity and vulgarity. Others were instead interested in the 
story and tried to follow its thread despite the noise and chatter. With some 
difficulties, the showing was followed by an intense debate introduced in this 
way by the daughter of the UCOII’s president: “Who among you feels that he 
is represented in this film?” Silence followed. “Nobody, so this film does not 
represent us. In the film there is a bad Muslim father and a good English 
                                                           
27  See his first book, Salaam, Italia (Reggio Emilia, Italy: Aliberti editore, 2005). 
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mother.” The UCOII’s vice president then added, “The Islamic family 
depicted in this film is the exception confirming the rule. Islamic pedagogy is 
the best. Next time you will choose a different film.”  
Obviously, this “literal” reading of the film created an underlying misun-
derstanding (i.e., film = reality) and did not entertain them or make them 
laugh. This reaction was not, however, universal. A young man from a 
Moroccan family living in Perugia said that “these things happen every day” 
and that there was no reason to be shocked if it did not depict reality, because 
a movie inevitably conveys one point of view, that of the director. A young 
girl of Tunisian origin from Novara also spoke up for the film, explaining that 
“comedy always exaggerates things” but that it still can be useful to think 
about issues like mixed marriages, or the fact that the children in the film are 
de facto English but the father can hardly understand it—something that many 
young Italian Muslims can identify with. The opposing faction then stated 
that the film was “anti-Islamic” and that it was time to fight to change the 
image of Muslim families, telling stories in which “the best image of Islam” 
could emerge. Once again confounding film and reality, a woman from the 
Association of Muslim Women in Italy, who had some of her children in the 
room, added that “if the mother had been a Muslim there would not have been 
all those problems.” She later warned against “mixed marriages” and ended 
with a panegyric on “Muslim women.” A member of the leadership at this 
point tried to calm the situation by saying that the issues dealt with in the film 
were not “typically Islamic” but could just as easily apply to “a family of 
immigrants from Apulia in Germany.” He invited the audience to consider the 
GMI a “nonhostile space to express oneself and discuss freely.”  
Clearly, showing and then discussing the film was an experiment in plu-
ralism and democratic participation: a demanding exercise to try to break free 
from the apologetic “cages” of Islam which paralyze the thoughts of many 
Muslims, an attempt at (self-)criticism. It was possible to observe in action the 
issues raised by the resigning president. Of course, these challenges concern 
not only the GMI, as nowadays it seems particularly difficult for any Muslims 
to find a “nonhostile space to express oneself and discuss freely.” The 
considerable socioeconomic problems that many immigrant families face 
daily (Frisina 2005) and the prevailing interpretive frameworks of “security” 
and “culture” with respect to Islam surely do not help. As anthropologist Lila 
Abu-Lughod (2002) has pointed out, in order to engage in self-criticism one 
needs time and tranquility. As long as the rhetoric on the “clash of the 
civilizations” and on “Muslim women in need of rescue” prevails, intracom-
munity debates and “transverse alliances” will be that much more difficult.28 
                                                           
28  Discussions about the veil issue also suffer from this kind of approach, so much 
so that during the convention there were those who defined the veil as “the flag 
of Islam.” In this case it is not easy to discuss what it means, for instance, to be 
modest, because everything is interpreted through a framework of bearing wit-
ness against a society that stigmatizes Muslims. This is another example of how a 
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Towards a “Critical Brotherhood” 
 
Of the association leaders invited by the GMI leadership, only Nour Dachan 
from the UCOII, Abu Soumaya from the ACEI, and Omar Camilletti from the 
great mosque in Rome (Islamic League) showed up. The latter supports the 
controversial “manifesto against terrorism” and was the first to speak up: “Let 
us not allow that only Islamophobics criticize us; let us do it ourselves, too. 
For example, let us not cover for the brothers who err, be it a matter of a 
violent father or a political issue.” He then invited the youths to study in order 
to “make of knowledge the distinguishing feature of Muslims” and to commit 
themselves to interreligious dialogue with Jews “because one must learn to 
distinguish between the Jews and the policies of Israel.” Dachan’s contribu-
tion was rather declamatory: “They thought we were done for, and instead 
here we are! Let us not compete amongst ourselves; we must cooperate 
together with the government … Beware of journalists who sow discord! 
Long live the GMI, long live the UCOII!” The ACEI’s vice president also 
followed this defensive approach, taking a stance against the outside world 
and for a new alliance of Italian Muslims: “Those who do not hold Islam dear 
try to exhaust us … We do not want youths who work only to make a show of 
themselves; we want youth who work for the good of all Muslims.”  
The resigning president was in the room and, perhaps feeling that such 
speeches were in reference to him, intervened in the debate:  
 
“The clash is not personal … We are not within a family; we are talking about the 
activity of an association that is public and political! We all share respect for our 
parents and the value of a fraternal relationship, but we are members of civil society! 
We youths want the good of our society. Confrontation must not be private, for we 
must learn to answer for what we do in the society in which we live … The media 
must not be demonized! We do not live in an Arab regime; we are citizens in a 
democratic state! … And real pluralism requires rules and above all mutual ac-
knowledgement […].”  
 
The young man was visibly tense and straining to measure the weight of 
every single word he spoke, but in exchange he got only a chilling response 
from the speakers on stage. The UCOII’s president refused to answer him, 
and Camilletti declared that he felt embarrassed and that he censored himself 
“out of respect for his senior brother from the UCOII,” thereby preferring to 
leave criticism for another time. What about his own encouragement to 
engage in criticism of and among Muslims just a few minutes earlier?  
Observing the actions of the only “external” figure at the convention, 
Camilletti, the young participants perhaps have come to understand that 
“brotherhood” can lead to even a grown-up man being reluctant to openly 
express his dissent. “Intracommunity” dialogue was therefore merely hinted 
at. It was, however, the youths who felt a need for it, and the new GMI 
                                                                                                                                                                          
defensive approach eventually paralyzes internal discussions and ends up legiti-
mating a normative version of Islam. 
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president seems determined to follow this route towards a “critical brother-
hood” in which there can be room for dissent and change. 
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FROM MIGRANT TO CITIZEN:  
THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY OF ROTTERDAM IN 
THE FORMULATION OF DUTCH CITIZENSHIP
1
 
Introduct ion  
 
The establishment of Islamic educational institutions is an important way for 
Muslims to manifest their position as a religious minority. Although young 
Muslims living in Europe have expressed a clear need to gain knowledge of 
Islam, few Islamic educational institutions exist in European countries. At 
present, the vast majority of Muslim religious leaders who have completed 
religious training come from Muslim countries. Many imams were trained in 
educational institutions based in Muslim countries, and often reside in Europe 
only on a temporary basis. As is the case elsewhere in Europe, young Mus-
lims in the Netherlands are searching for their religion’s roots and for Islamic 
norms and Islamic solutions to social and individual problems in the Euro-
pean context (see Amiraux 2000; Lesthaeghe 2000; Roy 2000; Vertovec 
1998; Waardenburg 2000).  
In 1997 an interesting initiative was taken by a group of first-generation 
Dutch-speaking Sunni Muslims from various ethnic and cultural back-
grounds: they established the Islamic University of Rotterdam (IUR). The 
IUR’s main aims are, first, to be an academic institution that conveys and 
deepens knowledge of Islam to Muslims living in Europe, in particular the 
Netherlands, and, second, to inform non-Muslims about the religion and 
culture of the Islamic world on an academic level. It also offers training for 
imams. At present, the IUR is not formally recognized by the Dutch govern-
ment as a university or as a center for training imams. The university’s board 
is eager to have the institution obtain official status.  
In defining the strategy for making their religion visible in the Dutch pub-
lic sphere, the initiators of this Islamic university and its students must deal 
with complex political, ideological, and legal structures. As a consequence of 
their social empowerment, Muslim organizations increasingly fill the space 
                                                
1  This chapter forms part of my PhD research at the International Institute for the 
Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), which examines the role of imams 
in Turkish and Moroccan mosque communities in the Netherlands and Flanders. 
I would like to thank Valérie Amiraux and Frank Peter for their helpful com-
ments, and Elena Fiddian Mendez for making corrections to this English version. 
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that exists between the state and its citizens: collectively, by establishing 
religious organizations and, individually, by enabling processes of identity-
seeking. The Netherlands has a long tradition of religious pluralism on this 
intermediate level between the state and its citizens. However, both a strong 
process of secularization and an internationally fed distrust of Islam are 
undermining the process whereby Muslims can establish their position in civil 
society. 
As a religious academic institution, the IUR aims to provide Dutch society 
at large with a clear position on subjects that lie at the core of the normative 
definition of national and social belonging to Dutch society. Such subjects 
include the nature of gender relations, the separation of religion and politics, 
democracy, and attitudes towards homosexuality. As the IUR navigates the 
process of acquiring a recognized position in the Dutch public sphere, a few 
questions arise: Will the IUR be accepted and recognized as an intermediate 
institution in civil society? Furthermore, how can the IUR obtain its recogni-
tion, both as a university and as a religious institution, and on what condi-
tions?  
To understand the IUR’s position, it is important to review the twenty-
five-year debate on the establishment of imam training in the Netherlands. In 
so doing, I show how the legal possibilities for the accreditation of Islamic 
educational institutions are embedded in a historical tradition of religious 
pluralism, and outline the social and political fields in which the IUR must 
maneuver. After this introductory analysis, I look more closely at the IUR and 
examine the motivations and needs of the students searching for answers to 
their questions of faith. In the fourth section, I discuss some dynamics that are 
central to the constitution of the IUR. At this point it becomes evident that the 
IUR’s room for maneuvering in the public sphere is restricted.  
Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal explores the ways in which the customary pa-
rameters of the European debate on the formation of an Islamic community 
are often defined as either a divisive and antidemocratic threat or as a positive 
contribution to Europe’s political and cultural pluralism. “At issue,” she 
states, “is the compatibility of Islam—its organizational culture and prac-
tice—with European categories of democratic participation and citizenship” 
(Soysal 1997, 509–510). In this chapter I outline the ways in which this 
question of compatibility results in a paradoxical situation in which the IUR 
can claim its right to orthodoxy in a liberal democracy, yet wishes to avoid 
putting itself in an alienated position, “foreign to the normative categories of 
European democracy” (Soysal 1997, 510).  
 
 
Imam Train ing:  The  Publ ic  Debate  
 
Imams working in European societies find themselves at the crossroads of a 
complex interplay between local, national, and transnational contexts in 
which Islamic knowledge is produced and transmitted. Their tasks in local 
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mosques are more extensive than those of imams in the local mosques of 
countries with a Muslim majority. Historically, imams have been, together 
with other religious scholars, individuals who have had a certain degree of 
access to sacred texts. In the diaspora, however, they become both representa-
tives of the normative Islam that is configured from such texts and the ones 
who form a link between diasporic communities and the cultural and socio-
linguistic traditions of their countries of origin. In addition, imams are 
responsible for interpreting Islamic norms and values within the context of a 
secular, non-Islamic society. Partly because a substantial proportion of imams 
do not know European society from within, this process is particularly 
difficult and is looked upon with suspicion throughout Europe. At the same 
time, the second and third generations often find it difficult to understand the 
imam’s teachings and hesitate to share their problems with the imams.  
A vast majority of the estimated four-hundred salaried imams working in 
Dutch mosques are recruited by mosque boards in their countries of origin 
(Turkey, Morocco, and some other Muslim countries). For example, about 
one hundred and fifty Turkish imams from Diyanet mosques have been sent 
from Turkey as civil servants.2 A substantial number of imams therefore have 
little or no proficiency in Dutch; they preach in Arabic or Turkish upon their 
arrival in the Netherlands. Since the 1980s, the possibility of establishing a 
training program for imams has been consistently raised, and as of January 
2002 all alien imams entering the country have been required to complete 
specially designed courses that provide an introduction to the Dutch language 
and Dutch customs.  
Although the precise role and influence of imams in the Netherlands re-
main unclear, particularly with respect to their influence through sermons to 
the younger generation, imams are thought to play a key role throughout the 
process of Muslims’ integration into Dutch society. They are thought to play a 
key role because mosques and imams not only fulfill a religious but also a 
sociocultural role in the diaspora. Indeed, analogous to priests and ministers, 
imams were expected to be the obvious figures to assume the role of spiritual 
caretakers in government-provided prisons and hospitals (Boender and 
Kanmaz 2002; Rath et al. 1996; Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1997). How-
ever, imams did not appear to be trained for these new tasks of the pastoral 
caretaker. No new, strong Muslim intellectual elite (like those in France or 
Britain), which can authoritatively speak out on ethical matters and religious 
affairs in the public debate, has yet to emerge. The 1998 report of the Nether-
lands’ integration policy on imams stressed:  
 
“The government considers it of high importance that the leaders of the philosophi-
cal associations and organizations, including those which attract especially ethnic 
minorities, can communicate fluently in their Dutch surroundings and that they are 
well acquainted with the social structures and cultural characteristics of Dutch 
society. Here the government pays special attention to the social skills of imams, as 
                                                
2  The Diyanet is the Turkish Presidium for Religious Affairs.  
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they belong to the largest philosophical stream among the ethnic minorities. The 
present practice of recruiting imams from Turkey and Morocco should come to an 
end.”  (“Integratiebeleid” 1998, 17; my translation)  
 
Dutch imam training, as promoted by the government, would be aimed at 
substituting the current generation of imams with a “homegrown” generation. 
Imams trained in the Netherlands would obtain a thorough education in the 
Dutch language and Dutch society, both of which would be necessary for 
counseling Muslims who ask an imam for advice on problems emerging in 
the Dutch context. Furthermore, it is argued, this change would prevent the 
possibility of ideological and political (state) interference by Muslim coun-
tries (e.g., Rath et al. 1996, 246) and would thereby help preclude the imam-
led radicalization of Muslim youth. Indeed, it would lead to the formation of a 
“Dutch Islam.” Time and again, imam training is proposed as a solution to the 
problems that arise in the formulation of citizenship of first-, second-, and 
third-generation Muslims, as well as a means, in essence, of making “the 




The Legal Right to Establish Imam Training 
 
In its efforts to establish a separation of church and state in the Netherlands, 
the state historically has financed the academic education of the clergy, both 
at public and confessional universities and at seminaries. In the “pillar 
system” in place between 1900 and 1960, religion was strongly integrated in 
the public sphere, and religious diversity was institutionalized in four pillars: 
Protestant, Catholic, socialist, and liberal. Each pillar had the right to establish 
its own schools; these schools were granted the same legal status as public 
schools and were also financed by the state. At present, the government must 
provide equally for the prerequisites of all religious groups, without interfer-
ing in those groups’ internal affairs. Since the formal policy on minorities was 
implemented in 1983, it has been recognized that religion plays a central role 
in the development and reinforcement of the self-esteem of members of an 
ethnic group as well as a considerable role in their equality and full participa-
tion in society (Minderhedennota 1983, 110). This implies that if these 
prerequisites in the public sphere have not been established, the government 
should help to provide them (Hirsch Ballin 1988). For their part, Muslim 
organizations are entitled to establish imam training courses if they fulfill the 
legal requirements.  
There are three main ways that government-financed imam training can 
take place. The first way is to join pre-existing institutions. The second is to 
have the general education of professional clergy provided by a public faculty 
of religion, whereas clergy-specific education is provided by the religious 
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organization itself.3 The third way, which is the path chosen by the IUR, is 
that of allocation (aanwijzing; Adviescommissie Imamopleidingen 2003, 14–
16). At present the IUR offers higher education that is not financed by the 
state, and it is unable to offer either recognized titles for graduates or scholar-
ships for students (Adviescommissie Imamopleidingen 2003, 14). The IUR is 
not the only institution that functions in this way: the Islamic University of 
Europe, which split from the IUR in 2001 and is based at Schiedam, also 
opted for the allocation method and is organized in a similar way.4  
 
 
Practical and Ideological Obstacles  
to the Establishment of Imam Training 
 
Despite the existence of a number of privately run initiatives,5 a formally 
recognized Islamic academic institution has not yet been created in the 
Netherlands. On one level this is because there are clear rules for allocation, 
and the institutions opting for allocation have not yet fulfilled the legal 
requirements. There are, however, several other factors currently impeding 
the successful recognition of imam training. For instance, although consensus 
on the importance of imam training exists among Muslims, politicians, 
policymakers, and opinion leaders, opinions on feasibility, need, effective-
ness, content, and financing differ. Practical obstacles range from a lack of 
qualified teachers with a Muslim background who can teach in Dutch, to the 
confessional heterogeneity of Muslims in the Netherlands. Indeed, if imam 
training in the Netherlands is to be instituted, the religiously and ethnically 
divided Muslim organizations will have to reach compromises. Such com-
promises would relate, for example, to the length and content of the training 
program and the separation of theological and societal subjects. If imam 
education is not supported by a number of Muslim mosque organizations, 
there is a considerable risk that graduates will not be accepted as imams in the 
affiliated mosques.  
                                                
3  This is called “duplex ordo” and is treated in Articles XIII and XIV of the law on 
higher education and scientific research.  
4  Although the Islamic University of Europe acts in the same social, political, and 
legal spheres, a discussion of this institution and the reasons underlying the split 
are not within the scope of this chapter. 
5  Some private imam training exists in the Netherlands. Organized along doctrinal 
lines and ethnic background, these are financed by Muslim organizations. They 
have not shown interest in accreditation by the government. The Jamia Madi-
natul-Islam of the World Islamic Mission (WIM) Netherlands instructs imams for 
Surinamese, Hindustani, and Pakistani mosques in the Netherlands (Karagül and 
Wagtendonk 1994, 22). Graduates work as imams in various Dutch WIM 
mosques. This traditional training focuses on the memorization of the Quran. The 
Ahmadiyyah federation trains “assistant imams,” who can continue their educa-
tion in Lahore, Pakistan. Furthermore, the Turkish Süleymanlı have their own 
education (see Landman 1992, 269–270). 
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Apart from these practical obstacles, the representation of imams in the 
public debate carries much weight. Three recent events which have caused a 
great deal of moral commotion and unrest in Dutch society illustrate this 
point: the so-called El-Moumni affair, about homosexuality (2001); the 
“Nova imams,” about political enemies and domestic violence (2002); and the 
murder of Theo van Gogh, after a provocative film on the abuse of women 
(2004).6 Each incident renewed interest in the debate on imams’ roles, 
influence, and ideological backgrounds. In the “post-9/11 era,” there has been 
an increasing emphasis on secularism in Dutch political culture, in the sense 
of laïcité in France, where a strong differentiation between the political and 
the religious is made. This interpretation of secularism is extended to the 
marginalization of religion to the private sphere (Casanova 1994). This 
tendency, however, has not prevented the state from actively interfering in the 
question of imam training. Since 2002, the creation of formally recognized 
imam training has become the spearhead of the policies espoused by the 
minister of alien affairs and integration. 
 
 
The El-Moumni Affair 
 
In May 2001, a Moroccan imam from a mosque in Rotterdam, Khalil El-
Moumni, expressed in a television interview that “homosexuality is harmful 
for society” and that “if the disease spreads into Dutch multicultural society, 
everyone can be infected.” Although his remarks caused great moral commo-
tion in society, and charges were brought against him, the imam was cleared 
of the charges on the basis of freedom of religion. It was the first time that a 
traditional Moroccan imam had given his opinion publicly, and El-Moumni 
soon came to exemplify the problematic relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims in Dutch society, and in particular the problematic position of 
imams. Imam El-Moumni unintentionally paved the way for opinion-makers 
to state that Islam was antimodern and antidemocratic.  
The El-Moumni affair provided the framework for the continuation of 
discussion about the relationship between the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and the limits of tolerance. Key 
questions were duly re-evaluated, including the questions of whether freedom 
of religion should still take precedence over freedom of expression and how a 
liberal democracy should react towards oppression in the name of a religion.  
Until the end of the 1990s, the motto associated with the formal integra-
tion policy had been that citizens should be able to “integrate while preserv-
ing one’s own religious and cultural identity.” With El-Moumni, however, the 
key question became: Should the normative definition of citizenship be 
redefined, if it turns out that the central values of “Muslims” collide with the 
central, hard-won values, norms, and rights of “the Dutch”? Further, what 
                                                
6  For explanations of the image of imams in the public debate, see Shadid and Van 
Koningsveld, 1999, and Boender and Kanmaz, 2002. 
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does integration mean? Is it assimilation into the dominant culture, or partici-
pation as a citizen in all aspects of society while preserving one’s (religious) 
identity? What should the state’s role be in dealing with religious groups in 





The role played by imams in processes of (deviant) normative orientation 
again became apparent in June 2002. On the basis of secretly taped sermons 
that subsequently were broadcast on television, it appeared that five Salafi 
imams operating from Dutch mosques called for the destruction of U.S. 
President George Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, proclaimed 
that adulterous wives should be stoned, and approved of wives being slapped 
by their husbands. Public anxiety about these imams’ influence over their 
audiences coincided with a strongly growing concern about the increasing 
radicalization of Muslim youth; recruitment for jihad in Kashmir, Afghani-
stan, and Chechnya; and alleged ties between al-Qaeda and mosques in the 
Netherlands. Through these antidemocratic and antiliberal statements, with 
their message derived from political Islam, these imams crossed the bounda-
ries of the private religious sphere and propelled themselves into the center of 
general public debate.  
 
 
Theo van Gogh 
 
The polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims further increased 
following the murder of Theo van Gogh, a controversial filmmaker and 
publicist who spoke in crude terms against Islam as a religion and a culture. 
He had made a film about the abuse of women in the name of Islam. The film 
showed veiled women with lines from the Quran written on their bare skin. 
The murder suspect was a 26-year-old Muslim man of Moroccan descent, 
Mohammed B., who left a note on the deceased in which he threatened 
Europe with a war in the name of Islam. Following this murder, which took 
place on November 2, 2004, there were further questions posed about why 
and how young men like Mohammed B. feel attracted to radical and extremist 
views, where they acquire their knowledge, and which mosques and imams 
preach this form of radical thought. Moreover, the question of how other 
imams react to this trend towards radicalization, and what they can do to 
prevent its escalation, surfaced once again. What was particularly confusing 
for politicians, journalists, opinion-makers, and scholars, however, was that 
the murder suspect had grown up in the Netherlands, spoke Dutch fluently, 
and was not a regular visitor of any mosque in particular (although he had 
been spotted in one of the Salafi mosques in Amsterdam).  
WELMOET BOENDER 
 110
Political pressure to establish Dutch imam training increased when, 
shortly after the murder of Theo Van Gogh, a motion submitted by the Social 
Democrats, the Liberals, the Christian Democrats, and the Green Party was 
successfully adopted (Motie Bos c.s. 29 854, nt 10). In this motion, Parlia-
ment requested that the government stop issuing residence permits to imams 
as of 2008. In this manner mosques would be forced to recruit “homegrown” 
imams. A second motion urged the government to oblige imams to complete 
their training in the Netherlands.  
In February 2005, the Free University in Amsterdam received a govern-
ment subsidy to start a training course on spiritual caretaking. In its prospec-
tus, the Free University does not indicate cooperation with Muslim organiza-
tions. The applications to establish imam training presented by Leiden 
University, Groningen University, and the University for Humanistics at 
Utrecht were not granted by the minister of education and the minister of 
alien affairs and integration. Leiden’s application was not accepted because it 
proposed to admit only students who had completed extensive training in 
Islamic sciences in the Muslim world. One of the reasons behind Groningen’s 
rejection was its isolated location. In reaction to the rejection of these univer-
sities’ proposed courses of study, the main Sunni and Shi’a umbrella organi-
zations (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid and Sjiietische Islamitische 
Raad) announced that they intend to establish their own imam training, but 
have not mentioned any possible cooperation with the IUR. 
 
 
Young Musl ims  and the  IUR  
 
The University  
 
The IUR’s main aims are twofold: first, to be an academic institution that 
provides and deepens knowledge of Islam to Muslims living in Europe and in 
particular the Netherlands and, second, to inform non-Muslims about the 
religion and culture of the Islamic world on an academic level. The university 
has created an extensive study program in Islamic sciences such as Quran 
recitation, tafsir, hadith, and fiqh; theology; courses in sociology and com-
parative religion, Islam in the modern world and Islam in the Netherlands, 
and Christianity; and ney lessons (a Turkish flute). The IUR also provides 
intensive language courses in Arabic. There are three faculties within the 
IUR: the Faculty of Islamic Sciences, the Faculty of Languages and Civiliza-
tions, and the Faculty of Islamic Arts. Courses of study leading to a BA or an 
MA are offered. The MA consists of imam training and training for spiritual 
caretakers and includes a research component. The three PhD projects 
currently being completed are on Turkish imams in Dutch mosques and their 
opinions on modern religious matters; halal food; and Ottoman-Dutch historic 
relations. A fatwa commission has been installed, but is not yet active. 
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Although the university was founded by an interethnic group, after the 
split in 2001 from the Islamic University of Europe the IUR’s orientation 
became decidedly Turkish, because the board consists of Turkish professors. 
However, the twenty-eight male teachers are in actuality quite diverse in both 
ethnic and “confessional” terms. As Sunni and Shi’a, they have received their 
training in the Muslim world at different Turkish universities, al-Azhar, the 
Islamic University of Medina, and Baghdad University. There are also a few 
non-Muslim Dutch teachers. The board never tires of stressing that “the IUR 
is not the spokesman of any particular Islamic religious sect or politi-
cal/ideological party or any other group” and that “the IUR is truly committed 
not only to Islamic values and the cultural values of the Netherlands but also 
the principles of Dutch higher education” (Islamic University of Rotterdam 
[IUR] 2002, 76). In their teachings they do not follow one particular madhhab 
(Sunni law school) or one religious current. The languages of instruction are 
Arabic, English, and, increasingly, Dutch.  
The 428-page study guide for 2003–2004, which outlines as many as 193 
courses accompanied by extensive reading lists, illustrates their high ambi-
tions. Critics argue that their ambitions are, in fact, unrealistically high. 
Another point of criticism is that they have called themselves a university. A 
number of reasons lie behind this decision: other Dutch colleges of higher 
education became universities in the 1970s; the IUR wishes to connect to the 
Dutch law on higher education; and the designation of university opens up 
connections in the Islamic world. Status and prestige are also key factors in 
their decision to call themselves a university.  
There are many challenges to the university’s ambitions. One is the enor-
mous variety in the students’ backgrounds and their existing qualifications. A 
second, very significant obstacle stems from the language deficiencies of both 
teachers and students. The university is “modestly satisfied with the students’ 
linguistic and academic profile” (IUR 2002, 33). Both teachers’ and students’ 
language deficiencies in Dutch in particular, but also in Arabic, form a “weak 
point in the agenda of the university” (IUR 2002, 33). Other obstacles relate 
to the IUR’s overall financial position, the teachers’ salaries, and working 
conditions. As a private institution it has been financed thus far by subsidies 
(10 %), tuition fees (30 %), and donations from various private sources, most 






According to the IUR, in 2005 there were 147 full-time students and 170 part-
time students. In practice, there is a relatively large percentage of “drop-in, 
drop-out” students. There is also staggering variety in the backgrounds of the 
students. They vary widely in their linguistic, ethnic, and sociocultural 
backgrounds as well as in age; their former educational profiles and profi-
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ciency outcomes are very diverse; and they have different educational atti-
tudes and objectives (IUR 2002, 71). The male-to-female ratio is approxi-
mately 45 to 55.  
Two main motivations to study at the IUR can be identified. The first 
group is formed by young, postmigrant students who are searching for 
knowledge of Islam through a critical examination of the religious sources, 
independent of parents and the imam. They are guided by the Islamic pre-
scription to learn as much as possible about one’s religion during one’s entire 
life. Mehmet, Fatma, and Emine belong to this first group.7 Mehmet was born 
in the Netherlands in 1971, completed a PhD in physics at a Dutch university, 
and is currently unemployed. For him, study at the IUR is not only a good 
way to fill his time between jobs. More important, he started at the IUR after 
completing several years of Arabic lessons with an imam in Utrecht.  
 
“The reason I came here was that I just wanted to learn the source of Islam better. I 
wanted to know why we do things the way we do them. So, to learn the real source, 
to be able to hold on better to the faith. Because I am a practicing Muslim. So much 
is said in society, by Muslims. And so much is based on false information. Thus, I 
thought this might be a good opportunity to get things clear, to list all the 
points.”  (Mehmet) 
 
This personal search for knowledge about “real Islam,” aimed mostly at the 
enrichment of personal knowledge, was also a priority for Fatma (born in 
Turkey in 1969, migrated in 1970) and Emine (born in Turkey in 1960, 
migrated in 1986). They are both inspired by the teachings of Said Nursi, and 
both followed a few years of Islamic high school, imam-hatip-lisesi, in 
Turkey.  
Not only at the IUR, but in Dutch society as a whole, young believing 
Muslims express a great need to acquire a substantial knowledge of their 
religion. With this knowledge they try to legitimate, in a religious manner, 
their particular way of living. Apart from searching for the spiritual values of 
Islam, they are eager to find information about Islamic norms, about what is 
halal and haram and everything in between. In their interethnic meetings in 
non-Islamic, secular society, they are confronted with the singularities of their 
parents’ religious practices. In providing answers about such practices, they 
differentiate between what they call “real Islam” and “cultural Islam.” As 
Emine explained, “the problem is that Muslims are different here. They say 
‘this is Islam,’ but it is not Islam. Their behavior is a result of their culture, 
not Islam. […] The university must provide information and be very active.”  
                                                
7  In order to ensure confidentiality, I have used pseudonyms for the students. The 
interviews referred to throughout this chapter took place in September and Octo-
ber of 2003 as part of my PhD research. I visited the IUR approximately fifteen 
times between September 2003 and November 2004, attending seminars and 
openings of the academic year, and speaking with the rector, the vice rector, the 
secretary general, and several teachers. 
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This stress on defining what is “real Islam” helps to dispel interethnic dif-
ferences in the interpretation of Islam. By emphasizing “real Islam,” Muslim 
youth also hope to clear the barriers that exist between their parents’ world 
and their own.  
 
“Our parents were satisfied with a brief explanation about how something should be 
done. We, the youngsters, are educated at school to ask questions like, ‘Why or why 
not?’ We are more curious. And we have learned to think in a certain manner. I used 
to ask my mother about the reason behind something like, ‘Why can’t we see God?’ 
And then she reacted with ‘Oh, you should not even ask that!’ But I was always 
looking for reasons. That was the beginning of a search for my own identity, while I 
was already Muslim. With us it is: From birth you are Muslim and after that as well, 
but you only learn from your own initiative what Islam means exactly. One’s parents 
think: We have taught them enough, as we have sent them to the mosque. But that is 
not enough. For me, that has been the reason to study here at the IUR.”  (Fatma) 
 
At school, young people have learned to critically discuss the material and 
subjects that are taught. They thus treat religion differently than their parents 
do. This difference is also evident in the changing attitude towards imams in 
the local mosque. Language is not the only barrier that exists, for the way in 
which an imam communicates his views to the young is clearly also impor-
tant. Young people want to know the background to certain norms. They 
regard such knowledge as a modern way of explaining Islam. A recurring 
criticism of imams and other classical authorities is that they only speak of 
what is allowed or forbidden, without explaining the reasons behind these 
norms and rules.  
However, throughout this process, which is visible in other European 
countries as well, the second and third generations are left to find their own 
resources. Indeed, those resources are very limited, because they often do not 
possess the key to the sources of Islam: a knowledge of Arabic. The young-
sters often have strikingly limited tools and insight into the historical tradi-
tions of interpretation and religious currents. For many, the Internet has 
become a major source of information. As a Muslim initiative, the IUR can be 
regarded as a response to young people’s needs.8 Not surprisingly, many 
students are still at a preliminary stage of training. These students are very 
eager to learn Arabic, a language that enables them to study the sources for 
themselves. As Fatma pointed out, “the teacher must communicate the 
contents of the Quran and hadith to me. However, he should not interpret it 
himself. I’ll do that. I’ll find it out myself.”  
In this quotation we see how Fatma aspires to obtain intellectual auton-
omy in moral and spiritual matters. Furthermore, through knowledge of “real 
Islam,” young Muslims can defend their religion in a seemingly hostile 
environment. “It is not Islam that is wrong, it is just that Muslims sometimes 
give the wrong image,” is an oft-heard explanation given by young believing 
                                                
8  Other Muslim responses to this need are the aforementioned Islamic University 
of Europe and Dar-al-Ilm, which provides short courses on Islam in Dutch. 
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Muslims. For Emine, this is one of the reasons she studies at the IUR: “I 
would like to see the Dutch and the Muslim communities cooperate, reaching 
out for each other’s hands. I want to change the ideas of people who equate 
Islam with terrorism. I would really like to change that idea.”  
The second of the two groups consists of students who migrated at a later 
age, due to circumstances of family formation and reunion or because they 
were asylum seekers. Members of this group see it as a logical, and often as 
the only possible, step to continue the education that they began in their 
Islamic country of origin. Hawa (born in Syria in 1958) studied at Damascus 
University and worked as an English teacher in Syria. She greatly regrets that 
her work experience is not valued in the Netherlands. Since her arrival in the 
Netherlands, she has undertaken voluntary work in a Dutch home for the 
elderly, but was unable to continue there due to language barriers. She has 
now found part-time work at the mail distribution office and also teaches 
Arabic to Dutch individuals. “I have time; I have no full-time job,” she 
explains. “I can study here and perhaps get a job in the future. That is my 
objective. And besides that, there are some people, not all, who think, ‘Islam 
equals the headscarf.’ But Islam is more, Islam is deeper than that.”  
Mohammed, born in Morocco in 1975, migrated in 2001 and is now in his 
final year of studies. Having studied theology at Qarawiyyin, Tétouan, 
Mohammed was able to skip several years of study upon his enrollment at the 
IUR. Although he speaks Dutch reasonably well, study at the IUR presented 
him with a good opportunity to receive a higher education. He hopes it will 
enable him to pursue an MA at a Dutch university. For students like Moham-
med and Hawa, who have a language deficiency in Dutch and sometimes in 
English as well, the IUR may provide the only opportunity to receive a higher 
education, although the university’s policy is to focus increasingly on becom-
ing a Dutch-speaking institution.  
 
 
New Religious Discourse  
 
In his 1996 book, Felice Dassetto predicted that the leadership of the Muslim 
community would be transferred from first-generation Muslims to the second 
generation, newcomers, and converts. Furthermore, he foresaw a passage of 
leadership from the local to the national level, to which we can now add, as a 
further step, the transnational level (Roy 2003). Dassetto was forced to leave 
open the question of whether the new Islamic centers—which “a bit pom-
pously call themselves ‘universities’”—would be among those to produce 
these new leaders (1996, 158). His question can now be directed to the IUR, 
but cannot yet be answered. The ambition to contribute to the building of an 
elite is indeed expressed by the IUR’s board. Concrete examples of contribu-
tions to the Dutch public debate are the seminars and lectures organized by 
the IUR over the past years. Topics covered during these seminars and 
lectures include interreligious dialogue, honor killings, female circumcision, 
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and Islam and democracy. IUR professors outlined the different points of 
view in relation to these issues from the perspective of various schools of law 
(including the Shi’a Jafari school). These seminars were attended not only by 
IUR students but also by Dutch representatives from social organizations. 
Referring to the conference on female circumcision held in December 2003, 
Edien Bartels remarked that  
 
“this conference at the Islamic University of Rotterdam was particularly significant. 
Muslims in the Netherlands that fall under Islamic schools of religious law in which 
circumcision of girls is not addressed—and who have actually never been involved 
in circumcising girls and reject the practice—are nevertheless trying to be clear 
about the rejection of this custom from the Islamic point of view. In so doing, they 
are taking responsibility for each other. Discussion is now underway about the 
development of a ‘Dutch’ Islam.”  (Bartels 2004, 397) 
 
Through these seminars, the IUR provides normative information about the 
compatibility of Islam and the West. 
The IUR’s students take up a modest position: they regard their knowl-
edge as still rather limited and not authoritative. Male and female students 
often are active in small, local discussion groups, women’s associations, and 
peer groups, and they spread their knowledge through these groups. Some 
provide lessons for children and teenagers, with male students concentrating 
on communicating with other males, females with females, and both genders 
with younger children. One of the few Dutch-speaking Muslim lecturers, a 
young man of Pakistani origin who speaks at debates on Islam organized by 
Muslim student associations, also followed the lectures at the IUR.  
Although their influence is mostly limited, the formation of a group of 
educated individuals with a strong Muslim identity will have an impact on the 
strengthening of Muslim identity at the community level. According to the 
interviewees, this process of strengthening religious identity and engagement 
as a citizen should take place not only start in the university but also in the 
family, in local Muslim organizations, and in mosques. But the university, as 
Mehmet points out, can play a special role in this process: “What I see is an 
estrangement from Islam. And I am pessimistic if that increases, for the 
Netherlands, for Islam. Little by little, people move away from Islam. Maybe 
the university can play a role in changing that process, I don’t know.” Ac-
cording to Mehmet, a reinforcement of identity promoted by the IUR might 
help to stop the secularization process taking place among young people who 
are loosening their ties to their original home countries and thus losing their 
religious and moral “nourishment.”  
Hawa, on the other hand, describes how she sees the Islamic university 
fitting into modern life, maintaining that it is important precisely because it 
offers the individual believer the opportunity to choose between options. “I 
think that the Islamic university fits well into modern life. It is not conserva-
tive. It accepts all people. It does not look at what is the madhhab, what is 
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Sunni, what is Shi’a. Many teachers here are Sh’ia and many are Sunni … 
That is good: choose what you like.”  
Could we consequently say that the IUR is an educational institution that 
strengthens individualization by offering a place for students to gain intellec-
tual and spiritual autonomy? Or does it offer a counterweight against the 
individualization and strong bricolage of believing youngsters’ religious 
practices? It does both. As I have shown, the main motivations to study at the 
IUR fit with the tendency towards individualization in the former sense. But 
the IUR also offers a counterweight against individual bricolage, since it 
stimulates its students to study the usul al-fiqh, the sources of Islamic law, 
instead of being satisfied with a “copy-paste Islam,” individually constructed 
from the Internet and (translated) books.  
In response to a question about his understanding of the role played by the 
IUR, Mohammed answered: 
 
“If someone comes here who is bad, but wants to find the way back to Allah, he does 
not go to this university. He goes to people who are a bit extremist or radical. They 
provide other things to him, things which are not in Islam, you see. And then he and 
they become more evil. But if it is someone who wants to know Islam well, he 
comes to this university, where there is an academic level and where people analyze 
things, who proceed with time and know what is correct and what is not. If they 
come here, they learn the right Islam and they can help other people outside. Then 
they can get good jobs, such as spiritual caretaking.”  (Mohammed) 
 
Mohammed has distinguished for himself between “true” and “false” Islam, 
and it is clear that he believes the IUR provides him with access to greater 
knowledge about the former.  
 
 
Conf l i c t ing  Expectat ions   
 
On the one hand, the IUR tries to make use of the legal remnants of the pillar 
system referred to above, as well as the importance placed in the constitution 
on the equality of religious and philosophical groups. It should be noted that I 
am not arguing that this emancipatory process is similar to that experienced 
by the Catholics and the Protestants as they negotiated the Dutch pillar system 
of the twentieth century. The ethnic and religious backgrounds of the Muslim 
communities are heterogeneous, and consequently the internal power dynam-
ics are characterized by division and struggle. The economic, social, and 
political position of Muslims is weak, and the support from Muslim organiza-
tions of the IUR is in essence extremely limited. Some of the Turkish teachers 
and students are inspired by the teachings of Said Nursi, and the perception of 
being Nurcu, or Fethullah Gülen, is a considerable hindrance to becoming 
accepted as an authority by other Muslim organizations, whether of Turkish 
or non-Turkish origin. In addition to these factors, the split giving birth to two 
separate Islamic universities (the IUR and the Islamic University of Europe) 
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further complicates the situation. The relevant question is whether IUR 
graduates will be accepted as imams if the IUR is not supported by the 
umbrella organizations and the individual mosque boards.  
On the other hand, the IUR makes use of the opportunities that arise in the 
debates on the creation of imam training, presenting itself as in the race to be 
an appointed provider of imam training both to the ministries of education 
and of alien affairs and integration and to the relevant Muslim umbrella 
organizations. Although imam training as such is not its central focus, it is in 
the IUR’s interest to emphasize that it can provide the imam training currently 
in demand. Indeed, it has applied for a “starters’ subsidy” in order to expand 
its present imam training facilities.  
This potential opportunity created by demand raises the question of 
whether the IUR should focus primarily on the study of Islam or on imam 
training. The students’ descriptions of their main motivations to study at the 
IUR make clear that the institution answers their need for the study of Islam. 
The IUR is a place where people can learn to develop their knowledge 
autonomously, independent of the imam. According to my research, there are 
only a handful of students following the imam training course specifically. 
Women are not interested in imam training, as this is a male domain.9 Meh-
met and Mohammed were not interested in obtaining a position as formal 
imams at a Dutch mosque, and provided several reasons for this decision. 
First, they do not believe that imams are best positioned to change society. 
Second, they do not want to be cornered between the mosque board and the 
believers who come to the imam, twenty-four hours a day, with their personal 
problems. Third, the financial standing of an imam is very low, given that the 
mosque community is responsible for raising the funds to cover his salary. In 
addition to these points, Mehmet and Mohammed do not consider the mosque 
to be the only location from which one can change things and reach people. 
Not only among the respondents, but also among higher educated Muslim 
youth in general, I have failed to detect much enthusiasm for the profession of 
imam. It is possible, however, that individuals did not consider it appropriate 
to indicate that they do in fact wish to become an imam, as such a claim could 
be perceived as awarding themselves religious authority in advance.  
Many of the IUR’s problems are related to the fact that the university is 
not yet recognized and thus not financed by the state. The students hope that 
the institution will soon acquire a recognized status, and this hope is often 
connected to their financial position, as Fatma explains: “Since it is not 
recognized, there are not many students. Everyone must work: how could you 
otherwise afford it?”  
The students also expect that if the IUR is recognized, they will be taken 
seriously as Muslims, and be able, Mohammed pointed out, “to contribute to 
the position of Muslims in the Netherlands.” According to Mehmet, this will 
be possible “because people will be able to find a job which has to do with 
                                                




Islam, like spiritual caretaker, teacher, or imam.” “If we are recognized,” 
Mohammed explained, “people will have to take our opinions into account. 
They must look at our theses, at what subjects we studied, at who we are. 
Then we can show that the university brings something that does not yet 
exist: imams.” Their position as citizens would change, leading to their 





Despite the aforementioned successful public seminars held over the past 
years, the IUR’s elbowroom in the Dutch sociopolitical context seems to be 
rather limited. This became clear when the newly appointed rector, Professor 
Ahmed Akgündüz, explained in a newspaper interview that the prescriptions 
of the Quran and Sunna will remain valid forever. In the interview, he gave 
the following examples: a Muslim woman is not permitted to marry a non-
Muslim man; a Muslim daughter receives half of the inheritance that a son 
receives; and a Muslim husband is allowed to slap his wife—provided that the 
woman is responsible for the marital conflict, that the man is unable to make 
her see reason in other ways, and that slapping will not physically harm her 
(Trouw, November 7, 2000). The headline “Rector IUR: You May Hit Your 
Wife, but not Regularly” caused moral commotion. Reactions came from all 
directions, including Parliament; some Muslim organizations, which took the 
opportunity to express their distrust towards the IUR; and the IUR itself. The 
former rector, Süleyman Damra, who is familiar with the Dutch language and 
Dutch sensitivities, tried to make the best of it by ensuring that the “alma 
mater advocates an Islam that fits into liberal Holland” (Trouw, November 8, 
2000). Several specialists on Islam stated that the declaration of the un-
changeability of the Quran and Sunna showed the rector’s conservative, 
orthodox attitude, and would alienate him from the generation of young 
Muslims who are looking for flexible and liberal outlooks on Islam (e.g., 
Leila Jordens in Trouw, November 9, 2000).  
Since this incident, the IUR has been reluctant to comment on “hot” social 
issues when there is a conflict between Dutch and Islamic norms and values.10 
                                                
10  This does not mean that they do not give any public reactions. They have issued 
press releases on the following: Ayaan Hirsi Ali (January 27, 2003); the an-
nouncement of the vision and mission book (June 19, 2002); Dutch Islamic 
schools and relations with fundamentalist movements (February 25, 2002); in-
formation on Id al-Adha (February 22, 2002; in English); statements made by 
Pim Fortuyn (February 11, 2002); information on Ramadan (November 16, 2001; 
in English); the announcement of the project “Imams: Conditions and Functions” 
(November 5, 2001; in English); “A Terrorist Cannot Be a Muslim, Nor Can a 
True Muslim Be a Terrorist” (September 13, 2001; in English); the opening of 
the fourth academic year and announcement of the new board (September 3, 
2001). See the university’s Web site: www.islamicuniversity.nl (January 2004).  
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In their reactions to the El-Moumni affair (e.g., in a television interview by a 
group of older male students; Nova, May 17, 2001), they condemned homo-
sexual deeds as being against Islam. However, the IUR’s board realized that a 
condemnation of homosexuality itself would cause a great deal of resistance 
from society at large and would only further discredit the university’s position 
as a liberal Islamic institution. Since the El-Moumni affair, an individual’s 
position on the issue of homosexuality has become a symbolic criterion for 
one’s integration as a Muslim. An official IUR statement on homosexuality 
would only have gained acceptance in wider society if it contained some form 
of disagreement with El-Moumni’s statements and a permission of both 
homosexuality and homosexual deeds on Islamic grounds.  
 
 
“Real” Islam or “Dutch” Islam? 
 
In the public debate on Islam and on imam training, some people seriously 
question whether Islam can function as an emancipatory force in the context 
of present-day Dutch society.11 According to this view, Islamic culture is 
backward, antidemocratic, and nourished by the political ideologies of 
Muslim countries, particularly by Wahhabi Islam. This construction of the 
Muslim as “the other,” which began in colonial times, intensified in the 1990s 
and became even stronger after 9/11. As elsewhere in Europe, in the Nether-
lands “questions increasingly concentrate on issues regarding ‘real’ and 
‘good’ Islam as opposed to supposedly less constructive readings of Islam” 
(Douwes 2003, 4).  
The students interviewed in the course of my research appear to be aware 
of this tension and discuss relevant issues accordingly. What should the rector 
have done, in their opinion? Hold firm to his explanations and beliefs, or 
change his opinion under pressure from dominant society? “If he had done 
the latter, I would consider that weak of him,” Fatma stressed. “But you must 
show society that the values are similar, but that the norms can be different 
sometimes. That is dialogue, isn’t it, that we recognize that.”  
Mehmet referred to the IUR’s task of bringing back Muslims who have 
strayed too far from the sources. According to him, some Muslim spokesmen 
are too flexible in their interpretations of Islam. He doubts “if the IUR can say 
that formally, I don’t know, because you can burn your fingers on it,” and 
continued by mentioning the incident with the rector’s statement and the 
commotion that it evoked. He stressed, however, that while Muslims must 
live according to Dutch laws, a Muslim cannot ignore or modify the shari’a 
itself, even if the two are conflicting. 
 
                                                
11  In 1991, the liberal politician Frits Bolkestein was one of the first politicians to 
express his doubts about the compatibility of Islam and the West (see Douwes, 
De Koning, and Boender 2005). 
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“One must think, we live in a non-Islamic country. And Islam is what it is. You must 
accept it the way it is. Being Muslim, you cannot adopt the Islamic shari’a in the 
Netherlands. But you should not say that the shari’a is different from what it is. You 
must take it as it is. And then you must just live according to the laws in the Nether-
lands. But whatever conflicts with the Dutch, or Western culture, those things are 
being treated as primitive. I think that is a bit nasty. Then you cannot have an open 
discussion and people won’t say what they really think. Then you do not have 
transparency. That is a bit what is happening now.”  
 
This excerpt shows that Mehmet realizes that when one acknowledges this 
constraint, one cannot easily enter the public debate. The way Islam really is 
should not be changed under pressure from the outside. He summarized his 
concerns as follows:  
 
“I think that the Dutch government wants Islam to adapt to the norms and values of 
Dutch society. And if the IUR is recognized, it will only be in that sense, I think. 
Only if the university fully adapts itself, only then it will be recognized, I think. No 
sooner than that. And then it won’t be totally independent, I reckon.”  
 
If they enter the public debate and adapt to the Dutch context, they may be 
obliged to make concessions on what they consider to be “real Islam.” It 
appears that the IUR “is caught in the dilemma of being recognised as a 
legitimate minority culture, while escaping the predicament of being a 
minority to watch and monitor, continuously needing to prove its loyalty” 
(Salvatore 2004, 1027).  
 
 
Concluding  Remarks  
 
The IUR is involved in a process of acquiring autonomous religious space for 
both socioreligious life and participation in the normative affairs of wider 
society. This process is contentious (Salvatore 2004). Much can be said about 
the opportunities and obstacles it has met on the “road to coexistence,” a path 
that rector Akgündüz describes as “something of a minefield.”12 Through 
collective action, the IUR has attempted to use existing legal and constitu-
tional opportunities granting equal rights to every religious group. As part of 
a religious minority, it wishes to manifest itself in a certain way in society. In 
this process, it claims a right to establish an educational institution as a means 
to practice its right to religious expression. At the same time, emancipation 
also means that one is entitled to claim one’s religious identity, in confronta-
tion with the dominant society, in order to acquire a place in the public realm.  
It has been my intention to show the connection between the establish-
ment of the IUR and the public debate on imam training. The government is 
searching for Muslim representatives and is focusing in this process on the 
                                                
12  From Rector Akgündüz’s speech at the opening of the academic year in Septem-
ber 2003.  
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building of a new generation of homegrown imams. For the IUR, this quest 
for new imams is a way to access the public realm. However, the imam 
training debate is structured by the government’s expectations of what a 
Dutch imam should be and do. These expectations appear to be difficult to 
fulfill. Through my interviews with several male and female students, I have 
identified the main constraints at present. First, the students, particularly the 
women, do not seem to be interested in becoming imams in a local mosque, 
and, second, the students have constructed a clear picture of what they regard 
as “real” or “authentic” Islam. However, they are aware that what they say in 
public affects the way in which Muslims are perceived in the public sphere. 
To be fully recognized as contributors in the normative debate on Dutch 
citizenship, the IUR must not only fulfill certain objective legal criteria but 
also convince society at large that “their Islam” can be “trusted.” 
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Gerdien Jonker 
ISLAMIST OR PIETIST?  
MUSLIM RESPONSES TO THE GERMAN  
SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
Is German society ready to digest religious “offerings” (da’wa) that aim at 
solving its problems from a Muslim point of view? Can it recognize these for 
what they are? Or has the distinction between religion and politics now 
become a “no-go area” in this time of international terrorist threat? In this 
contribution, I cross-reference the political discourse in Germany on Muslims 
with the religious discourse in different Muslim communities. Between these 
two worlds there exists a remarkable asymmetry that can be conveyed 
through two observations: First, policymakers consider the phenomenon of 
Muslim terrorists to be a consequence of the Islamic religious tradition and to 
be part of Muslim identity. The majority of Muslims in Germany have 
furiously denied this imputation. Second, policymakers demand answers from 
the Muslim communities that could help to enforce security. These Muslim 
communities have not responded in a direct way, but instead have resorted to 
issues of religious conduct and ethics.  
Since the attacks on New York and Washington, an alternating current 
exists between policymakers and Muslim communities in Germany. The 
former responded to imminent threat with security measures that took all 
Muslims in Germany into consideration. The latter denied the perpetrators the 
right to call themselves Muslims and protested that the security measures 
were unjust because they focused on the wrong actors. It is my argument that 
the resultant interaction took the form of a process of translation. Muslim 
communities rendered political signals into religious ones, and policymakers 
(re-)translated religious gestures and other expressions into the language of 
politics. In the highly sensitive climate that currently surrounds Muslims and 
Islam, the borders between religion and politics are being redefined. Some 
hundred years ago, Max Weber pointed out the basic tensions between 
politics and religion. The question now is how, in the present situation, this 
tension is given shape.  
To outline the scope of these tensions I focused on two Turkish religious 
communities. One is the Jamaatunnur, a pious Sufi lay community that 
embraces a politics of improving European society through the reformulation 
of Muslim conduct as a universal value. The other is the Islamic Community 
of Milli Görü, an Islamist organization that tries to realize its social concerns 
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through legal and political claims-making (see also the chapter by Gökçe 
Yurdakul in this volume).  
Several reasons back up this choice. A focus on Turkish communities that 
settled down in the 1960s and look back on a history of some forty years 
allowed me to weigh continuity against change. It also enabled me to depict 
the religious framework and to lay out the diversity of religious propositions 
that respond, however indirectly, to the pressure and demands from outside 
the community. The choice of two Turkish rather than, for instance, two 
Arabic communities is not haphazard. Muslim organizations in Germany are 
dominated by Turks (75 %) and characterized by an intense struggle between 
laic and religiously organized Turks, on the one hand, and between (Turkish) 
state-controlled and independent religious organizations, on the other.  
The two communities have in common that they organize independently 
of the Turkish state and over the last thirty years have developed their own 
Western European profile. For that reason they are attractive to young Turks. 
The anguish that laic Turks in Germany experience vis-à-vis their religious 
compatriots accounts for the fact that religious Turks attract negative attention 
more readily than do Muslims in other religious organizations.  
Both Milli Görü and Jamaatunnur members shape their personal conduct 
with the help of shari’a rules and regulations. What they share is the attempt 
to consolidate strict religious conduct while observing the German constitu-
tion, for example by holding on to gender segregation and the covering of 
women—to mention only the most visible aspects of a social order based on 
shari’a. However, Jamaatunnur translates the keyword of Muslim religious 
participation, jihad, into a process of inner discovery and a culture of ascetic 
religious conduct, whereas Milli Görü translates this keyword into political 
engagement. Due to these different aims, the two differ dramatically in the 
way they make their entrance on the public stage. Jamaatunnur opts for a 
religious politics that aims at the implementation of Muslim ethics and 
addresses colleagues, neighbors, and the workplace. Milli Görü opts for a 
religious politics that aims at political change and addresses actors in the legal 
and political spheres. Their different politics have made Jamaatunnur almost 
imperceptible. By contrast, they have rendered Milli Görü glaringly visible.  
The interaction between policymakers and Muslim communities will be 
set against the backdrop of the violent events that, over the last few years, 
have influenced the public perception of Muslims and “Islam.” Focusing on 
Germany, I first recount the particular scenario in which young Arab students 
in Hamburg planned “the legitimate defense” of the Islamic moral and legal 
order, which culminated in the massacre of 9/11. I then outline the German 
political reaction that introduced a new discourse on Islam. The bulk of this 
chapter then describes the different strategies with which young people in the 
Islamic Community of Milli Görü and in Jamaatunnur presently counteract 
both policymakers and jihadis. Finally, I sum up the reciprocities between 
terrorism, political pressure, and the recent changes in the two communities 
and draw a number of conclusions. These conclusions touch upon internal 
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differentiation and the tension between religion and politics, the diversity of 
Muslim views on the “secular world,” and the task that young Muslims have 
set for themselves.  
Several questions helped me to select my material and to think through the 
details of my narrative. For example, what do young believers do when they 
represent a religious tradition which, in another corner of the world than they 
happen to be in, sanctions and generates violence? How do they measure the 
distance? How do they advance their own religious vision? Which voices 
become audible? Which faces represent the promotion of the religious vision? 
Who opts for what, and why?  
 
 
J ihad  as  “Leg i t imate  Defense”   
 
The German scholar of religious studies Hans G. Kippenberg recently 
advanced the theory that free global markets diminish the power of the 
nation-state and stimulate new forms of religious solidarity (Kippenberg 
2005; Kippenberg and Seidensticker 2004, 85). Islamic organizations such as 
Muslim Brothers, Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda must be viewed as 
outcomes of this development. Combining a high level of solidarity with the 
inside—even the willingness to sacrifice oneself for one’s community—with 
a rigorous and violent policy of separation from the outside, these organiza-
tions regard violence as a necessary form of defense that is supported by the 
Quran and a long political history (Krämer 2005; Malik 2005).1 In their 
particular worldview, non-Islamic values and norms presently beleaguer the 
Islamic world: a threatening situation resembling the jahiliyya of the time of 
the Prophet has arisen. Therefore, they have taken it upon themselves to 
“free” Islamic norms and values. This scenario also legitimized the attacks on 
New York and Washington. The documents that the perpetrators left behind 
prove beyond a doubt, Kippenberg argues, that the attacks were religiously 
motivated.  
His analysis is based on the contents of the so-called spiritual manual, a 
document that was found in the luggage of the perpetrators and that appar-
ently guided them through the different stages of preparation. The text makes 
abundantly clear that the attacks were considered a ghazwa, a “raid,” and 
were staged as a meticulous imitation of the historical raid that Muhammad 
once fought at Badr. Without ever mentioning the deed itself, the stages that 
led to its performance were embedded in asceticism. They involved purity of 
                                                 
1  Jihad means “effort on the road to God.” The Quran uses the term thirty-five 
times, twice with the meaning of “peaceful struggle” and twenty-nine times as 
“warfare.” Beginning in the eleventh century, the Sufi tradition gave the term the 
spiritual dimension of “inner struggle, inner growth” (Malik 2005). The history 
of Islamic political governance is rich with examples in which the concept of 
jihad is used as a political instrument to justify military attacks, predominantly 
against “unbelievers” (Krämer 2005).  
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intention, worldly denial, sincerity, and the high consciousness of ritual re-
enactment, ritual cleansing, fasting, and the constant recitation of prayers. The 
instructions were designed to turn “ordinary young Muslims into warriors and 
martyrs” (Kippenberg 2005, 30), convinced of the need to perform a legiti-
mate jihad, a military act for the benefit of the Muslim community. In accor-
dance with this logic, the young men were to neither feel hatred nor turn their 
raid into an act of personal vengeance. Rather, their role was to be that of the 
seclusive executor, soberly performing a painful but necessary deed. The 
result of this painstaking preparation was that, on the morning of Septem-
ber 11, seventeen young men simultaneously boarded three planes in Boston 
in order to in all probability cut the throats of the flight personnel and to aim 
themselves as flying bombs at their targets, causing the death of some thirty-
five hundred people. The careful instructions in the “spiritual manual” 
indicate that the ascetic preparation was not simple embellishment but a 
central component of the perpetrators’ activities. Their aim was to turn the 
massacre into an act of worship (Kippenberg 2004; Scheffler 2004).  
Although in the course of 2002 it was firmly established that, of the 3.2 
million Muslims in Germany, fewer than three hundred were in some way or 
another involved in the al-Qaeda network, the perpetrators conferred a terrible 
heritage on the remaining Muslims. Their response took the form of the 
asymmetry that is the subject of the following pages. 
 
 
Pol i t i ca l  Percept ions  
 
On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, when the planes crashed into the twin 
towers in New York City and the media images of their collapse caused a 
global chain of reactions, a sequence of events also was set off in Germany. It 
pushed the political perception of who Muslims are and what they stand for in 
the direction of security. Observers were quick to notice that the change in 
perception caused “a general suspicion of Islam.”2 However, it was not the 
suspicion but the acute interest that was new. A climate of mutual indifference 
had characterized the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Ger-
many. German policymakers took no great interest in migrant groups and for 
a long time did not attempt to integrate them. Most scientific studies in the 
field of Islam concentrated on historical and philological research. Whenever 
media attention turned to the Muslim world, it employed the old binary 
construction of “Oriental (Muslim) culture” versus “Western enlightenment” 
(Rotter 1992).3 For their part, Turkish and other Muslim migrants did not take 
much interest in their host country. Most of the migrants came from rural 
                                                 
2  Matthias Geis, “Vom Gastarbeiter zum Schläfer,” Die Zeit, April 15, 2004; “Eine 
Religion unter Verdacht,” Stern, April 8, 2004. 
3  In 1992, the German Islam specialist Gernot Rotter (1992) analyzed the way in 
which the media, with the help of the Middle East “specialist” Rainer Konzel-
mann, produced distorted images of the Islamic world.  
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areas and had had very little education; they had to struggle to make a living 
in Germany and, for the most part, were content to live their lives according 
to their own rules. In terms of visibility, neither German society nor Muslim 
migrants took much notice of each other.  
This state of affairs changed radically after 9/11. The absence of reliable 
data—for instance on the number of organized Muslims or the way they were 
represented—caused an information vacuum. Yet information was the first 
commodity that policymakers were in need of. As long as this vacuum 
existed, it caused a structural uncertainty that had to be dealt with. Specula-
tions and suspicions emerged as the natural mechanisms to fill the gap. They 
offered, at least, answers in a situation in which previously no questions had 
been asked.  
Actual information on Muslims in Germany was also substituted by the 
stream of information on violence, mismanagement, and terrorism in the 
Islamic world. Together with the media coverage of the actions of terrorist 
organizations, this indeed conveyed a threatening picture of Muslims and 
their religious traditions. Through this change of perspective, Muslims in 
Germany, who for so long had remained invisible, were suddenly set in a 
blazing light. Having allowed them to develop religious structures in Europe 
was soon judged to be “a deadly tolerance.”4 Consequently, Islam became “a 
religion under suspicion.”5 With each attack on the global stage, fear of the 
three million Muslims in Germany grew.  
Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, the Egyptian who is said to have been re-
sponsible for the “raid” in Madrid on March 11, 2004, accurately identified 
that fear and used it in the global battle on Islamic visibility. In a telephone 
call to a young recruit shortly before the deed, he toyed with its more worldly 
options:  
 
“We are migrants of God. We believe in God and [therefore] everything is permitted 
to us, also that we marry Christian women, because the papers are useful. We have to 
be present everywhere, in Germany, in Holland, in London. We dominate Europe 
with our presence. The women find us the necessary documents because we repre-
sent God’s business.”  (lead article, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 18, 
2004)  
 
This is not the voice of asceticism. Rather, the speaker shrewdly mixes the 
religious and the political realm. In his narrative, “migrants” become divine 
messengers: “migrants of God” who are freed from legal forces and given 
religious authority instead, through which “everything is permitted.” The 
mixture of religion and political claims-making encourages deception: “we 
marry Christian women” as a means to reach the ultimate goal, to “dominate 
Europe with our presence.” The mass murder in Madrid which followed one 
                                                 
4  Mechtild Küpper, “Worte zum Opferfest,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
January 23, 2005; “Eine Religion unter Verdacht,” Stern, April 8, 2004.   
5  “Eine Religion unter Verdacht,” Stern, April 8, 2004, 49.  
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week later drove the message home. It also functioned as yet another piece in 
the security puzzle about “what Muslims think.” The merging of religion, 
migration, and infiltration was exactly what scared the German public most. 
The spelling out of key elements of infiltration—the misleading of women, 
unlawful access to documents, and domination—provoked deep fears about 
fifth columns. Osman Ahmed’s justification of the murder of hundreds of 
people by declaring “we believe in God,” “we are migrants of God,” and “we 
represent God’s business” conjured up the image of a ruthless religious 
activist. His words were considered to be yet another indication of the type of 
covert political activities that Islamic organizations were suspected of.  
In an interview on the state of security, granted some days after the attack 
on Madrid, the German minister of the interior, Otto Schily, expressed this 
sentiment: “All Muslims living in our country must ask themselves why their 
communities produce such furious fanatics.”6 With these words he implicitly 
expressed security agencies’ beliefs about Islamic communities in Germany: 
“their communities” produce terrorists—”such furious fanatics.” Neither the 
media nor policymakers questioned the equation. In the absence of informa-
tion other than the current news items, they had associated Islam with a 
dangerous form of political Islam, so-called Islamism. As a consequence, the 
insufficient transparency of Islamic organizational structures, the absence of 
Muslim spokesmen, the insistence on wearing headscarves, and the institu-
tionalization of Muslim conduct through German legislation were all read as 
signs of the same persuasion that had engendered al-Qaeda cells and death 
pilots (Breuer 2003).7  
These are the components, then, which in recent years have framed the 
visibility of young Muslim men and women making their entry in the German 
public agora: acts of global Islamic terrorism, demands for clarification, and a 
political discourse that equates Islamic religious diversity with Islamism. To 
enable the development of appropriate political responses, policymakers 
adopted a well-known German rhetoric of connecting the present security 
threat with earlier periods of crisis. They recalled the popular student protests 
of the 1960s and 1970s, which culminated in isolated terrorist acts against the 
German state. As will be shown, this rhetoric heightened the political percep-
tion of Muslim activists as belonging to the extreme right and of Islam as a 
right-wing ideology. The presence of a strong Turkish political Islam, embod-
ied by the Islamic Community of Milli Görü, made people in Germany 
aware of the potential politicization of Islam. It functioned as a pars pro toto, 
as a part that, in the eyes of the general public, represented the whole. In line 
                                                 
6  Konrad Schuller, “Wir leben in Zeiten epochaler Bedrohung,” Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, March 21, 2004.   
7  In September 2003, in line with this development, public opinion polls reported 
that 93 % of the German population thought of “oppressed women” upon hearing 
the word “Islam”; 83 % associated the word with “terror”; and 82 % thought that 
Muslims were “fanatical and radical.” 
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with this perception, Muslim visibility itself already functioned as a sign of 
threat.  
One did not have to go all that far to understand how this master narrative 
was adapted to the German context. It was enough to read the dailies in the 
morning and zap through the many talk shows at night. On these well-visited 
German stages, now paralyzed by fear of international terrorists, phrases 
popped up that reminded Germany of its own terrorist past. It did not take 
long before a scenario had been set up in which “terrorist cells,” “sleepers,” a 
“milieu of sympathizers,” and “naive do-gooders” played the main roles. The 
vocabulary evoked the German past: some of it went back to the crisis of the 
1970s, when student protests rocked the country; some of it went further back 
to the Nazi period. The chain of associations itself was hardly a subject for 
contemplation; rather, it offered a quick and therefore welcome means to 
identify the enemy within and launch upon a well-trodden political path of 
action.8  
One particular occurrence helped to set the train in motion. Soon after the 
airplanes had crashed into the twin towers, it was discovered that one of the 
traces left behind by the suicide pilots led to Hamburg. Here, unnoticed by 
security forces, scholars, neighbors, church dialogue partners, or anyone who 
had been in regular contact with the Muslim community in Hamburg, an 
’ashira, a cell belonging to al-Qaeda, had been formed. The leader of the 
group, Muhammad Atta, even appeared to have been a well-respected student 
at the Technical University of Hamburg.9 From this city, more traces led to 
inconspicuous provincial towns such as Bochum and Osnabrück, where 
equally young and unsuspected Arab students had been preparing for the 
attack. To its horror, the German population realized that the terrorists of New 
York and Washington had been planning in its midst without attracting the 
least attention. As long as they did not commit any crimes, these young men 
had been literally invisible.  
To grasp this extraordinary fact, the term Schläfer (sleepers) made its (re-) 
entry.10 Originally, the term had been used in bacteriology to indicate carriers 
of infectious diseases. Nazi Germany borrowed it to label “asocial ele-
ments”—men and women who acted against the ruling ideology (Briese 
2003). In the 1970s, it was again used to describe the cells of leftist activists.11 
Schläfer called up the image of a hidden threat “sleeping” in the bowels of 
society. It suggested the presence of an invisible enemy within, waiting for its 
chance to strike. It also aptly conveyed people’s feelings of helplessness.  
                                                 
8  Peter Homann, “Terrorismus und RAF,” Der Spiegel, February 21, 2002.  
9  Niklas Maak, “In einer kleinen Stadt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Septem-
ber 19, 2001.  
10  “Behörden kündigen gezielte Suche nach ‘Schläfern’ an,” Frankfurter Allgemei-
ne Zeitung, September 21, 2001; Anne Zielke, “Import, Export, Mord: War Mo-
hambedou Ould Slahi der Mann, der die Schläfer weckte?” Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, October 30, 2001. .  
11  Peter Homann, “Terrorismus und RAF,” Der Spiegel, February 21, 2002.  
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Several markers helped to identify the new “sleepers.” The first set com-
bined “male,” “Muslim,” and “student.” For some time, the application of this 
set of markers turned a substantial portion of the male Muslim population into 
potential suspects.12 The next marker to be added was “religious,” rerouting 
the search to Germany’s twenty-four hundred mosque organizations. Excerpts 
from the “spiritual manual” and the testament of Muhammad Atta appeared in 
the papers.13 From these could be gleaned that Muhammad Atta and his crew 
apparently had been pious Muslims who turned to a rigorous form of asceti-
cism in order to fulfill their death mission. The trail they left behind seemed to 
indicate that “religious” would be the most promising marker.  
In line with Germany’s recollections of the Rote-Armee-Fraktion (the Red 
Army Faction), in which sleepers had entertained stable connections with a 
“milieu of sympathizers,” the Hamburg mosques came under suspicion. But 
suspicion did not limit itself to Hamburg alone. Unlike the German terrorists 
of the 1970s, who had maintained connections to a limited number of sup-
porters only, the Muslim terrorists appeared to be backed up by masses of 
people all around the world. Television viewers could witness, in the first 
media images after the attack, large crowds in Indonesia, the Middle East, and 
some African countries applauding the suicide bombers. A story emerged that 
in a Milli Görü mosque in Berlin spontaneous applause broke out during 
Friday congregation and sweets had been handed around to celebrate.14 
Whether fact or rumor, this story awakened another misgiving that took hold 
of politicians, opinion-makers, and the general public: Muslims all over the 
world apparently rejoiced in the death of thousands of people. From here, the 
transition to a general suspicion of all mosque organizations in Germany was 
no longer all that great. Muslim organizations were accused of cooperating 
with the extreme-right neo-Nazi scene. Although there was a lack of proof 
and the accusation was dropped after some time, the accusation pushed the 
perception of religious Muslims into a corner from which German politicians 
and journalists necessarily had to distance themselves.15  
                                                 
12  Lutz Schnedelmann, Franziska Köhn, and Christine Richter, “Nach den Terror-
Anschlägen: Polizei überprüft arabische Studenten,” Berliner Zeitung, Septem-
ber 19, 2001.  
13  “‘Leben im unendlichen Paradies’: Der in Boston gefundene Leitfaden für die 
Attentäter,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 29, 2001; “‘Beten, daß 
ich bei den Engeln bin’: Das in Boston aufgefundene Testament des mutmaßli-
chen Terroristen Atta,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 1, 2001.  
14  A German convert and imam of the German-speaking Muslim community in 
Berlin broadcast the story. In an interview with the Berliner Zeitung (Septem-
ber 20, 2001), he stated, “I have been a Muslim for twenty-one years; I am fami-
liar with the scene and know where the terrorists are.” Other witnesses still main-
tain that an old man gave sweets to some children to keep them quiet during ser-
mon. 
15  “The World Crisis,” Focus, September 21, 2001; “Islam – Eine Religion im 
Visier,” Stern, September 17, 2001; Anne Zielke, “Allah ist mit den Springerstie-
feln,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 15, 2001.  
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As stated earlier, suspicion as such was not a novelty. In some ways the 
public had always observed Muslims through the frame of Orientalism: exotic 
at its best, untrustworthy at its worst. In the past, however, this suspicion was 
coupled with indifference, in the sense of “we don’t care what they do.” New 
was the vehemence with which the old binary construction of “Oriental 
culture” and “Western modernity” was expanded into a narrative that held 
Islam to be a threat to the constitution. New also was the polarization that 
marked off religious Muslims in Germany as right-wing and legitimized the 
full force of the state. The phrases and metaphors that were used to identify 
them helped to accelerate this process.  
The spotlight on sleepers incidentally illuminated another group of per-
sons, the so-called Gutmenschen (do-gooders), who were accused of being 
blauäugig (literally, “blue-eyed”; figuratively, “naive”). The word Gutmen-
schen carries with it a complex nexus of accusation and self-hatred and 
betrays an instance of suppressed German collective memory.16 First, it 
conjures up memories of blond and blue-eyed Nazi soldiers and denotes 
people who seemingly are all right but in the end prove to be malicious. In 
reference to this usage, the term has been used, in the context of the protest 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, to accuse leftist students of “naive” 
phantasmagoria. Applied in connection with Muslim “sleepers,” Gutmen-
schen comprised a group of professionals, scholars, churchmen, and social 
workers who had had regular dealings with Muslims. They were scolded as 
Gutmenschen because they, whenever dealing with Muslims, supposedly had 
ignored “the dark sides of Islam.” In retrospect, it seemed almost incredible 
that these men and women had not noticed any impending danger. They were 
suspected of both “shutting their eyes” and being dangerously “naive,” that is, 
of talking something straight that was very clearly wrong. Above all, they 
were considered “door openers” because their work had provided Islamists 
and terrorists with a large window of opportunities (Kandel 2002).  
The political decision-makers reacted with extensive security measures 
and with a political redefinition of Muslims and their religious traditions 
which equated Islam with Islamism (Bundesministerium des Innern 2003). 
This step entailed the homogenization of a group of people with an otherwise 
high level of differentiation. It also set into motion a polarization between 
“us” and “them” which turned Muslims—whether migrants or converts, 
religious or laic, pious or politically oriented—into suspect outsiders and 
potential troublemakers. Islam was declared “potentially dangerous” and 
                                                 
16  Dictionaries point to two different origins. One is the dictum of Friedrich 
Nietzsche that “perhaps there is no ideology more dangerous, no mischief in 
psychological matters more grave than the intention to be good: it has engende-
red the most repulsive type of human being, the toady” (Nietzsche 1873, part 3, 
798; my translation). The other goes back to the Nazis’ corruption of the Yiddish 
expression “a gutt Mensch” in order to ridicule German church officials who 
opposed their euthanasia program (Droste and Bittermann 1998; Schmidt 2004).  
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young women with headscarves “political weapons” (Haug and Reimer 2005; 
Kandel 2004).  
Not only religious activists but also Turkish laic Muslims opposed the 
sweeping gesture with which their religion was condemned and their integrity 
questioned. Muslim members of Parliament, trade unionists, writers, and 
scholars wrote vociferous letters of protest to the papers.17 Mehmet Dai-
magüler, a German politician of Turkish descent and a member of the execu-
tive board of the liberal party (the Freie Demokratische Partei), summarized 
the situation thus:  
 
“All of us, more than three million Muslims in Germany, are held in suspicion. This 
is not just a vague feeling but harsh experience: I was born and raised in this 
country; nonetheless, the word ‘sleeper’ is being written all over my election posters. 
Most of us came from Turkey, and we have lived here for forty years or more. By 
comparison, the Hamburg terrorists were all Arab students, not really at home in this 
country. But nobody seems to notice the difference. We pay for the crimes of others 
and we are powerless.”  (Daimagüler, “Wort zum Freitag,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, June 23, 2004) 
 
Daimagüler, a laic Turk who is a fully active citizen in German society, is 
light years removed from that little group of Arabic students in Hamburg that 
secretly planned a terrorist act. Yet he too became part of the vicious circle 
that associated Muslims with internal foreigners, with sleepers, with hidden 
threats, with extremists, and with terrorist deeds. The adoption of a rhetoric 
that called up old fears from the German past helped to set the wheel in 
motion. With the help of “sleepers,” “do-gooders,” “sympathizers,” and 
“terrorist cells,” the political perception managed to reduce a large and highly 
differentiated group of people to a mere security risk.  
One circumstance that favored this change in perspective was the lack of 
representation on the side of Muslims. On October 3, 2001, during the official 
act of national celebration, and for the first time since migration started, a 
religious Muslim representative spoke in public and was listened to by 
millions of people. Contrary to official expectations, however, Dr. Nadeem 
Elyas, president of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat 
der Muslime in Deutschland), did not represent all religious Muslims in 
Germany but only his organization, which counted some twenty thousand 
members. Here, then, was another point of irritation that the new visibility of 
Muslims revealed. It had been expected that, in line with civil society, one 
representative would now step forward and gain visibility on behalf of all 
others. But the organization of Islamic devotion was scattered, or so it 
appeared. If anyone ventured to speak out at all, Muslim actors acted on 
behalf of small factions or as individuals, speaking just for themselves. In this 
                                                 
17  Mehmet Daimagüler, “Wort zum Freitag,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
June 23, 2004; Navid Kermani, “Feindliche Übernahme,” Tageszeitung, Octo-
ber 9, 2003.  
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respect, too, the political demand and the Muslim supply did not fit. A 
politician skilled in returning the inquisitive gaze, Daimagüler chose the word 
“powerless” to capture the situation.  
For the two religious communities discussed in the following sections, the 
discourse of security sets the stage for asymmetrical communication. Whereas 
policymakers claimed that “the whole of Islam is a mistake,”18 and treated 
Muslim activists as “a potential threat,” the two communities contrasted their 
strategies in order to find acceptance for their own interpretation of jihad.  
 
 
“Like  Greenpeace”:  Mi l l i  Görü  and  German Soc ie ty  
 
In the course of 2002, a young spokesman of the Islamic Community of Milli 
Görü—I shall call him Mehmet—started to notice severe changes in the way 
he felt treated in public. For years, Mehmet had represented his organization 
at public occasions, and because he was a pleasant, communicative fellow he 
had been treated with respect. In September 2002, he related to me the details 
of a roundtable that for some time had already been dealing with plans for 
Islamic religious instruction in public schools.19 Although the curriculum had 
been discussed in great detail and had already been agreed upon, the partici-
pating policymakers suddenly expressed severe misgivings about the hidden 
intentions of his organization, Milli Görü. Refusing to acknowledge the 
difference between his person and his organization, he reacted pretty much 
like Susanna in Les Noces di Figaro and took their doubt for personal defa-
mation. Referring to his discussion partners, he remarked to me, “How long 
have we already been speaking with one another? Five years? Seven years? 
Why should they cast old doubts over and over again?” A churchman present 
at the same meeting recalled him exclaiming, “If I have explained my view on 
a subject, say ten times or a hundred times, that must be enough. When do 
you start to believe me, then? Always you hark back!”20  
Glimpses like this one illustrate a clash of entirely different frameworks. 
The young man still counted on the commitment that springs from personal 
involvement. He called up as his witnesses his personal integrity and the sheer 
length of time that he had discussed his plans with policymakers. Against 
their professional doubts he employed the experience of shared communica-
tion and the context of everyday trust. He realized that “the other side” 
possessed a power of definition against which his personal weight could not 
compete. Instead of acknowledging the trouble that his local Milli Görü 
peers had been provoking at that time (see below), he reacted with a generali-
                                                 
18  In an interview with the journalist Konrad Schuller, Otto Schily, the minister of 
the interior, stated, “To our understanding of religious freedom must belong the 
possibility to argue that the whole of Islam is a mistake” (Schuller, “Wir leben in 
Zeiten epochaler Bedrohung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 21, 2004).  
19  Interview with M. T., September 17, 2002.  
20  Telephone call with H.–H. W., September 20, 2002.  
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zation: “Somehow it is like this. If one holds onto a different view, one is sure 
to be chopped up in this city.”21 Mehmet presents one aspect of the Milli 
Görü relationship with the outside world, but presently not the one that 
dominates. To understand the community’s predominant view of—and its 
communication with—the world around, it is helpful to first consider the 
internal communication of the movement.   
Mehmet’s career resembles that of many young men in the Milli Görü 
organization. As a child left to himself for the larger part of the day, the Milli 
Görü youth organization took care of him, provided him with a view on the 
world, and gave him something to do for the weekend. The community 
supported him in school and organized a grant for him, enabling him to go to 
university. After finishing his studies at the age of 26, he was already consid-
ered one of Milli Görü’s elite and given a responsible post. Back then, I 
knew him as a humorous fellow who believed in the force of personal en-
counter and always looked at the bright side of things. Seven years later—and 
the same goes for many of his peers—he made the sickly impression of being 
just short of a heart attack.  
The Milli Görü community started as a social movement that catered to 
poor, uprooted, and illiterate Turkish peasants (Seufert 1997; Hermann 1996). 
This was back in the 1960s, when Turkey’s rural inhabitants started to move 
to the big cities and challenged the city dwellers with their conservative 
outlook. The name Milli Görü itself is a pun that blends a national with a 
religious view and, moreover, mixes religious with political interests. What 
the movement proposed to the Turkish nation was a religious alternative. It 
preferred the fruits of Islamic civilization over those of Western modernity 
and proclaimed the fusion of religion and the state (din ve dawla) in opposi-
tion to the Turkish secular order, which actually keeps religion tightly under 
control.  
From the start, Turkey’s policymakers and elite suspected that these de-
mands threatened the republic’s principles. And, indeed, the emerging 
religious-political movement pushed towards a conception of society with a 
revolutionary potential, one that had to be realized here and now. In the early 
1990s, its political claims-making culminated in the manifesto “The Right 
Order” (Adil Düzen), a mixture of communist and religious ideals to realize 
social justice with the help of religious rule based on shari’a. In the manifesto, 
“the right order” was contrasted sharply with the Western or “the wrong 
order” (batil düzen). The manifesto also contained outspoken anti-Western 
sentiments.  
The shift of generations began in Hamburg in the late 1990s.22 The after-
math of 9/11 accelerated the retreat of the founding generation; the national 
                                                 
21  Interview with M. T., September 17, 2002.  
22  The following is based on a series of interviews and informal conversations in 
the period between October 2001 and March 2005. Among the interviewees and 
discussion partners were Ali Kizilkaya, secretary general of the organization at 
the time of the interview and around thirty years old; Mustafa Yeneroglu, head of 
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steering group in Cologne was restructured and revitalized, and other cities 
soon followed suit. However, many features typifying the old community 
structure remained. The organization continued to be dominated by men, for 
instance. As before, there exists a national women’s organization that caters 
to the religious needs of women, and locally one can find large women’s 
congregations that engage in prayer sessions and handicrafts. All the deci-
sion-makers, however, are male (Jonker 2003a, 2003b). The new elite also 
consciously held on to the distinguishing features of a social movement. In 
this respect, they stayed in line with the founding generation as well. In 2004, 
the secretary general acknowledged: 
 
“We are a movement, no question! We insist on personal responsibility. That’s what 
we stand for. That makes us different from [other Turkish communities such as] 
Süleymanci and Nurcu. […] One should leave the people their freedom. That’s how 
we can reach more people than we have members. What we do, we set out a general 
direction and leave it up to them to take responsibility.”  (interview with Oguz 
Üçüncü, May 7, 2004) 
 
In their refusal to exercise control and to instead stress personal responsibil-
ity, in their preference to set out “a general direction” for like-minded people 
who are not necessarily a member, the younger generation follows in the 
footsteps of its fathers. By holding on to the distinguishing features of a 
socioreligious movement, the community is guaranteed a dynamic character. 
Like all social movements, it aims to create a strong collective identity, a 
broad network, and a strong potential for mobilization. Various initiatives 
“from below” that do not fall under the leadership’s responsibility should 
follow from these efforts. The new leaders opened up new avenues for others 
to take up, avenues that the founding fathers had not even fathomed would 
exist. One of these is the introduction of new legal interpretations of shari’a 
that have the capacity to “zip up” Islamic law with the German constitution: 
 
“If one begins to take this seriously—integration, to become integrated—then we 
want to be taken seriously as partners as well. We represent the largest Islamic 
community in this country. If we want to succeed, we have to find new interpreta-
tions for shari’a regulations, not only for those that make Islamic life possible but 
also for the hard spots [hudud punishments for fitna, theft, and adultery]. We want to 
become accepted with our rough edges and likewise build up solidarity with the 
whole umma. We want to become a partner of the state.”  (interview with Mehmet 
Yeneroglu, April 16, 2004) 
                                                                                                                                               
the legal department, and Oguz Üçüncü, secretary general, both in their late 
twenties and members of the steering committee at the time of the interviews; 
Mustafa Yoldash and Ramazan Yazici, both in their thirties and responsible for 
the Hamburg community at the time of the interviews; Mehmet Gül, head of the 
local community in Berlin and 61 years old at the time of the interview; Nail 
Dural, head imam of the Berlin community and in his late fifties at the time of 
the interviews. In addition, I regularly spoke with younger members and activists 
holding lower positions. I cite them with their initials only for several reasons. 
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The speaker, who is head of the legal department, demanded integration 
through partnership. This approach must be understood in two ways. The 
notion of “partners” implies a claim to the legal status of a “Church,” the so-
called corporation of public law, which in Germany only the churches and the 
Jewish community possess—none of the Islamic organizations possess this 
status (Jonker 2002). It also lays claim to the right to political participation, 
with or without that status. The word “partners” indicates a shift between 
religion and politics, one that is to be realized through existing legal means. 
For the movement, this discourse signaled a new self-confidence. In passing, 
it broke with the conservative spirit of the older generation. What his legal 
department tried to discover, my discussion partner explained to me, were 
brand new possibilities for the legal interpretation of shari’a that could be 
accepted by German legislators. His department was busy adapting central 
shari’a regulations to a secular framework: “In Germany, Islamic law has 
been interpreted within the context of German law for a long time already. All 
we want is to smooth up the process a bit.” Central religious regulations that 
secured an Islamic life in Germany included halal slaughtering, Islamic 
cemeteries, the wearing of headscarves in state-run institutions, access to 
religious education in public schools, and the aforementioned status of a 
corporation of public law. At the time, these regulations were still treated 
under Article 4 of the constitution, freedom of religion. In the future, or so my 
discussion partner speculated, they would be reinterpreted in the context of 
different constitutional articles: 
 
“Take the headscarf. Right now it is being treated [in court] in the context of an 
individual right. Or take slaughtering: it also touches upon articles that deal with the 
protection of animals. If we succeed in its transference, Muslim concerns can be 
better understood by secular society.”  (interview with Mehmet Yeneroglu, April 16, 
2004) 
 
The key term on which everything hinges is “secular society.” By transferring 
religious concerns into central values, Milli Görü tries to “zip up” with 
German society. It aims to convince others that its concept of “jihad equals 
political engagement” is a general concern comparable with other forms of 
participation: 
 
“What matters is that one does more than the daily prayers and the zakat. That’s 
what everybody does. What matters to us is engagement. To engage is the same as 
jihad. Jihad includes just about everything; it means that one engages politically, like 
Greenpeace.”  (interview with Mustafa Yeneroglu and Oguz Üçüncü, May 7, 2004)  
 
“Like Greenpeace.” This approach is at the core of Milli Görü’s response to 
security measures and political pressure exactly because it promises under-
standing. My discussion partner felt certain that, some day, even the “hard” 
bits of shari’a—the hudud punishments in the case of adultery, theft, or 
anarchy—could receive some new interpretation in the context of German 
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law and become recognized as a “secular” (universal) concern. But that, he 
acknowledged, was still a long way off.  
For the moment, this approach was difficult to stomach for at least part of 
the community. When, in June 2003, the new head of the European commu-
nity of Milli Görü, Yavuz Karahan, spoke in front of the general assembly in 
Cologne for the first time, he bluntly stated, “The Quran and Sunna present no 
obstacle to our integration into the existent [German] juridical system.” In 
reaction, around half of the imams and other representatives rose from their 
seats and left the meeting hall in protest.23 Karahan’s words were judged an 
intolerable provocation. The protest made clear that, within the organization, 
reformers stood against conservatives and both sides could count supporters 
from all generations. However, the demonstration did not split the organiza-
tion. Political participation being the ultimate aim, the very last thing anyone 
wanted was a cleavage. The younger generation had taken over and continued 
in ways that were far more challenging than the revolutionary ideas of the 
older generation, which had, after all, produced nothing but ideas.  
What made an impression was the fact that the new generation had begun 
to employ legal means to defend the organization against critics. In 2002 and 
2003, the legal department of the Milli Görü organization deluged adminis-
trators, policymakers, and the federal agency for internal security with legal 
charges. Anyone who wrote or spoke about the Milli Görü community in a 
derogatory manner, or who distorted the image nurtured by the community, 
could reckon with charges. The charges against the agencies for internal 
security in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and North Rhine-Westphalia 
especially caused commotion.24 In 2002, for instance, the North Rhine-
Westphalia report on Milli Görü appeared under the heading “Extremism of 
Foreigners.” It quoted from the revolutionary manifesto Adil Düzen and 
suggested that this organization was based on authority and obedience, that 
members nursed undemocratic and anti-Zionist sentiments, that the organiza-
tion intended to Islamize Germany, and that, for these reasons, it presented a 
natural habitat for extremists (Verfassungsbericht NRW 2002, 167–175). 
Through the use of legal charges, the Milli Görü steering group tried to break 
the federal agencies’ power of definition. The charges were also intended to 
rid the organization of close observation by the authorities as soon as possi-
ble. In reality, however, scrutiny of the organization had just begun in earnest. 
In the years to come, although the charges of extremism or of relations with 
terrorists were withdrawn, the federal agencies continued to make accusations 
against the organization. Structures that were not sufficiently transparent, 
                                                 
23  Konrad Schuller, “Von der Demokratie verführt? Die Islamisten von Milli Görü 
erwägen eine Abkehr von ihrer strikt antiwestlichen Linie,” Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, April 18, 2004.  
24  On September 12, 2002, against the federal agency of Bavaria; on February 5, 
2003, against North Rhine-Westphalia; and on April 12, 2003, against Baden-
Württemberg (VG Stuttgart 18 K 41 79/02). 
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attempts to legalize shari’a rule, and proof of anti-German sentiment were 
considered sufficient to justify the accusations.  
The Islamic Organization of Milli Görü in Germany is currently in trou-
ble. It has been under constant surveillance by the federal agencies for 
internal security since the 1980s. The social seclusion, the revolutionary 
sympathies, and the hostile language of the parent generation gave rise to 
serious doubts about its intentions. The strategy embraced by the present 
generation has strengthened the suspicions of the security agencies. The 
employment of legal means to sanction religious conduct and ward off 
unwanted critics has invited even more observation. The youngest generation 
is already objecting to this treatment and showing signs of impatience: “When 
can we finally say what we think in this country?” they asked Mehmet.25 The 
old men, less concerned that they might be overheard, vent their emotions in 
public. Yakup Tashi, who has been a preacher in one of the Milli Görü 
mosques in Berlin since 1979, remembered in one of his Friday sermons in 
November 2004:  
 
“When we came here, these Germans gave us no toilets. There were no toilets in the 
apartments when we came. One had to go five flights down to use a bucket. They 
had put together four or five boards for us to use as a toilet.”  (Verwaltungsgericht 
2005, 4)  
 
In that sermon, knowing that he was touching upon a shared sentiment, the 
preacher expressed his frustrations. What he told his audience came down to 
this: Some Germans are all right, but most stink because they do not shave 
under their armpits; they are atheists, good-for-nothing. Eventually, they will 
end up in hell (Verwaltungsgericht 2005, 4). These words were taped in 
secret and broadcast on television some days later. Policymakers considered 
the animosity of his words to be “hate speech.” In the trial that followed, 
security agents also brought proof of the preacher’s sympathy with “Iraqi 
martyrs” and his conviction that the death of a martyr ranked among the most 
beautiful. In actuality, he expressed this sentiment not in a sermon but in a 
prayer that was recited at the end of a pro-Iraq demonstration. The prayer 
contained the word “ghazi” (freedom fighter), which erroneously was trans-
lated as “martyr” (Schiffauer 2005). But this is a detail. Anti-German senti-
ments linked to sympathies with suicide bombers proved to be too much. The 
events fuelled public suspicions that Milli Görü, despite its repeated denials, 
shared the worldview of terrorists. After reflection on the consequences of 
such leadership, the city of Berlin started a procedure to obtain a deportation 
order and have him expelled. 
                                                 
25  The questions were posed in educational courses that Mehmet currently organ-
izes. The aim of these courses is to introduce teenagers to Islamic thinkers like 
Qutb and Mauwdudi and to explain to them how “the West” thinks (informal 
conversation, February 3, 2005). 
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Having considered these different voices, it is time to ask what the Islamic 
Organization of Milli Görü chooses. What is its religious framework, and 
what does it perceive through it? Having grown up as children of immigrant 
families in Germany, my discussion partners, once in power, started to turn 
the revolutionary Milli Görü ideals into concrete demands for political, 
social, and legal incorporation. Words like hizmet and jihad became rites of 
passage from religious mobilization to political participation and legal 
partnership. What connects the new generation with the founder generation is 
a demand for social justice. In line with the older members, in line also with 
other protest and socioreligious movements, they want to inspire and mobilize 
people whom they do not necessarily know. The general aim should be 
democratic involvement, not acts of illegal resistance. Yet although the line 
between the two sometimes seems dangerously thin, they also know that 
creating control mechanisms and transparency would lead to a loss of mobili-
zation capacity.  
Unlike the experience of the founding fathers, the upbringing and self-
image of the new generation suggested that it might be possible after all to be 
both a German and a Muslim. Nevertheless, at the back of their minds they 
held on to a deep resentment of German society, which, under the security 
pressures of the last three years, they increasingly referred to as “the West.” 
Distrust of it remains an integral part of the Milli Görü identity.  
In this transition, the instructions that shari’a issues for personal conduct 
act as a compass for identity politics. “Zipping up” shari’a with the German 
constitution is presently considered a guarantee of partnership, political 
participation, and group rights. In the eyes of my discussion partners, the 
private religious conduct that other Islamic communities profess simply 
cannot be enough. What they wish to accomplish is the incorporation of 
Islamic regulations—those that “guarantee” a collective Islamic life—into the 
foundations of German legislation. It brings them into competition with 
politics: “Gaining political acceptance in Germany comes down to overcom-
ing the legal system,” is how the head of the legal department put it.26  
His formulation holds the key to the lock. Like their fathers, this genera-
tion links political demands for social justice with religious revolutionary 
zeal; but unlike their fathers, they do this in the context of a nonreligious 
European society that currently feels threatened by Muslim terrorism. The 
founding generation still demanded din ve dawla, the fusion of faith and 
politics, in Turkey. The younger generation in Germany has modified this 
demand: it now seeks a fusion of religious law with secular law. It wants its 
concerns to be understood as a universal interest, something for the common 
good that transcends national borders.  
In its attempt to make itself understood, the new steering committee began 
the transfer from religious to secular rights with the help of legal means. In 
other words, Milli Görü responded to the political pressures telling them to 
                                                 
26  Interview with Mehmet Yeneroglu, April 16, 2004.  
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distance themselves from terrorist activism with a totally different kind of 
activism, namely, that of political claims-making. This strategy brought the 
organization into a deadlock with security agencies.  
The ideal profile of a Milli Görü activist, then, includes elements of so-
cial engagement, the voice of the oppressed, distrust, and a readiness to claim 
power. My interview partners denied having any association or sympathies 
with the worldview of hijackers and suicide bombers (“we cannot break with 
people we do not know”). Instead, they urged policymakers to accept them as 
partners with legitimate claims. As a result, they managed to make Milli 
Görü glaringly visible. 
 
 
“The  Need  for  Trans la t ion”:   
Jamaatunnur  Ref lec t s  on  Secular  Soc ie ty  
 
In order to illustrate the breadth and scope of Muslim religious responses to 
German security pressures, in this section I provide a brief depiction of the 
Jamaatunnur, or “Nur community.” This is a Turkish Muslim organization 
that shares the same religious compass as their Milli Görü compatriots, but 
that embraces an entirely different approach to the public sphere. Its general 
direction is engaged asceticism, which is a combination of ascetic conduct 
and the introduction of ethical standards in the workplace.  
The Nur community was founded on the writings of the Turkish philoso-
pher and theologian Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1878–1960; Mardin 1989; 
Vahide 2000; Abu-Rabi 2003). Unlike the founders of the Milli Görü 
movement, who appeared in the public arena some forty years after the 
founding of the Turkish republic, Said Nursi opposed Kemal Atatürk’s 
republican reforms from the very start. He inspired peaceful resistance that 
especially caught on among rural Turks. In the course of his life, he became 
the republic’s most prominent religious opponent and certainly the most 
prolific: Said Nursi wrote sixty-five hundred pages of free Quranic interpreta-
tion (tafsir manevi, the so-called Risale-i Nur, or “Letters of Light,” which 
were smuggled across the country and secretly copied by hand hundreds and 
thousands of times). Imprisoned by the republic for most of his life, he 
attained a level of popularity that was matched only by the founder Kemal 
Atatürk himself. Fear of his reputation ran so high that, when Said Nursi died, 
his body was abducted by the military in a covert action and buried in an 
unknown spot. Although he had appeared in public only to defend himself in 
one of his many trials, Said Nursi became the most visible and, because of his 
nonviolent resistance, most respected Muslim of the early Turkish republic.  
Today his students still gather to study his writings. Said Nursi had 
claimed that every Quran reflection should also include the study of nature. 
He believed that the contemplation of nature provided a safe way to discover 
the miracles of God in the universe. It encourages students to fuse religious 
with scientific knowledge and to simply feel enchanted with the world 
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(Nereid 1997; Reed 1999). On a more practical level, Nur students search for 
ethical inroads into European society. They look for ways to share their 
brimming enthusiasm with others, both Muslims and non-Muslims, on an 
individual level. Editing and printing Said Nursi’s words and furthering their 
reflection is considered the most important road towards that aim.27  
From the start, the emerging community focused on collective reading as 
well as the interpretation of the Risale-i Nur. Because of the exegesis in-
volved, this approach led to many competing groups (Yavuz 1997). Ja-
maatunnur claims to safeguard the core and manages to include a wide 
spectrum of followers, ranging from “traditionalists” who still copy the 
Risale-i Nur by hand to international scholars who compare Said Nursi’s 
theology with relevant Christian thinkers. Up to now, only the Turkish 
preacher Fethullah Gülen, once a companion of Said Nursi, could seriously 
challenge this claim (Yavuz and Esposito 2003).  
Community life centers first on the collective study of Said Nursi’s texts 
and second on the discovery of new knowledge. Like Said Qutb and Hassan 
al-Banna, Nur students claim that all knowledge must be discovered rather 
than constructed. This means that the production of knowledge is considered 
a process in which the truth dawns upon one rather than a result of decon-
struction or reconstruction. But unlike Qutb and al-Banna, who pursued the 
Islamization of science, Nur students fuse Western scholarship with love of 
nature, “the great book of the universe,” which to them is the quickest road 
towards the discovery of divine love. All knowledge of the world, including 
the one that has not yet been discovered, has in principle been described in 
the Quran. They compare its text with seeds from which everything emanates. 
A correct Quranic interpretation occurs when the mind, the heart, and the 
spirit blend and infuse the reader with a range of intellectual and emotional 
insights. Said Nursi’s inspired Quranic commentary serves as a compass in 
achieving such interpretation.  
Nur philosophy is about localization. Like Milli Görü, it deals with 
“communities of feeling” (Appadurai 1996) that try to create localities in a 
shifting world. Like Milli Görü, Nur students in Germany struggle to make 
their religious concerns understood by “secular society.” But unlike the 
former, they cultivate a culture of individual, peaceful conduct that is de-
signed to be shared with people who do not belong to the Nur community or 
even to the Muslim community.  
In 2003, I was invited to participate in a youth seminar in which Nur stu-
dents from different cities of Western Europe meet.28 It is called the Interna-
tional Seminar Group and was first held in 2000. Over the last five years 
                                                 
27  Printed in the 1950s for the first time, the collection was translated into fourteen 
languages. There are thirteen publishers and distributors of the Risale-i Nur. I 
also counted seventy-three Web sites in twenty-two languages; see http://www. 
Ahmetberk.tripod.com/ and click on the “Risale-i nur” link.  




students have met every other month. The group is an outcome of a different 
effort to mobilize the Nur community, the so-called international symposia, 
which since 1991 have taken place in Istanbul.29 Whereas the organizers of 
the symposia try to interest renowned Arabic and Western scholars in the 
writings of Said Nursi, the organizers of the seminar group encourage stu-
dents to take steps on the path to intellectual independence—while staying 
within the religious framework set by their founder. In some cases, they are 
being prepared to join in the international scholarly exchange.  
A word on my entrance in the Nur community: over the last ten years, I 
had known of the existence of the Jamaatunnur but had never succeeded in 
making any contact. Among Muslims in Germany, the community was 
disparaged as being of the intellectual type and renowned for minding its own 
business. It was my impression that this community shunned public debate 
related to Muslims to a degree that made it invisible. If it had any strategy for 
visibility, I had concluded, it must be the private politics of not being noticed 
at all. The first time I encountered the Jamaatunnur in public, it was in the 
form of a press release issued shortly after 9/11. It stated, among other things, 
the following: 
 
“We call upon the responsibility of the general public with a basic principle from the 
Quran: ‘Partners, families, or their communities cannot be blamed for the faults and 
crimes of individuals or small groups.’ Therefore, one should not confound a world 
religion, whose members sharply condemn these abominable terrorist acts, with 
those who misuse the name of this religion.” (press release on September 13, 2001)  
 
Here was the first explicit sign of a religiously based refusal to answer to the 
challenge of 9/11. When, in September 2003, the leader of the community 
approached me with a request for research, I was intrigued. Where did this 
community position itself? The answer I brought away from the meeting was 
that Nur students were changing their approach. Without so much as mention-
ing the “jihad equals legitimate defense” approach of their violent coreligion-
ists, they actively promoted another view of jihad, one that equated it with 
intellectual discovery and spiritual growth.  
Approximately fifty persons attended the seminar, and the majority 
seemed to be younger than thirty years old. Of the thirty men present, twelve 
worked in finance management, consultancy, or banking professions, six 
claimed to be scholars in the technical sciences (three professors among 
them), and the others were still university students. I counted sixteen women, 
                                                 
29  International symposia took place in 1991, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 
2004 in Istanbul. The scholarly output is impressive: the organizers already have 
published ten thousand pages both in English and in Arabic. See, for instance, the 
proceedings of the 1995 symposium: The Third International Symposium on 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: The Reconstruction of Islamic Thought in the Twenti-
eth Century and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, ed. Nesil Foundation (Istanbul: Sözler 
Publications, 1997), which comprises some one thousand pages. All proceedings 
are printed in Istanbul and are widely distributed. 
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among them two doctors, one theologian, two business managers, two 
teachers, and a range of students in computer science and business informa-
tion management. Men and women sat in the same room but kept different 
sides. All of the women had their heads covered.  
The main subject of the seminars is the adaptation of ahlaq, Islamic ethics, 
to different professional situations. The working language is Turkish, but 
during break country representatives stood together and preferred to discuss 
the proceedings in their own European language. It struck me that the delega-
tion from Holland had something unmistakably Dutch in the way they were 
dressed and in their facial expressions and body language. Looking around, I 
saw that the Swiss, the German, the Austrian, the French, and the English 
delegations equally bore a whiff of their respective European country.  
On this particular weekend, the seminar concentrated on hizmetkar lider-
lik, or “leadership as a religious task.” Important qualities such as mentorship, 
responsibility, and empathy were discussed, and the participants spoke at 
length about the necessity of showing one’s spiritual roots and of “being 
different.” As a matter of course, a Risale-i Nur text formed the basis for 
discussion. Said Nursi’s free poetic style allowed the seminar participants to 
reflect together. From all sides of the room ideas were offered and new 
thoughts were developed quickly. Although the teacher remained standing on 
the male side of the room, the women freely and frequently contributed with 
questions and objections.  
Later that day, a brainstorming on how to continue best in the near future 
took place. Suggestions included the encouragement of dissertations, the 
preparation of short PowerPoint presentations, and, above all, a selection of 
thoughts from the Risale that could answer to the pressing problems of 
European reality. The group especially stressed “the need to find transla-
tions.” More important than anything else, Said Nursi’s ideas should be made 
accessible to the larger public and “translated” into nonreligious thinking.  
The Jamaatunnur does not want to impress with numbers but with qual-
ity.30 As one of the more prominent participants remarked, “We are the yeast 
that makes the dough rise.”31 I came home with the impression that these 
                                                 
30  There seems to be an average of three Nurcu-run study centers or dormitories 
(dershanes) in fifteen German cities as well as in London, Vienna, Rotterdam, 
Luxembourg, Zurich, Brussels, Paris, Metz, and Strasbourg. Together, they add 
up to approximately sixty Nur centers in Europe. Each receives some one 
hundred participants on a regular basis (two to four times a week). Adding these 
numbers together, I count no more than six thousand active Nur students in Eu-
rope. As for the competition, most interviewees mentioned two to three centers in 
their town or its vicinity in which the writings of the preacher Fethüllah Gülen 
dominate. None of them, however, possessed a full overview of all Nur activities 
in Europe (results of a questionnaire issued to the participants of the seminar 
group in October 2003). 
31  Faris Kaya, organizer of the international symposia in Istanbul and himself one 
of the original companions of Said Nursi. 
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people challenged the defensive and violent interpretation of jihad through the 
active promotion of a view that preached nonviolence and spirituality instead. 
They were, moreover, convinced that Said Nursi’s writings held something in 
store for their Christian and nonreligious colleagues. But where were the 
words that might fit the lock?  
There is still a large distance to be crossed from the local Nur study center 
in Europe to the international symposia in Istanbul. Local discussion circles 
revolve around Muslim devotion, enchanted visions of nature, questions of 
private conduct, and, above all, the desire “to look behind the curtain and 
realize, ‘Ah, that’s how it is!’”32 The international symposia cater to the 
international standards of the scientific community while introducing a set of 
ethical standards. As one of the organizers, a philosophy professor, explained 
to me, “Our jihad is a jihad of pen and paper”33 The material with which the 
Nur community wants to build a bridge is made of something far more 
comprehensive than the local political claims-making, partnership, or group 
rights of their Milli Görü brethren: a universal language that touches upon 
matters of insight, inspiration, and a common, universal ethics.  
The Jamaatunnur is, however, by no means a sect. Milli Görü members 
view it as an orthodox and devoted community that does far more than is 
strictly necessary. As they see it, Nur members pray more, they pray longer 
prayers, and they meet more often to study religious texts. In the eyes of 
religious Muslims, Nurcus are religious virtuosi. The latter’s efforts to 
translate Quranic values into universal values seems to escape them. During 
Ramadan I regularly saw Milli Görü members make a “crossover” to join in 
the extra-long evening prayers of the Nur community. But, as these people 
told me, this was just to do something extra in an extraordinary time. To 
them, during the rest of the year, five times a day was more than enough.  
These few glimpses must suffice to answer the question of what frame-
work the Jamaatunnur employs and what it allows the community to see. How 
does it answer to the present situation, which is dominated by violence 
legitimized with the Islamic tradition and oppressive security politics? In 
comparison to Milli Görü, Jamaatunnur does not present the fuzzy territory 
with unclear borders that typifies social movements. The community does not 
care about political claims-making. To the contrary, its borders are clearly 
defined by a corpus of texts and a method to deal with them. The Nur com-
munity is first of all a community that consumes meaningful texts. It busies 
itself with the copying, reading, interpreting, editing, printing, and distribut-
ing of the immense oeuvre of its founder. Moreover, the Nur community is a 
text-producing community. With the help of the international symposia in 
Istanbul, some ten thousand pages of commentary on the founder’s oeuvre 
already have been published, and more is expected in the future. Their 
occupation with meaningful text also creates the framework for the mobiliza-
                                                 
32  Group interview at the Islamic University of Rotterdam, January 8, 2003. 
33  Group interview at the Islamic University of Rotterdam, January 8, 2003. 
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tion of that heady human potential located somewhere between enthusiasm, 
inspiration, and love. The expression that the heritage of Sufi devotion takes 
in this community comes close to the Pentecostal experience. Nur students 
brim with enthusiasm and they are willing to share it. But who is willing to be 
a recipient? At this point, Europe, or, more precisely, European nonreligious 
society, comes into view. What Nur students seem to perceive is a world that 
must do without inner experiences, a disenchanted and demoralized society 
that is badly in need of a spiritual infusion. To view Europe as a place for 
da’wa, as a place to bring the good message to those who are in need, is not 
unique to Nur students. But what sets them apart from other Muslim endeav-
ors is their refusal to proselytize. Instead, they want to share universal es-
sence, reaped from the Quran, discovered with the help of Said Nursi’s 
inspired commentary, and processed through texts and individual encounters.  
The profile of the ideal Nur activist, then, is that of the intellectual, well-
trained, highly ethical, and engaged colleague and neighbor. Nur students 
want to convince through personal conduct. Its perception of German society, 
and the strategies that were found to cope with it, keeps the Nur community 
outside the spotlights of policy-making agencies, although not outside those 
of the media. Meanwhile, though still in need of finer translations, it already 
has managed to translate the current political signals—suspicion and pres-
sure—into a pressing need on the part of “secular” society, to which it 
responds from its religious point of view. 
 
 
Summary  and Conc lus ions  
 
In the course of 2000 and 2001, a small group of Arab students prepared to 
execute a massacre. Hamburg was the center of their preparations, New York 
and Washington their ultimate stage. From the documents left behind by the 
students, it can be concluded that they considered the massacre a necessity to 
free Muslim norms and values from what they deemed intolerable oppression. 
Among the documents left behind was a “spiritual manual,” which the 
students in all probability used. The manual gave instructions for a rigorous 
asceticism that prepared them for and guided them through the deed. The 
careful ritual setting and the ritual re-enactment of a raid that the Prophet had 
once staged indicate that the perpetrators acted within a religious framework 
and that they were religiously motivated, deliberately turning the massacre 
into an act of worship.  
The hijack bombers of 9/11 shocked German policymakers out of their 
disinterest in Muslims. They suddenly realized that Muslims also lived in 
Germany, but, in the absence of other information, they could not—or could 
only with great difficulty—distinguish them from Muslims all around the 
world. As a result, all Muslims were perceived through a security framework. 
What this framework allowed them to see was an amorphous group that 
shared religious claims, organizations without any transparency or representa-
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tion, and individuals who seemed to sympathize with terrorists. Their re-
sponse was a standard reaction that came out of Germany’s historical experi-
ence with left- and right-wing terrorists, ranging from student protests to the 
extermination politics of the National Socialists. Part of this collective 
memory was recalled with the use of words like sleepers, sympathizers, and 
do-gooders. The rhetoric helped to shape a political response that seemed 
appropriate in similar situations. Whether the current situation was really 
comparable with those of the German past was a question that did not receive 
much attention. The approach simply pushed the perception of Muslims, in 
particular religious Muslims, into the corner of right-wing activism, from 
which German politicians necessarily had to distance themselves. Observed 
from this angle, Muslim holy texts seemed to speak against the basic rights as 
guaranteed by the constitution, in particular that of equality between the 
sexes. Islam appeared to embody a particular political interest that threatened 
democracy. It was thus equated with Islamism, which in its turn was consid-
ered a fertile ground for terrorists. At this turning point, the lack of transpar-
ency and representation of the religious organizations started to serve as proof 
that they indeed had something to hide. The accusation of being sleepers, of 
undermining and threatening the democratic order, was aspersed like dew on 
all 3.2 million Muslims in Germany.  
The Muslim community in Germany reacted with repulsion and apprehen-
sion. Secular Muslim members of Parliament and writers admitted that they 
were “powerless,” meaning that they were not able to turn the tide with the 
same means on the same level. Religious organizations denied that they 
shared a religious tradition with hijackers and suicide bombers. They felt that 
the ensuing political pressure had been wrongly addressed. Then, in a second 
step, they began a complicated shift in strategies that revealed a new scale of 
tension between religion and politics: first, within a few years’ time, the 
younger generation replaced the older one; second, “powerless” was reformu-
lated as “inner strength”; and third, the dominant perception of “Islam equals 
politics” was challenged with a view of Islam that underlined its divine origin 
and universal value. In a third step, different Muslim religious actors em-
braced different strategies to become accepted as a group. The two religious 
organizations that I have discussed, Milli Görü and Jamaatunnur, are posi-
tioned at opposite ends of the scale. The former launched into political 
claims-making; the latter placed its trust in ethical involvement and the power 
of inspired words. The former wound up in a headlong clash with political 
interests; the latter escaped any specific political attention. Their different 
strategies brought Milli Görü all the limelight that political Germany could 
muster. The Jamaatunnur managed to stay more or less out of focus.  
What do young Muslim believers do when confronted with the fact that 
their religious tradition also sanctions and engenders shocking instances of 
violence, although they themselves do not? How do they counter the political 
pressure? How do they communicate their version of their religious tradition? 
In this chapter, I have tried to capture the reciprocity between terrorism, 
ISLAMIST OR PIETIST? 
 147
political pressure, and the change of generations in two communities. To sum 
up my conclusions:  
 
1. The groups under study positioned themselves in the German context 
differently. The distinction proposed by Max Weber can be applied: Milli 
Görü actors moved towards the political sphere, whereas Nurcus laid 
claim to a shared professional sphere. Milli Görü adherents, once they 
had taken over the positions of their fathers, intensified their political 
claims-making. Nur students reacted by linking spirituality with concrete 
instances of personal involvement. As a result, the former clashed with 
policymakers whereas the latter did not. These clashes, however, proved 
to be the decisive factor in gaining visibility.  
2. This difference in approaches allows us to perceive Islamic groups that 
nurse distinct religious interpretations and embark upon divergent courses. 
This insight is of particular importance because the Islamic tradition al-
lows for a multitude of interpretations, courses, and organizational forms, 
all of them considered to be equal to each other. It does not, however, al-
low for standardization—neither through a hierarchy nor through terrorist 
acts. Muslims who try to bomb themselves to the top count on achieving 
high visibility through the global media, something that is then counter-
acted with the silence of nonviolent Muslims.  
3. Both groups are very much aware of the multitude of possible interpreta-
tions and the limits that this multiplicity sets on their own interpretation. 
Terrorist acts in the name of Islam forced them to act in a global context, 
but they rejected the idea of a theological discussion or direct confronta-
tion with their extremist competitors. The terrorist attacks challenged them 
to actively promote a different interpretation of the Islamic tradition and to 
act out their beliefs in the German context. Both communities fostered a 
discourse on Islam which was based on nonviolence and social engage-
ment, hoping that one day it would gain dominance again. In their local 
context, their respective discourse brought both groups only negative visi-
bility: the signals that Milli Görü sends are perceived as “dangerously 
close” to the worldview of extremists; the signals that Jamaatunnur sends 
are considered to be “missionary.”  
4. In both communities, the German context was captured with the word 
“secular,” secular being the keyword with which the new generation per-
ceives and reacts to its surroundings. For the one it stood for atheist and 
good-for-nothing, for the other it meant disenchantment. “Secular” also 
stood for the power to define values, to anchor them in the constitution, 
and to declare them universal. “Secular society” as perceived by young 
Muslims born and raised in Germany calls for the need to be different, to 
show one’s religious roots, and to translate Muslim values into under-
standable principles that are equally universal.  
5. For Nur students, the tension between religion and the world involves the 
entire social world. For Milli Görü, it is limited to the political world. 
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The new Milli Görü generation formulated the task of finding a compro-
mise as a legal matter, transferring religious claims to secular rights as 
guaranteed by the constitution. Nur students formulated their religious 
claims in philosophical terms, embarking upon a translation of Muslim 
conduct as universal ethics.  
6. In the highly tense political situation, their religious views on Germany 
offered both groups a means to translate political pressure into a basic 
human need. They drew their impulse from this change of frameworks. 
For the younger generation, it finally made Germany visible as a promis-
ing field to make oneself understood and to gain respect.  
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Gökce Yurdakul 
SECULAR VERSUS ISLAMIST: 
THE HEADSCARF DEBATE IN GERMANY
1
 
Two opposing voices from Turkish communities emerge in public space in 
Germany.2 One argues that Muslim teachers should be allowed to wear 
headscarves in public service:  
 
“The religious freedom of Muslim teachers who wear headscarves is restricted, and 
their free entrance to jobs in public service, which is their right according to consti-
tutional law, becomes impossible. This cultivates prejudices against Muslims, 
encourages continued discrimination against Muslims in all social spheres, and 
negatively affects the integration efforts of Muslims. The essence of the judgment is 
that the state would have to declare neutrality. This principle of government action is 
incompatible with a Muslim teacher who wishes to wear a headscarf while teaching. 
Obviously, the judge is proceeding from an incorrect understanding of the principle 
of neutrality.”  (Oguz Ücüncü, secretary general, Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli 
Görü; see Ücüncü 2002) 
 
The other one argues that this is an “Islamist trap”:  
 
“Have they forgotten that fundamentalist claims mean real discrimination against 
girls and women? The Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg warns against falling 
into the Islamist trap, which connects the ‘ban on headscarves’ to ‘professional 
exclusion’ and then to ‘discrimination against women.’”  (Türkischer Bund in 
Berlin-Brandenburg, press release, December 1, 2003) 
 
It may seem unusual that I wish to explore how Turkish social democratic 
associations compete with religiously oriented Turkish Muslim associations 
                                                           
1  I would like to thank Gerdien Jonker and Valérie Amiraux for their encourage-
ment and support in my pre- and post-natal months, and my daughter Daphne 
Yudit for her patience while I was writing this chapter. I also would like to ac-
knowledge the intellectual contribution of Michal Bodemann and Pascale 
Fournier to the research and writing process.  
2  A number of terms are used to describe Turkish immigrants and their children in 
Germany (Caglar 2001). In this chapter I use the term “Turkish communities” to 
refer to the Turkish immigrants and their children who live in Germany. “Turkish 
Muslims” is used to refer to the Turkish immigrants and their children who 
strongly associate with Islam.  
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for political representation in Germany.3 Many of the studies on Muslims in 
Europe and North America fail to discuss the heterogeneity of these commu-
nities. They focus on Muslim communities as only a homogeneous group. By 
focusing on Turkish social democrats as well as Muslim associations, I aim to 
bring the heterogeneity of immigrant communities into the discourse. I 
present comparative case studies of the Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Branden-
burg (the Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg; hereafter “TBB”), a secular, 
social-democratic immigrant association, and the Islamische Gemeinschaft 
Milli Görü (hereafter “Milli Görü”), a religiously oriented Turkish immi-
grant association with ties to Islamic fundamentalism.4  
The third voice in this debate is that of German political actors. They have 
formed the context for the TBB spokespersons and Milli Görü representa-
tives during the headscarf debate. Specifically, in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
German police and the mass media started to focus on Islam and Muslim 
communities. The gathering places of Muslims, such as mosques and reli-
gious associations, became the targets of state inspections and the subjects of 
flashy newspaper headlines, both of which viewed them as possible shelters 
for terrorists.5 Muslims from different backgrounds—from Moroccans to 
Turks, Egyptians to Pakistanis—became the victims of the same anti-Muslim 
discourse, which portrayed them as foreigners posing a threat to European 
democracy and society (Amiraux 2003; Bodemann 2004; Kastoryano 2004; 
Fournier and Yurdakul, forthcoming). I chose the headscarf debate as one 
example among many discussions about Muslim practices in Germany 
because the differences between the discourses of Turkish social democrats 
and of Muslims became clearer and more explicit in this debate than in any 
other public debate. Various explanations can account for this development, 
but one thing is clear: although the headscarf debate in Germany occurred in a 
different legal, social, and political system, it had similarities to the headscarf 
debate in Turkey. Therefore, the echoes sounding from the Turkish context 
may have played a central role in dividing the Turkish communities in 
Germany. In Germany, as in Turkey, this Muslim community was considered 
                                                           
3  It is important to note that the Milli Görü and the Türkischer Bund in Berlin-
Brandenburg (TBB) are not competing for the same kind of political representa-
tion. Whereas the Milli Görü emphasizes that the social and political differences 
of Muslim practices should be recognized (these practices are defined in the 
“Islamische Charta”), the TBB argues for erasing social and religious differences 
from the public sphere. As a result, these associations have different political 
representations and appeal to different constituencies.  
4  Of course, the Turkish Muslim community in Germany is not limited to these 
two groups. It is also divided along lines of ethnic, religious, and gender differ-
ence. In this chapter, however, I intentionally focus on the TBB and the Milli 
Görü and the different political perspectives and stances they represent.  
5  Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görü, “Münchener Polizei tritt den Rechtsstaat 
mit den Füßen,” September 30, 2004, on their Web site “Das islamische Portal”: 
http://www.igmg.de/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&ceid=12
77&itmid=1.  
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homogeneous; other features, such as the leftist, social democratic, and pro-
integration characteristics of some Muslim immigrant communities, as well as 
class, gender, and ethnic differences, were mostly ignored (Yurdakul, forth-
coming).  
I shall first briefly introduce the TBB and the Milli Görü, two political 
immigrant associations that compete for representation in the German politi-
cal context. I then discuss the different discourses that emerged during the 
heated debate over Muslim women’s headscarves in public places in Ger-
many. In this section I map the different positions of the German political 
actors and the immigrant associations. I explore how the discourses of the 
social democratic and the religiously oriented associations competed during 
the headscarf debates in Germany. Drawing on this debate, I then consider 
what these discourses tell us about immigrants’ political representation in 
Germany today.  
 
 
The TBB and the  Mi l l i  Görü  
 
The TBB is a social-democratic immigrant association that claims to represent 
the Turkish communities in the Berlin-Brandenburg region. The core organi-
zation of the TBB was originally the BTBTM (Berlin Türk Bilim ve 
Teknoloji Merkezi, or the “Turkish Science and Technology Center Berlin”). 
This student organization was founded by Turkish students at the Technical 
University of Berlin in 1977. The BTBTM defended the rights of immigrant 
workers and also fought for equal rights for international students, in particu-
lar Turkish students. From its beginnings, the association had a strong social 
democratic tendency, which was deeply affected by the rising tensions 
between left- and right-wing political parties in Turkey in the late 1970s, 
which resulted in the abolishment of all nongovernmental associations after a 
military coup d’état in 1980. In fact, the official letterhead of the BTBTM in 
1977 bluntly revealed the political leanings of this student organization: “The 
Turkish Science and Technology Center Berlin; Political Tendency: Democ-
ratic Left.”  
According to its early archives of 1977, the BTBTM openly showed soli-
darity with the JungsozialistInnen (Young Socialists), the youth organization 
of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party; 
hereafter “SPD”), by attending common events such as student meetings. 
However, in the late 1970s, the BTBTM’s major focus was its ties with the 
social-democratic Turkish political parties, specifically with Bülent Ecevit, 
the founder of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party). In various 
documents, such as annual reports and press releases, two main themes were 
expressed: the BTBTM’s strong political support for the social democrats in 
Turkey and the attempts to find solutions for the problems of Turkish workers 
in Germany.  
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By 1992, the Turkish students of the BTBTM had begun to welcome sec-
ond-generation Turks in Germany: the children of guest workers were grown 
up, had started to attend German universities, and had joined Turkish stu-
dents’ political movements. In the early 1990s, the executive committee of the 
BTBTM started discussions about an umbrella organization that would bring 
all Turkish immigrant associations together. This organization developed 
from the BTBTM to the Federation of Immigrants from Turkey (Bund der 
EinwanderInnen aus der Türkei) and finally to the TBB in 1995.  
The current political tendency of the TBB is still social democratic; how-
ever, it now emphasizes equality for immigrants, specifically Turkish immi-
grants. Eren Ünsal, a spokeswoman of the TBB, described the association’s 
goals and constituency as follows: 
 
“The political aim of the TBB is based on the thesis that immigrants do not have 
equal rights [with Germans]. Our aim is to ensure that they have equal rights. And 
we organize our campaigns according to this aim. [Our campaigns are] directed not 
only at Turks; they are directed at everyone who is not German. But the TBB 
appeals more to Turks. Turkish people feel sympathetic to us and become our 
members. But our campaigns and projects are directed at all people who are not 
European, who are not German.”  (interview with Ünsal on October 24, 2002)  
 
In general, Ünsal is relatively accurate about the aim and the constituency of 
the TBB. However, the TBB’s aim is not solely to defend immigrants’ rights; 
in fact, the TBB’s major aim is to organize political mobilization against all 
sorts of discrimination against immigrants and foreigners in Germany. In this 
sense, the TBB has redefined its previous role as the Federation of Immi-
grants from Turkey, which had attempted to defend only Turkish immigrants’ 
rights. 
Although the TBB was founded to defend the rights of immigrants at 
large, it is in fact a technocratic and top-down elitist body (Göle 1986). The 
founders of the TBB are traditional intellectuals in the Gramscian sense: they 
have been educated in the best schools in Turkey. A spokesman of the TBB 
also heads the foreigners’ commission of the German Federation of Trade 
Unions in the Land of Berlin-Brandenburg (Ausländerberatungsstelle des 
Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, Landesbezirk Berlin-Brandenburg). The 
other members also come from privileged backgrounds and occupy high 
positions in state institutions or private enterprises. They thus are not like the 
immigrants whom they claim to represent, who own an Imbiss (a snack bar or 
döner kebab stand) or work shifts in a German factory.  
Many German political authorities refer to the TBB as the supporter and 
guardian of “immigrant integration.” In return, the TBB keeps close contact 
with parliament members and political parties. Although the spokespeople of 
the TBB strongly emphasize that they have good relations with all of the 
political parties, there is an obvious affiliation of the TBB’s executive com-
mittee with the SPD. TBB’s executive director serves as the chair of the 
Migration Working Group (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration) within the SPD. 
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The working group specializes in immigrants’ issues, presenting reports to the 
party authorities. The treasurer of the TBB is a member of the SPD, serving 
on the commission for women’s issues.  
Although there are many indications of the close ties between the TBB 
and the SPD, a spokesman of the TBB, Safter Cınar, denies that this is the 
case. It is the TBB’s duty, he explains, to mobilize German Turks to vote in 
the elections; the TBB should not, however, encourage German Turks to vote 
for a specific party. He claims that the TBB is a nongovernmental association; 
hence, a specific political ideology would not be imposed on its members.  
Having said this, who is the constituency of the TBB? The TBB is made 
up of nineteen member associations. It appeals to associations that have 
social-democratic political tendencies, such as the Türkischer Elternverein 
(Turkish Parents Association), as well as some individual members who are 
in politically powerful positions, such as Mehmet Eksi, a politically active 
teacher and researcher in the Aziz Nesin Europäische Schule (Aziz Nesin 
European School),6 and Mustafa Yeni, who is the chair of the foreigners’ 
commission in one of the most powerful unions in Germany, IG Metall.  
In sum, the TBB appeals to people with a social-democratic and middle-
class background who have settled down in Berlin. The main concerns of this 
constituency are immigrant integration, political representation, and antidis-
crimination campaigns. Through a statistical analysis of a random sample of 
fifty topics from the TBB newsletters published between 2002 and 2004, I 
found that the most popular topics were the integration of immigrants (nine 
cases), campaigns against racism and discrimination (seven cases), the 
education of immigrant children (seven cases), and political lobbying for 
Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union (eight cases). The least popular 
topics were environmental consciousness (one case) and campaigns against 
homophobia (one case), which do surface on the TBB’s agenda, though 
rarely.7  
Like the TBB, the Milli Görü also frequently campaigns about discrimi-
nation, though exclusively about discrimination against Muslims. In fact, the 
historical background of the Milli Görü in Germany is characterized by this 
emphasis on Muslim mobilization. The Milli Görü was present as an infor-
mal network in Europe even in the early 1970s. In Germany, it emerged as a 
diasporic association of the members of Milli Selamet Partisi (National 
Salvation Party), the banned party of Necmettin Erbakan, a former prime 
minister of Turkey and the spiritual leader of Milli Görü ideology.  
The name Milli Görü refers to the political ideology created by the Milli 
Nizam Partisi (the National Order Party) in Turkey during the 1970s. The 
ideology of the Milli Görü has been represented in the Turkish political 
arena by a series of religiously oriented political parties, such as the National 
Order Party (founded in 1970 and banned from politics by the Constitutional 
                                                           
6  Aziz Nesin Europäische Schule was the first school to introduce bilingual 
education in Turkish and German. 
7  There may be a time-specific bias. 
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Court in 1971), Milli Selamet Partisi (the National Salvation Party, founded in 
1972 and banned after the 1980 coup), Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party, 
founded in 1983 and banned in 1998), Fazilet Partisi (the Virtue Party, 
founded in 1997 and banned in 2001), and, finally, Saadet Partisi (the Felicity 
Party, founded in 2001). During these various bans from political activities 
and subsequent re-establishment of the party under different names, the Milli 
Görü was strengthened as a diasporic network of Turkish Muslims in 
Europe, and particularly in Germany.8  
The Milli Görü is listed by the Bundesverfassungsschutz (Germany’s 
federal office for the protection of the constitution) as a “threat” to German 
democracy (Schiffauer 2004). The main reason for the inclusion of the Milli 
Görü on this list is that it is considered to be Islamic fundamentalist, prevent-
ing the immigrants concerned from full political participation in German 
society. The report states that the Milli Görü pursues anti-integrative efforts, 
especially with respect to the Islamic education of children. Moreover, the 
report provides many examples of defamatory statements made in Milli Görü 
publications, in particular anti-German and anti-Semitic statements in the 
Milli Gazete.9 The label of “threat” to German democracy largely restricts 
Milli Görü activities and campaigns and makes Milli Görü members objects 
of suspicion (Schiffauer 2004; Bodemann 2004). German political actors, in 
particular, consider the Milli Görü to be an illegitimate discussion partner.10  
Because the association is included on the list of the Bundesverfassungss-
chutz, Milli Görü leaders are not able to find supporters among German 
politicians and state authorities. Although they are represented as a threat to 
German society, they still make claims on the German state in order to create 
sociopolitical space for Muslims in Germany. However, because the Milli 
Görü has no credibility among German politicians, they use different 
channels, different associations, and other kinds of representatives. One of 
these associations is the Islamische Föderation in Berlin (Islamic Federation 
of Berlin), which has been granted permission to teach Islam courses in 
German secondary education in the German language.11  
                                                           
8  The Milli Görü is a diasporic network in many countries in Europe as well as in 
North America. The networks in Germany, the Netherlands, and France are the 
most well known.  
9  The daily newspaper Milli Gazete is considered to be the major publication of 
Milli Görü supporters. Its anti-Semitic and anti-German statements have pro-
voked many negative reactions from the German state authorities. The Milli 
Görü in Germany has published different German periodicals that are not affili-
ated with the Milli Gazete, such as Perspektive.  
10  The Milli Görü has an organic relationship with the current governing party, 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, in Turkey. Even this relationship is not sufficient to 
clear its name from the list of the Bundesverfassungsschutz.  
11  See “Milli Görüe John Destegi,” Sabah, July 10, 1999; “Geld für Islam-
Unterricht,” Berliner Morgenpost, September 21, 2002; Häußler 2001. In the 
school year 2002/2003, 1,607 students in Berlin (852 girls, 805 boys) took Islam 
as a religion course in Berlin; 74 % of them were of Turkish nationality, 21 % 
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In addition to cases involving educational rights, the following legal cases 
have been introduced by the Milli Görü to the German courts: the right to 
ritual slaughtering (affirmed by the courts in 2002), Muslim teachers’ right to 
wear religious attire in schools (denied in 2003), the right to have religious 
education (affirmed in 1984), Muslim girls’ right to withdraw from swimming 
courses when both sexes are present (affirmed in 1993), the right to add 
Muslim names in conversion to Islam (affirmed in 1992), the right to the 
availability of Muslim services in social and medical institutions (still in 
consideration), and the right to burial according to Muslim rituals (still in 
consideration). The right to the announcement of Islamic prayer (ezan) with 
speakers and the right to receive permission from the employer for daily 
prayer times (namaz) and for religious holidays (dini bayram) have not been 
brought to the courts yet.12  
Of these court cases, the most controversial was the one on Muslim 
women’s wearing of religious headscarves in public places. Although women 
have rarely been in a position to demonstrate their strengths in the Milli Görü 
movement, in the headscarf debate the Milli Görü appeared to be the pio-
neering organization for defending women’s right to wear the headscarf in 
public places. Mustafa Yoldas, chairman of the Schura, Rat der Islamischen 
Gemeinschaften (Schura, the Council of Islamic Communities), explained the 
strong position of the Milli Görü in the headscarf debate:  
 
“If you force people, saying ‘this is the only way,’ then people will do the opposite. 
Many young girls began to cover their heads as a reaction. If you treat [Muslims] 
like this, and if we have to make a choice, then we have to choose the people of our 
own religion. This is what we are experiencing after September 11.”  (Interview with 
Yoldas on August 10, 2004) 
 
During the court cases on wearing the headscarf while in public service, the 
Milli Görü supported the teacher, Fereshta Ludin. Eventually, Ludin began 
work as a teacher in an Islamic primary school in Berlin that is affiliated with 
the Milli Görü. 
 
 
The Headscarf  Debate  in  Germany 
 
In late 2003 there was renewed controversial public debate in Germany about 
whether Muslim women teachers could attend their classes wearing the 
traditional headscarf. The debate was re-ignited when a German school-
teacher of Afghan origin, Fereshta Ludin, insisted on wearing the hijab in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
were Arabs (see Islamische Föderation in Berlin, “Aktuelle Daten über den IRU 
für das Schuljahr,” http://www.islamische-foederation.de/IRU.htm; “Die Kopf-
tuch Schule,” Die Tageszeitung, June 24, 2004). 
12  See “Das islamische Portal,” the Web site of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli 
Görü: http://www.igmg.de.  
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school. Ludin was subsequently dismissed from her teaching job, and she in 
turn complained that she was being discriminated against on the grounds of 
her religious beliefs. When her case was brought before the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht (Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court),13 the court ruled that 
“Germany’s constitutional law did not explicitly forbid the wearing of 
headscarves in the classroom in state-run schools” (the German station 
Deutsche Welle, September 25, 2003). However, the courts expressed fear 
that the headscarf, as a religious symbol, would in and of itself threaten the 
educational mission:14 
 
“If teachers introduce religious or ideological references at school, this may ad-
versely affect the state’s duty to provide education which is to be carried out in 
neutrality … It at least opens up the possibility of influence on the pupils and of 
conflicts with parents that may lead to a disturbance of the peace of the school and 
may endanger the carrying out of the school’s duty to provide education. The dress 
of teachers that is religiously motivated and that is to be interpreted as the profession 
of a religious conviction may also have these effects […]. 
 
“If a teacher wore a headscarf in lessons, this could lead to religious influence on the 
students and to conflicts within the class in question, even if the subject of complaint 
had credibly denied any intention of recruitment or proselytizing. The only decisive 
factor was the effect created in students by the sight of the headscarf. The headscarf 
motivated by Islam was a plainly visible religious symbol that the onlooker could not 
escape.”15 (Fournier and Yurdakul, forthcoming)  
 
Presented as creating a “potential situation of danger” in the classroom,16 the 
headscarf is regarded by the court as an expression of Islamic fundamental-
ism: “Most recently, it is seen increasingly as a political symbol of Islamic 
fundamentalism that expresses the separation from values of Western society” 
(Fournier and Yurdakul, forthcoming).17 In a final step, the court let the 
individual Länder decide whether to legally enact a ban on wearing the 
headscarf in school:  
 
“However, the Land legislature responsible is at liberty to create the statutory basis 
that until now has been lacking, for example by newly laying down the permissible 
                                                           
13  During the court case, it was believed that Ludin was supported by the lawyers of 
the Milli Görü to bring out the headscarf issue and challenge the incorporation 
policies for Muslims; this point, however, has not been publicly confirmed.  
14  The following two paragraphs were written exclusively by Pascale Fournier in 
our co-authored article “Unveiling Distribution: Muslim Women with Head-
scarves in France and Germany,” in Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos, ed. Michal 
Bodemann and Gökce Yurdakul (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).  
15  BVerfGe, 2BvR, 1436/02, Judgment of the Second Senate of September 24, 
2003, on the basis of the oral hearing of June 3, 2003, Supra, note 24, at Par. I 
(6). 
16  Ibid., at Par. III (1). 
17  Ibid., at Par. II (5) a). 
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degree of religious references in schools within the limits of the constitutional 
requirements. In doing this, the legislature must take into reasonable account the 
freedom of faith of the teachers and of the pupils affected, the parents’ right of 
education, and the state’s duty of ideological and religious neutrality.”18  
 
Most German Länder were in favor of the ban, particularly those states 
governed by the conservative Christian Democratic Union and Christian 
Social Union parties, such as Baden-Württemberg. They supported the ban by 
stating that the German “constitution is based on a Christian Occidental 
tradition and [that] they would begin to draw up legislation to ban head-
scarves in the classroom as soon as possible” (Deutsche Welle, September 25, 
2003). According to this argument, nuns who obviously come from the 
aforementioned Christian tradition are allowed to wear headscarves while 
teaching. Muslim women, however, are not allowed to wear their headscarves 
because their Oriental religious attire is not compatible with the “cultural 
homogeneity” of majority society (Schieck 2004, 71). 
Since then, the Stuttgart school authority—the school district for which 
Ludin used to work—argued with respect to the state’s obligation to religious 
neutrality that it views “the headscarf [as] symbolizing a desire for cultural 
disintegration that was irreconcilable with the state’s obligation to neutrality” 
(Schieck 2004, 70). Referring to the court’s statements about religious 
neutrality, the school authority revision board (Oberschulamt Stuttgart) 
carried the topic further to the conflicting religious beliefs of parents and 
teachers. It argued that the students will be influenced by the teacher’s 
headscarf, viewing it as a religious statement. As the debate shifted to the 
issues of state neutrality, the “common good” of the society, religious free-
dom, and gender inequality, Ludin had to give up her hopes of teaching in her 
previous school. She moved to Berlin and took a job at the Islamische Gesam-
tschule, a private school where she can wear her headscarf while teaching.19  
At the peak of the headscarf discussions, leftist politicians were divided 
on the issue, and the political climate in Germany dramatically changed. 
Supporters of multiculturalism (e.g., Integrationsbeauftragte [”government 
representatives for integration”] and Marieluise Beck, a member of the Green 
Party) stood behind religious immigrant organizations in their efforts to 
defend multicultural rights, whereas supporters of state neutrality (e.g., Lale 
Akgün, parliament member from the SPD) were in the same camp as main-
stream Christian Democrats, arguing against the politicization of Islam.  
The Green Party, and especially Marieluise Beck, defended the supporters 
of the headscarf by emphasizing multiculturalism and, therefore, a respect for 
diversity. In fact, the leading German women of immigration politics, such as 
Marieluise Beck, Barbara John, and Rita Süssmuth, stated in an open letter on 
the banning of the headscarf from public places:  
 
                                                           
18  Ibid., at Par. 72.  
19  “Die Kopftuch Schule,” Die Tageszeitung, June 24, 2004.  
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“Whether or not one should opt for a more strictly secular school system, we want to 
make religious plurality in our society visible. The equal treatment of all religions is 
mandated by the constitution. A different treatment of Islamic symbols as opposed to 
Christian or Jewish ones is problematic from the viewpoint of integration and 
exacerbates conflicts instead of reducing them.”20  
 
The former president of Germany, Johannes Rau, also addressed the head-
scarf issue:  
 
“I am firmly convinced that we cannot prohibit the symbol of a religion—and the 
headscarf is one such—and can still believe we could leave everything else the way 
things are. This cannot be reconciled with freedom of religion, guaranteed to all by 
our constitution. It would open the door to a development which most proponents of 
the prohibition of the headscarf surely would not want.”  (speech by President 
Johannes Rau in 2003; my translation) 
 
Whereas the president of Germany was openly against the headscarf ban, Lale 
Akgün, a parliament member from the SPD and an immigrant of Turkish 
background, presented arguments similar to those of mainstream Christian 
Democrats and launched a campaign against the wearing of the headscarf in 
public places. In addition, an open letter in response to Beck’s call for the 
headscarf was signed by many pioneering women academics, politicians, 
artists, doctors, and teachers:  
 
“Who within the Muslim population would feel marginalized if the headscarf were 
prohibited in school? Only those who are under the influence of the Islamists and for 
whom wearing the headscarf is a sine qua non not only in the private sphere, but also 
in public service. All those for whom religion is a private matter and all those who 
are indifferent to religious precepts know and accept without problem the constitu-
tional principle of neutrality in the school system.”21  
 
At the same time, immigrant organizations were competing for space in the 
public sphere to promote and defend their views. Turkish Muslim immigrant 
organizations in particular, such as the Milli Görü, argued that religious and 
cultural differences should be regarded as constitutional rights and that, 
consequently, Muslim women should not be prevented from practicing their 
religion in the public sphere. In contrast, the immigrant organizations with 
social democratic leanings, such as the TBB, supported the ban of all religious 
symbols from the public sphere, a position that is in line with the Turkish 
state’s secularism.22  
                                                           
20  “Religious Plurality Instead of Forced Emancipation: An Appeal Against the 
Headscarf Law,” open letter published in Die Tageszeitung, December 15, 2003.  
21  “Für Neutralität in der Schule,” open letter published in Die Tageszeitung, 
February 14/15, 2004.  
22  The tension between these opposing views should be viewed in relation to the 
headscarf debate in Turkey (Göle 1997; Göcek 1999; Cizre and Cinar 2003). 
Currently, it is forbidden for students to wear headscarves in Turkish universi-
THE HEADSCARF DEBATE IN GERMANY 
 161
The TBB issued a press release informing Germans about the differences 
between the regular headscarf and the Islamic fundamentalist headscarf and 
warning the public about the evils of the latter. The traditional headscarf, the 
association explained, has a loose knot under the chin and leaves some of the 
front hair out, whereas the political headscarf, also known as a turban or 
hijab, is a conservative covering of the head which leaves no hair out and 
wraps tightly around the neck. The former is eligible to “cross the border” 
from the immigrant society to the mainstream host society, whereas the latter, 
the political headscarf, must be eliminated from the public sphere. The TBB 
accused the religious immigrant organizations of being Islamic fundamental-
ists, and Marieluise Beck and her supporters of being naive.  
 
“When […] the headscarf, veil, and burka are ‘instruments for the oppression of 
women and when they represent basic political symbols,’ then this naiveté [Beck and 
her supporters] is incomprehensible especially in a time of stronger fundamentalist 
activities.”  (TBB press release, December 1, 2003) 
 
Launching a campaign in support of parliament member Lale Akgün, the 
TBB took a public stance against the Green Party’s policy on the headscarf. 
The standpoint of the TBB—an association that represents Turks in Berlin—
put the Green Party in a strange position: in spite of the reaction from Turkish 
immigrants favoring social democracy, the Greens were trying to force 
multiculturalist values down immigrants’ throats. In fact, the TBB warned 
Germans about Islamic fundamentalism: 
 
“The people who signed this letter stress that the banning of the headscarf from 
public services would concern only women (and therefore be discriminatory). Have 
they forgotten that fundamentalist claims mean real discrimination against girls and 
women? The Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg warns against falling into the 
Islamist trap, which connects the ‘ban on headscarves’ to ‘professional exclusion’ 
and then to ‘discrimination against women.’”  (TBB press release, December 1, 
2003)  
 
On every occasion involving the headscarf debate in Germany, the TBB 
supported the idea that religion is a private matter and discouraged the idea of 
wearing religious symbols in public service. In order to prove its point, the 
TBB drew on various assumptions, the most common of which actually 
mirror many Germans’ conceptions of Islam “the headscarf is a symbol of 
women’s oppression in the Muslim world,” “it is the symbol of Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ties. A university student, Leyla Sahin, who wanted to wear her headscarf in the 
university brought her case to the European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg. The court decided in favor of the Turkish state and declared that it is the 
state’s right to protect public order. For more information on this case, see the 
European Court of Human Rights, Case of Leyla Sahin versus Turkey, Stras-
bourg, June 29, 2004 (available online).  
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fundamentalism,” and, most important, “the Muslim headscarf is a threat to 
the German state’s religious neutrality.”  
As a cultural interpreter of Turkish Islam, which is unfamiliar to many 
Germans, the TBB warned the German public that the wearing of religious 
symbols in public service would hinder immigrant assimilation. Moreover, by 
emphasizing that the Muslim headscarf is a threat to the religious neutrality of 
the German state, the TBB argued that one of the most important principles of 
German democracy is under scrutiny by Muslim communities (Schieck 2004; 
Yeneroglu 2004).  
The position of the Milli Görü in the headscarf debate was fundamentally 
different from that of the TBB. When the spokespeople of the TBB warned 
Germans about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, they were referring to 
religiously oriented immigrant groups such as the Milli Görü (interview with 
Safter Cınar in April 2005). In contrast to the TBB, Milli Görü representa-
tives and related associations argued that women should be allowed to wear 
headscarves in public places.23 Legal permission to wear the Muslim head-
scarf in public places had been discussed in Milli Görü publications, such as 
the German association’s magazine Milli Görü Perspektive. Oguz Ücüncü, 
the secretary general of the Milli Görü in Germany, explained: 
 
“The religious freedom of Muslim teachers who wear headscarves is restricted, and 
their free entrance to jobs in public service, which is their right according to consti-
tutional law, becomes impossible. This cultivates prejudices against Muslims, 
encourages continued discrimination against Muslims in all social spheres, and 
negatively affects the integration efforts of Muslims. The essence of the judgment is 
that the state would have to declare neutrality. This principle of government action is 
incompatible with a Muslim teacher who wishes to wear a headscarf while teaching. 
Obviously, the judge is proceeding from an incorrect understanding of the principle 
of neutrality.”  (Ücüncü 2002) 
 
In this publication, Ücüncü stresses that the headscarf ban will exacerbate 
discrimination against Muslim women and hinder efforts to integrate Mus-
lims. Moreover, he juxtaposes the two important concepts of the democratic 
state, freedom of religion and state neutrality, and argues that the judge 
misinterpreted the neutrality of the state in religious matters. Contrary to what 
Akgün and her supporters argue (that wearing the headscarf in public places 
threatens the state’s neutrality), Ücüncü stresses that state neutrality in 
religious matters is to encourage religious plurality.  
In opposition to the court’s statement (i.e., “If a teacher wore a headscarf 
in lessons, this could lead to religious influence on the students and to con-
flicts within the class in question, even if the subject of complaint had credi-
bly denied any intention of recruitment or proselytizing”), Ücüncü (2002) 
argues the following: 
 
                                                           
23  Associations such as Islamische Föderation Berlin and SCHURA Hamburg.  
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“One of the aims of education is to make students think about other cultures and 
religion. This aim would be supported by a Muslim teacher who is wearing a 
headscarf. Through this, she could help weaken prejudices and provide better 
understanding.”  
 
Mustafa Yeneroglu, the lawyer of the Milli Görü in Cologne, takes a fiercer 
and more defensive position. In an interview, he brought up the controversial 
connection between the headscarf and Islamic terror: 
 
“The decision of the Constitutional Court on the headscarf is wrong. Although it 
seems like the decision is in favor [of wearing the headscarf in public places], when 
you look at other decisions of the Constitutional Court in religious matters, this one 
is wrong. The court left the freedom of religion, a matter of basic freedom, to the 
decision of Land-level parliaments. It left it to political initiatives … Whatever I say, 
in all the reports of the constitutional institutions, it is stated that ‘these are funda-
mentalists, Islamists, radicals, extremists … they are terrorists.’ This is how it is 
perceived.”  (Interview with Mustafa Yeneroglu, head of the legal office for the 
Milli Görü in Cologne, July 27, 2004)  
 
In all of these statements by Milli Görü representatives, the main aim of the 
Milli Görü is to bring some exclusively Muslim practice, such as wearing the 
headscarf, into German political discussions.24 The TBB, on the other hand, 
have made Muslim immigrant associations the main target of their accusa-
tions, warning against “Islamic fundamentalism” in their press releases. 
Therefore, whereas the Milli Görü brings Muslim practices into the debate, 
the TBB accuses Muslim associations of being Islamic fundamentalists and 
threats to German society.  
 
 
Musl im Debates  in  the  German Context  
 
What do the competing discourses of the TBB and the Milli Görü on the 
headscarf debate tell us about the political representation of immigrants in 
Germany today? In consideration of the many themes and concepts that 
emerged during the headscarf debate, such as discrimination against Muslim 
women and teacher conflicts with parents’ right of education, it is remarkable 
that “state neutrality in religious matters” and “freedom of religion” consis-
tently appeared as two controversial topics.  
“State neutrality in religious matters” originates from the idea that in 
Western liberal societies, nation-states are “culturally homogeneous.” Ac-
cording to the cultural principle of constitutive justice, “the political commu-
nity should consist of a group of like-minded members who band together to 
                                                           
24  These Muslim practices are listed in the “Islamische Charta,” from the Zentralrat 





nurture their own common identity and who reserve the right to accept or 
reject new members” (Barbieri 2004, 17). This principle assumes cultural 
homogeneity as the basis for democracy and gives minorities and immigrants 
three options: assimilate, live in social exclusion, or leave the country.  
As Gavin A. Smith (1999) argues, cultural homogeneity is intrinsic in the 
Marshallian concept of citizenship, which derives from “deeply middle-class, 
English, male and white” cultural values. It does not take individual subjectiv-
ities and cultural differences into account (Benhabib 2002). Most important, 
the different experiences of state rules and regulations have not been ad-
dressed in the discussions on citizenship. Nevertheless, immigrants are still 
subjected to the law of the state even though they have not rationally and 
officially consented to be ruled in this way. The cultural homogeneity princi-
ple assumes that the culture of the majority is neutral and that it forms the 
norm for all members of society.25 
However, neutrality is a problematic concept of liberal democracy and has 
been widely criticized in political philosophy literature (Ackerman 1983). 
Critiques of the supposed neutrality of the liberal state argue that neutrality is 
built on the “necessity of having a secure culture” (Kymlicka 1989, 896). Will 
Kymlicka argues that in those cases in which a “collectively determined 
ranking of the value of different conceptions of good” do not exist, then the 
state authorities may take action to “formulate and defend the conception of 
good” (1989, 900). As he points out, this action may not be desirable, because 
state authorities would give priority to predominant ways of life and exclude 
the values and practices of marginalized and disadvantaged groups. Minority 
groups would be “convinced” to transform their values, norms, and practices 
to the majority’s conceptions of good. According to Kymlicka, this process 
reinforces the cultural conservatism of the dominant group over the minority.  
An example of such a process is the headscarf debate in Germany, which 
brought up issues of state neutrality. The case of Fereshta Ludin shows how 
cultural conflict is discussed in different ways by the state authorities, such as 
the Constitutional Court, by politicians, such as Marieluise Beck and Lale 
Akgün, and by immigrant associations, such as the TBB and the Milli Görü. 
The ambiguous definitions of the state’s obligation to neutrality make these 
                                                           
25  For a discussion about immigrant and minority consent to state regulations, 
please see Will Kymlicka’s argument in Politics in the Vernacular (2001) and its 
critique in Sujit Choudhry’s article in the Journal of Political Philosophy (2002). 
According to Kymlicka’s argument (2001), immigrants become part of the coun-
try as permanent residents or full citizens; that is, through voluntary immigration. 
As such, they are expected to learn the language of the majority, conform to its 
values and norms, and assimilate into the host society. In his article, Choudhry 
referred to Kymlicka’s assertion that “immigrants have waived their right to live 
in accordance with their own cultures through the decision to immigrate to a 
society which they knew that they would constitute a minority” and has provided 
his critique against Kymlicka’s assumptions (2002: 60–61). 
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different expressions possible. As Kymlicka has argued, when there is 
ambiguity about the collectively determined notions of common “good,” the 
state authorities define these notions and give priority to the predominant 
values. Consequently, the conflict will lead either to the forced assimilation of 
the minority groups or to their social exclusion, as in the case of the conflicts 
over the headscarf issue.  
The headscarf debate between German political actors, social-democratic 
immigrant associations, and religiously oriented immigrant associations 
illustrates that concepts central to the German nation-state are redefined by 
immigrant groups. Whereas Muslim immigrant groups challenge the state’s 
neutrality by making claims to religious plurality, others redefine its function 
for immigrant groups. In both cases, the fundamental values of Western 
democratic societies become major subjects for discussion, and immigrant 
groups become important actors in the German political arena.  
 
 
Conclus ion  
 
In this chapter I attempted to show how a social democratic association, the 
TBB, campaigns against the promotion of wearing the headscarf in public 
places in Germany, unlike the Milli Görü, which protests against the head-
scarf ban. I also elucidated and discussed the TBB’s major aim, which is to 
erase the ethnic and religious differences between Turks and Germans so that 
German Turks can enjoy equal rights as German citizens.26 The TBB repre-
sents the Turkish immigrant as a “good citizen” who views religion and 
ethnonational identity as private matters. This representation fits very well 
with the preference for cultural homogeneity in the German nation-state.27  
For the TBB, immigrants who challenge the idea of homogeneity by wear-
ing headscarves, by insisting on holding Turkish passports, and by frequent-
ing mosques are threats to immigrant integration. Seyla Benhabib (2002) has 
argued that, “just as German Jews, German Turks should make their religion 
a private issue, so that they would be assimilated into the majority and would 
not be threatened by the occidental civic traditions.” This policy of making 
religion a private issue is quite evident in the example of the TBB and its 
stance in the headscarf debate in Germany.  
However, the positions of the TBB and the Milli Görü in the headscarf 
debate are paradoxical. On the one hand, the TBB, whose members have a 
social-democratic political orientation, argue that permission to wear the 
                                                           
26  For detailed observations that explain the TBB’s political stance, see Gökce 
Yurdakul, “Mobilizing Kreuzberg: Political Representation, Immigrant Incorpo-
ration and Turkish Associations in Berlin” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Toronto, Department of Sociology, 2006).  
27  Benhabib (2002) rightfully argues that “Germans would like to make ‘good 
Germans’ out of Turks when contemporary Germans themselves are hardly sure 
what their own collective identity consists of.”  
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headscarf in public places would foster Islamic fundamentalism in Germany. 
Moreover, the wearing of the headscarf in schools and other government 
institutions would pose a threat to the state’s neutrality. Therefore, the TBB, 
which claims to be the representative of Turkish immigrants in Berlin, was 
against wearing the headscarf in public places in Germany. On the other hand, 
the spokesman of the Milli Görü, Oguz Ücüncü, argues that the ban on the 
headscarf will foster discrimination against Muslim women, because they will 
not be able to practice freedom of religion. 
The headscarf debate between social democrats and the religious immi-
grant association Milli Görü leaves us with two puzzles. The first one is 
about cultural conflict, state neutrality, and freedom of religion: How can the 
state solve the paradoxical relationship between the state’s neutrality and 
freedom of religion, particularly with respect to immigrant communities in 
Germany? Should cultural differences be recognized as political rights, and 
would this facilitate the incorporation of immigrants into the majority society? 
If so, what kind of rights should be recognized? Could the German debates on 
the headscarf be affected by the human rights narratives of the dominant 
juridical framework at the European level?28  
The second puzzle is about the future of Muslims in Germany: Which po-
litical association attracts more young people into its body and mobilizes 
Muslim immigrants? Are the TBB’s campaigns against racism and discrimi-
nation also an appeal for Muslim youth, who are arguably one of the most 
discriminated groups in Germany today? Or, as Mustafa Yoldas stated in his 
interview, will more young women prefer to wear headscarves in reaction to 
the state’s ban on the headscarf from public places?  
Although the TBB started as a youth group at the Technical University of 
Berlin and clearly attracted students with social democratic leanings in the 
1980s, it is questionable whether the TBB continues to be successful in 
recruiting young people. Safter Çınar, a spokesperson of the TBB, explained 
his worries about Turkish youth in Germany as follows: 
 
“We will lose these young people if we fall into the trap of organizing only as an 
ethnic association. This is because we think of ourselves as ethnic immigrants. But 
our situation would change if we would organize around a social problem. There is a 
social problem [racism], and we organize around it. Then we are not different from 
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, or ATTAC.”  (interview on November 3, 2002) 
 
Although the TBB claims to attract young Turkish people to the association, it 
is doubtful whether they provide an alternative to the religious associations 
currently attracting many of them (see the chapter by Gerdien Jonker in this 
volume). Contrary to what Cınar maintains, Muslim youth associations, as 
markers of identity, seem to appeal to many young Turks today. With more 
extensive research in this area, we will be able to understand what attracts the 
youth to religion rather than to social democratic values.  
                                                           
28  See Soysal (1994) for a related argument. 
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FROM SECLUSION TO INCLUSION:  
BRITISH ’ULAMA  AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL VISIBILITY 
The  Br i t i sh  Sta te  and Rel ig ion  
 
In Britain, civil society includes civic religion with government-funded 
chaplaincies to parliament, the armed forces, and wherever people are vulner-
able, whether in prison or hospital. The personnel and buildings of the Church 
of England—an established church—continue to be used for national and 
local rituals of celebration and mourning. Public service broadcasting contin-
ues to include religion. All state schools must give education in religion, and 
taxpayer money funds students who study nondenominational theology at the 
university level, so that the discipline is not confined to confessional colleges 
and maintains a conversation with academic life in all its diversity.  
Because public life makes institutional space for “religion,” that space has 
begun to make room for Islam, as it earlier had for nonestablished Christian 
denominations and the Jews.1 The annual ceremony at the cenotaph in 
remembrance of those who died in war now includes members of all faiths. 
All new religious education syllabi used in schools—agreed at municipal 
level—have to reflect diversity and no longer can simply teach about Christi-
anity. Many university departments of theology now include religious studies. 
Islamic Studies can be studied at the postgraduate level at at least sixteen 
universities, and a growing number of academics teaching the discipline are 
themselves Muslim.  
Since the Labour government came to power in 1997, a range of measures 
have been taken to meet Muslim-specific concerns. In 1998, after a ten-year 
struggle, Muslims won the right to state funding of a couple of schools, a 
privilege hitherto only enjoyed by Christians and Jews. In September 1999, 
the Prison Service appointed the first Muslim Adviser. And a question on 
religious affiliation was included in the 2001 census in England—the first 
since 1851—after strenuous lobbying by Muslims. The Home Office also 
commissioned research to determine the extent of religious discrimination, an 
issue that has exercised many Muslims since the publication in 1997 of the 
                                                 
1  A new study of Muslims in Britain, France, and Germany makes clear that each 
nation’s approach to Muslims is shaped, in part, by historically based church-
state institutions (Fetzer and Soper 2005).   
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Runnymede Trust inquiry, entitled Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All 
(Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997).2  
The institutionalization of Islam also has proceeded apace. Key battles 
were won in the 1980s on issues such as planning permission to establish 
mosques; the accommodation of religious and cultural norms in schools, 
including the provision of halal meat in school meals; burial spaces in ceme-
teries; gender-specific community centers; and the right to wear Islamic dress. 
In a city such as Bradford, Muslims can perform the call to prayer from their 
mosques for three of the five daily prayers. “By the mid-1990s [in Britain], 
there were at least 839 mosques and a further 950 Muslim organizations, 
ranging from local self-help groups to nationwide ‘umbrella organizations’” 
(Ansari 2002, 6). The most significant among the latter is the Muslim Council 
of Britain (MCB), founded in 1997. The MCB has its roots in Islamist 
protests against Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses; the upsurge of 
protests indicated the pressing need for an effective national body to lobby 
government and liaise with statutory and public bodies.  
Indeed, in Britain it is the Islamists who have pioneered an Islamic civil 
society with associations of Islamic doctors, lawyers, and teachers, an Islamic 
human rights commission, and the cleverly named FAIR, or Forum Against 
Islamophobia and Racism, established in 2001. The MCB is indicative of a 
new organizational sophistication. For its inaugural convention and accompa-
nying glossy literature it chose the slogan “Seeking the Common Good,” 
which deliberately echoed an influential document published a year earlier by 
the Catholic Bishops of England and Wales. The main weaknesses of such a 
movement are that it is seen as elitist, enjoys little grassroots support in the 
main centers of Muslim settlement, operates mainly outside traditionalist 
Muslim networks, and is dismissed as Wahhabi/Salafi by those in the more 
Sufi-oriented traditions.3  
The Muslim communities enjoy a measure of incorporation into public 
and civic life. In 2001 there were more than two hundred Muslim local 
councilors (161 Labour, 27 Liberal Democrat, and 22 Conservative). In 1997 
the first Muslim member of Parliament was returned, with another selected in 
2001. The government also appointed three Muslim peers drawn from the 
Pakistani, Bengali, and Indian communities.  
In the last few years the British state has also begun to self-consciously 
engage with what are dubbed “faith communities.” This is most evident with 
the creation of a Faith Communities Unit in the Home Office in November 
2003. In February 2004, in a wide-ranging report entitled “Working Together: 
Co-operation Between Government and Faith Communities,” the government 
acknowledged: 
 
                                                 
2  A new report, Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action (Richardson 2004), 
reviews progress in the last six years.  
3  For an overview of Salafism in the United Kingdom, see J. Birt, 2005.  
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“In recent years there has been a sea-change in the consultation of faith communi-
ties. Work done, in particular through the Inner Cities Religious Council and the 
Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom, has been influential in changing 
Government’s attitude to the contributions which faith communities can make. Some 
areas of policy are now routinely recognised by Departments as requiring the input 
of the faith communities, for example as partners in urban regeneration.”  (Home 
Office Faith Communities Unit 2004, 8) 
 
The Inner Cities Religious Council was set up in 1992 as a forum in which 
representatives of faith communities could work together on urban renewal 
and issues of social exclusion. It was an initiative born of collaboration 
between the Archbishop of Canterbury and a government minister. The Inter 
Faith Network for the UK is a nongovernmental organization that was 
established in 1987 to link interfaith activity and develop good relations 
between people of different faiths. The network has worked with a range of 
government agencies to develop “religious literacy”: 44 % of authorities in 
England and Wales now have an officer responsible for liaison with faith 
groups (Inter Faith Network for the UK 2003, 1X). 
The rationale for such collaborative activity was that faith communities 
were considered a good point of entry for involving local communities and, 
particularly in the inner city, difficult-to-reach groups. Further, it embodied 
“the new politics of the ‘third way’”: “instead of a dominating state or a 
minimalist state, the future is seen as a partnership between an active civil 
society and a modern government committed to social partnership and 
decentralisation […] [with] faith communities […] viewed as agents of social 
cohesion, important building blocks of civil society and valuable partners in 
the new frameworks and processes of local government” (Farnell et al. 2003, 
7–8). It was also in line with European Union directives—the “Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003”—to make reasonable ac-
commodation for religious needs in the workplace.  
The Home Secretary’s rationale for establishing a Faith Communities Unit 
in the Home Office was clear in the Heslington lecture “One Nation, Many 
Faiths—Unity and Diversity in Multi-Faith Britain,” which he delivered at 
York University in November 2003: to recognize and build on practical 
collaboration across different faiths, to encourage interreligious and inter-
community engagement, and to incorporate moderate religious leaders in 
policy discussions and thereby isolate extremists.  
 
 
Scrutinizing the ’ulama through a Post-9/11 Security Lens 
 
It was important to point to the continuity of government policy pre- and 
post-9/11. However, it is clear that Muslims in general and imams in particu-
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lar are now the object of scrutiny in a way they were not pre-9/11.4 This 
should not be a source of surprise: in December 2001, Richard Reid, the shoe 
bomber, was apprehended during his attempt to blow up a plane on its flight 
from Paris to the United States; Reid, a Muslim convert, was radicalized at the 
now notorious Finsbury Park Mosque. In May 2003, two British-educated 
Pakistani Muslims were involved in suicide attacks in Israel. A Rubicon was 
crossed in March 2004, a couple of weeks after the Madrid massacre of 191 
people, when eight British Muslims, most of them young British-born and -
educated Pakistanis, were arrested after the discovery of more than half a ton 
of explosives and bomb-making equipment in west London. Five have since 
been charged. In the past, radical Muslims in London were drawn from “Arab 
Afghans,” Egyptians such as the now notorious Abu Hamza, arrested in May 
2004 and facing extradition to the United States for his alleged links with al-
Qaeda. Yet here were young, British-educated Muslims drawn from the 
biggest ethnic group in the United Kingdom—two-thirds of Britain’s 1.6 
million Muslims, according to the census data for 2001, have their origins in 
South Asia, with the biggest group from Pakistan.5 
Concern about the nature, character, and impact of Muslim religious lead-
ership in the United Kingdom—a staple of Islamic publications for more than 
fifteen years (cf. Lewis 2002, chap. 5)—is increasingly being articulated by a 
variety of distinguished British Muslims in the mainstream media. Two 
examples illustrate this concern. Lord Ahmed, one of the three Muslim 
members of the House of Lords, and himself of Kashmiri origin, recently 
penned a long article in The Mail On Sunday (April 4, 2004)—a newspaper 
considered the voice of “middle England,” whose votes Labour and other 
political parties carefully cultivate—under the title “Top Muslim: Ban 
Preachers of Hate,” in which he alleged: 
 
“[…] a significant minority of imams perpetuate the outdated notion that Muslims 
are the victims of British colonial oppression and encourage people to rise up against 
the white man. If a Church of England vicar used the kind of abusive language about 
Muslims that some imams habitually use about the British, they would be rightly 
prosecuted for inciting racial hatred. The reason the imams are not prosecuted is 
because the non-Muslim community has no idea what goes on inside some mosques 
[…] Most come from the Indian subcontinent, speak no English and have no 
knowledge of British culture […] All this has a terribly damaging effect on young 
Muslims in Britain. They go to the mosque and hear a sermon in a foreign language 
                                                 
4  BBC news reported on July 2, 2004, that the Home Office had released figures 
revealing that police stop and search of “Asians” had increased threefold from 
2002 to 2004, largely as a result of new antiterrorist legislation. In real terms this 
meant an increase per day from two to eight stop and searches. In 2004 the MCB 
produced a short pocket guide for Muslims entitled “Knowing Your Rights and 
Responsibilities,” which includes sections on “stop & search powers of the po-
lice” and “vigilance and the terror threat.” 
5  The 2001 census gives the ethnicity of South Asian Muslims as follows: Paki-
stani, 42.5 %; Bangladeshi, 16.8 %; and Indian, 8.5 %.  
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about the past. It has no relevance to the problems they face—unemployment, racism 
or any of the economic and social problems affecting Muslims in Britain. At the 
same time, it fills them with hate and absurd notions about Britain and the British. 
They leave the mosque angry and confused and walk straight into the arms of 
extremist groups such as Al-Muhajiroun which talk to them in language they 
understand and offer them a way of venting their anger […]”6  
 
A young award-winning British filmmaker and radio producer, Navid Akhtar, 
recently underlined the seriousness of the alienation of sections of young 
Muslims from South Asian backgrounds in a radio program broadcast on 
prime time on a popular BBC radio show, Five Live Report. His program was 
cleverly entitled “Islam’s Militant Tendency” and began with these words: “I 
am a British-born Muslim and I have always believed it is possible to practise 
and live a British way-of-life. But among young Muslims I am increasingly 
rare.”7 His program opened a window into the proliferation of radical Muslim 
bookshops that romanticize jihad and pump out audiotapes and videotapes by 
the likes of Abu Hamza—a radical Salafi message—and study circles that 
meet outside the mosques and are led by young British Muslim professionals. 
Akhtar worries that such literature and study circles, though not advocating 
violence, generate “an extreme and separatist version of Islam.” He believes 
that many young British Muslims are “at odds with their parents’ insular 
Asian culture and the mainstream British way of life. They find themselves in 
a vacuum with no direction, no roots and a lot of questions. ‘Pure’ [Salafi] 
Islam claims to be authentic Islam as practised at the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad” (BBC’s Five Live Report, March 14, 2004).  
British Muslim academics and intellectuals also have little positive to say 
about ’ulama. Ziauddin Sardar, who writes for the New Statesman, has one 
reference to ’ulama in the index of his much publicized Desperately Seeking 
Paradise, Journeys of a Sceptical Muslim. The reference is to an address by a 
preacher of an influential revivalist movement, which he characterized as “a 
closed circuit whose sole, obsessive concern […] [with] ritual obligations […] 
left the world and all its problems out of the equation” (Sardar 2004, 13). 
Dr. Humayun Ansari, in a ground-breaking history of Muslims in Britain, 
                                                 
6  Al-Muhajiroun is a splinter group that broke away from Hizb at-Tahrir; the latter 
had their origins in Palestine, where they had separated from the Muslim Bro-
therhood. Lord Ahmed also appears for the prosecution in a detailed indictment 
of the ‘ulama in the first of a four-part series of articles on life in Muslim Britain 
in The Times (July 26, 2004), written by young British journalist Burhan Wazir 
and entitled “Mosques: Sources of Spiritual Comfort or Out of Touch?”  
7  Militant Tendency was a radical left-wing group that infiltrated mainstream 
Labour politics in the 1980s and for a while, especially in Liverpool, where they 
were the controlling group, brought the city’s public services to a halt.  
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dryly describes the proliferation of mosques in Britain as “accompanied by 
sectarian fragmentation and ideological inflexibility” (2004, 346).8  
The Home Office’s response to these anxieties has been to render obliga-
tory as from August 2004 a certain standard of English for any “minister of 
religion” wanting to work in the United Kingdom.9 Further, it has supported 
the Learning and Skills Council in England to pilot some basic managerial 
training for Muslims active in mosques and Muslim organizations. In the 
longer term it intends to open a dialogue with all religious communities in 
order to establish basic accreditation and accrediting bodies for “ministers of 
religion” coming into the country. 
 
 
British-Educated ’ulama: The Impact of Post-9/11 
 
The picture offered so far of the ’ulama is, however, only partly accurate. I 
have worked for twenty years as an adviser on Christian-Muslim relations to 
Anglican Bishops in Bradford, as well as for the last four years as a university 
lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University. This 
experience has provided me with a range of contacts and friendships within 
the Muslim community, not least among some religious scholars.10 In what 
follows I briefly profile a number of imams whom I have got to know. All are 
Sunnis who have spent much of their education and socialization in Britain 
and, with one exception, in Islamic madaris in Britain.11  
All are seeking to connect with young British Muslims, many alienated 
from the mosques. All have realized that the institutions of wider society are 
eager to work with them on a range of initiatives, especially at city level on 
issues of cohesion and urban regeneration. One had developed partnerships 
with agencies and organizations in wider society, and his work was already 
marked by a new professionalism well before 9/11. Others again, in retro-
                                                 
8  Fear of ‘ulama as bearers of South Asian sectarianism, among other things, was 
one reason the founders of the Bradford Council for Mosques drafted a constitu-
tion in 1981 to exclude them (Lewis 2002, 145–146).  
9  British Council offices overseas will give a test to ascertain whether the applicant 
has reached Level 4 of an accredited system—at present graduates overseas need 
Level 5; nurses and doctors need Level 6. After two years they will be expected 
to achieve Level 6.  
10  This is not to pretend that I have not been viewed at times with suspicion and 
variously accused of being a “spy for the church” or of working for MI5! Such 
“malicious gossip” has been noted by other academics working in this field (see 
Werbner 2002, IIX).  
11  There are now at least twenty-five registered Islamic seminaries in Britain. Only 
three offer undergraduate or graduate courses accredited by British universities. 
One was established in the 1970s, three in the 1980s, eighteen in the 1990s, and 
three since 2000. For their history, ethos, sectarian affiliation, curriculum, and 
changing social roles, see J. Birt and P. Lewis (forthcoming) and S. Gilliat-Ray 
(forthcoming).  
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spect, saw 9/11 as an event forcing a conservative community to open up 
mosques to a range of outside agencies, however reluctantly. Another realized 
that post-9/11 he had to encourage Muslims to emerge from their comfort 
zones and begin to engage with wider society. One continues to be ambiva-
lent about such engagement.  
I do not pretend that they are typical of the majority of British imams; they 
are not. They do, however, indicate an emerging engagement with British 
society among a section of the better educated imams. Their career trajecto-
ries illuminate both the civic and public roles we might envisage more of 
them fulfilling in the years to come and the structural weaknesses that must be 
addressed if more are to follow them.  
 
 
Pioneer ing  a  Mult ipurpose  Musl im Center   
 
Dr. Musharaf Hussain, in his early forties and of Pakistani ancestry, is the 
founder of and inspiration behind the Karimia Institute in Nottingham, which 
he established in 1990. Dr. Hussain has traversed three distinct intellectual 
and cultural worlds. He acquired his elementary religious education from a 
Pakistani imam in Bradford, then went on to earn a PhD in medical biochem-
istry. After some years as a research scholar at a British university, he spent a 
year in a traditional Islamic “seminary” in Pakistan. He rounded off his 
Islamic formation by obtaining a BA in Islamic Studies from al-Azhar in 
Cairo.  
The Karimia Institute is an innovative, multipurpose center serving the 
local community. It includes a mosque, a new sports center, an accredited 
nursery, an information and technology center and a number of classrooms, 
and a radio station. Its private primary school is located nearby. Dr. Hussain 
also established a monthly magazine, The Invitation, which has been running 
for more than ten years and now has some two thousand subscribers and a 
Web site. The institute’s most recent annual report listed seventeen projects, 
twenty full-time and thirty-five part-time staff, and an annual budget of some 
£400,000. What is striking in the report is the institute’s emphasis on youth: 
 
“At Karimia our youth work is not about tackling disaffection but more of preventa-
tive nature by providing a learning environment, recreational activities and camps. 
We want to inspire the young and train them to be good citizens by giving them a 
sense of direction and mission, so that they can be a positive force for social change. 
Our youth club attracts many youngsters who would otherwise be on the streets.”  
 
Another feature of the report is the willingness of staff to be involved in a 
range of partnerships, whether with the local education authority, urban 
regeneration schemes, the local further education college, or the youth 
service. Their work in providing tutorial classes in English, math, and science 
for youths under 16; a General Certificate of Secondary Education in Islamic 
Studies in Urdu; and homework clubs, adult classes, and youth provision all 
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point to their success in such partnerships. In the report, they reflect on the 
demands of partnerships: 
 
“It is important to emphasize the fact that the organisation’s work does not only 
produce good in an individual’s life but […] produces many goods for the wider 
society. [Further] work that is funded by others may be minutely scrutinized […] 
[and] such funds cannot be used for da’wa [an “invitation” to Islam] work […] and 
[must] not discriminate against anyone […] Most of us joined [Karimia] because 
[we] are driven by faith to help and serve others […] I hope that our secular friends 
and agencies will notice this commitment to faith and the important role it plays in 
people’s life.”  
 
In conversation, Dr. Hussain remarked that as he engaged with wider society 
and its agencies his fears and stereotypes began to be challenged. He feels 
that most local Muslim institutions in the United Kingdom are still in the first 
two stages of creation and consolidation. Few have moved into the critical 
third phase of “professionalism.” He also was one of the pioneers of the local 
Muslim charity Muslim Hands, which now has sixteen paid workers and 
operates in thirty-five countries. In 2003 it raised some £4 million. Muslim 
Hands is now a professional organization and has won an “Investing in 
People” award: most of the staff have gone through his mosque, local school-
ing, and university. 
He has developed many of his initiatives gradually. For seven years the 
institute ran extratutorial classes in a variety of subjects. This project enabled 
the institute to develop a pool of young trained teachers, some of whom now 
work in its private school. Similarly, they have been licensed by the radio 
authority to run a local radio station during the month of Ramadan every year 
since 1996. They trained a number of people during this time, three of whom 
have gone on to be journalists with the BBC in various capacities. This gave 
them the confidence to apply for one of sixteen licenses across the country for 
community radio. They won this license in 2002, partly because of their 
willingness to share it with an Asian women’s group.  
The ethos and concerns of Dr. Hussain are evident in his professionally 
produced monthly magazine, The Invitation. He writes the editorial; one of 
his Friday sermons becomes the article on the Quran; his book of hadith 
translations furnishes a monthly hadith reflection; and he acts as resident 
mufti, answering a selection of questions. His contributions breathe a Sufi 
humanism; indeed, he often cites from famous Sufi writers. This observation 
is not to charge his magazine with otherworldliness. He told me that often his 
editorial is a response to an article in Newsweek; he reads eclectically and 
draws from the Islamist journal Impact International as well as the monthly 
Q-News. There are articles on fair trade and health matters, as well as articles 
by local Muslim women. A recent issue of The Invitation includes a hard-
hitting piece entitled “Why We Are Where We Are?”, from which the fol-
lowing remarks are drawn:  
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“[Our] dominant chauvinism has trampled upon [women’s] God given rights […] 
Women have become subservient to […] husbands […] extra decoration pieces in 
their homes […] There are few independent and progressive thinkers in contrast to 
the vast majority of traditionalists and ritualistic [scholars] […] because it is an 
easier option as compared to requiring ijtihad or adaptation to the new realities of 
the modern world. In the absence of any clear vision, today the Muslims present 
themselves as victims around the world […] [we retreat into] escapism from reality 
[…] [and] we blame the Jews for [all] our ills […] [the desiderata listed include the 
need to] build bridges of understanding with the West […]”  (2003, 10:2, 24–25) 
 
He is one of only two scholars in the Barelwi/Sufi tradition who sit on the 
central committee of the MCB. Since 9/11 he has sought to increase the range 
of contacts with his local community—not least a joint project with a local 
church—so as to challenge negative depictions of Muslims. He assumed 
national media prominence when, in September 2004, he and the assistant 
secretary general of the MCB, Dr. Daud Abdullah, went to Iraq, supported by 
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to intercede for the life of Ken 
Bigley, a British hostage, who later was murdered. Dr. Hussain had already 
held a much publicized prayer vigil for Mr. Bigley in his local Muslim 
primary school. Their intervention won much praise from the British media 
for them personally and for the MCB. The choice of a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and a Sufi to travel together showed a good deal of wisdom, as 
each could appeal to different constituencies in Iraq.  
Dr. Hussain is aware that if more ’ulama are to have the skills and confi-
dence to benefit from the new openness of the local state and public bodies to 
Islam, there will have to be major changes in religious formation. He sets 
great store by the Muslim schools movement; there are now over 110 full-
time private Muslim schools in the United Kingdom, most of which are 
affiliated with the Association of Muslim Schools (AMS), established in 
1993, to which he belongs and which he used to chair. He believes that such a 
network will render many of the Islamic “seminaries” in Britain irrelevant in 
the not-too-distant future. The AMS network follows the national curriculum; 
thus, schools in the network do not teach Islam “out of context”—unlike in 
many Islamic seminaries in the United Kingdom, whose teaching still occurs 
in Urdu and whose curriculum still appears to be frozen in nineteenth-century 
India. He surmises that the Muslims will follow the Catholics and develop a 
tertiary college and teacher training college within the next decade. Such an 
institution could draw on the products of the AMS and both offer degrees and 
pioneer an appropriate Islamic curriculum in order to develop a new religious 
leadership that is at ease in Britain. Such a curriculum could include history, 





We Can Kick  I t :   
An Is lamic  Drug  Aw areness  Serv ice  
 
In 1996 Khalil Ahmed Kazi, a Gujarati and in his early thirties, became one 
of the first imams appointed to prison chaplaincy work after completing his 
six-year ’alim course at a “seminary” in Bury.12 He initially assumed that his 
role would simply be an extension of his preaching and teaching role in the 
mosque, which he continues part time. He discovered that his ’alim course 
had furnished him with few transferable work or social skills: he had to 
master the art of writing complex letters on behalf of inmates to probation 
officers and review boards; to organize religious festivals in the prison; to 
develop administrative and managerial skills enabling him to work within a 
complex hierarchical institution; to acquire the knowledge and confidence to 
relate to Christian colleagues; to perform a pastoral role for disorientated 
Muslim prisoners and intercede with fathers whose first response was to wash 
their hands of the sons who had brought shame on the extended family; and to 
build a network of support within the Muslim community for those released. 
As a chaplain he had a generic role and therefore wider responsibility for all 
prisoners. Initially, his role as a prison chaplain was met with incredulity 
within the Muslim community, which was in denial about the soaring number 
of Muslim prisoners.13  
The lessons he has learned as chaplain were applied in Batley, West 
Yorkshire, where he is general secretary of an institute of Islamic scholars 
which networks some one hundred Deobandi ’ulama. His first biannual report 
for 2000–2002 made clear both the need for “professionalism” in the organi-
zation and the emerging patterns of interaction with wider society. The report 
was marked by a refreshing candor. Typical was the comment in the foreword 
by the chairman, who pointed to the need for 
 
“true Islamic knowledge and wisdom [in a period] of turmoil and fitna. Each day 
brings greater challenges and requires insight into complex issues. Many a time it 
becomes extremely difficult to differentiate between haq [truth] and batil [false-
hood], and thus a dilemma is created as to which route one should adopt.” 
 
The organization is between Dr. Hussain’s second and third phases, consoli-
dation and professionalism. This is clear from Kazi’s overview as general 
                                                 
12  Bury is the “mother” house of a network of sixteen Islamic seminaries in the 
United Kingdom which belong to a reformist traditionalist group, Deoband, crea-
ted in India in 1867. Historically, a main target for reform has been other tradi-
tionalist Muslims, especially the Barelwis, who are deemed to have made too 
many concessions to Hindu religiosity and customs. The Barelwis have five se-
minaries in the United Kingdom. 
13  The census data for 2001 indicated that 2.7 % of the British population is 
Muslim, yet the Muslim prison population is 8.5 % (see Home Office Faith 
Communities Unit 2004, 96). 
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secretary of the institute, in which he described the shift from “ad hoc” 
responses to development of a formal constitution and the introduction of the 
apparatus of any “professional” organization—agenda, attendance registers, 
minutes, and even a Web site. The report indicated the extent to which they 
were engaging with wider society through their contacts and work with 
groups responsible for hospital and prison chaplaincy; local schools and 
colleges; a da’wa and publications department; lecture and youth programs; a 
community services network working with the police, members of Parlia-
ment, and policymakers; lectures on Islam delivered in a variety of venues, 
including an interfaith council; and a support group for drug and alcohol 
abuse.  
There was also plenty of self-criticism. In the section on Islamic education 
the report noted that “the student, after spending a good part of the day at 
[state] school, comes exhausted both mentally and physically to the madrasah. 
If the [teacher] then conducts his lesson without any preparation, planning or 
using relevant methods, how would that then capture the imagination, atten-
tion and hearts of the students?” One major concern clearly articulated in the 
report was the limited expectations that parents have of Islamic education. 
“Their idea of Islamic education is no more than the ability to read the Qur’an 
[…] [U]nder the pretext of flimsy excuses, such as increased school workload 
or attending weddings,” they deprive them of this basic education: 
 
“Consequently, when pupils reach adolescence, when they are in a position to 
appreciate the beautiful teachings of Islam, when they need to be guided through the 
difficult period of teenage-hood, they are taken out of madaris. This great injustice is 
going to create an identity crisis, an ignorant rebellious Muslim.”  
 
As a prison chaplain, Kazi is well aware of the growing disaffection of a 
section of young Muslims from the mosque. In Batley, where he serves as a 
part-time imam, he has started meetings for these disenchanted young Mus-
lims in a community center, a neutral space outside the mosque. Able to 
bridge the world of mosque, prison, and wider society, he has developed 
some innovative projects in partnership with local agencies. One that has 
given him considerable satisfaction was the launch at a Muslim community 
center in Batley in April 2004 of an Islamic drug awareness service, We Can 
Kick it, with an accompanying Web site.  
The project, which aims to work with hard-to-reach groups in local 
mosques, schools, and community centers, involves all of Batley’s fifty 
mosques and has been devised by Kazi, as Muslim consultant and project 
coordinator, with a number of Muslim professionals—two drug trainers from 
the Health Authority, a sports researcher, and a community liaison officer—
who have created the material to be used in the mosque with eleven-year-olds. 
The material has been tested with schools and the project funded by police 
and drug action teams. Those who complete the two-hour course, whether in a 
mosque, a community center, or school, are given a certificate and access to 
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sports training programs as an alternative to the culture of “hanging out” and 
drug misuse.  
This is just one of many projects in which Kazi is involved. Another, the 
Madressah Project, aims to promote positive parenting and provides guidance 
on child-welfare issues. It is headed by another Bury-trained religious scholar 
and funded by the social services and community education and regeneration 
services. It has already built relationships with thirty mosques, establishing a 
cross-cultural dialogue in order to explain child protection, behavior man-
agement, and health and safety issues both in the home and in the mosque 
teaching environment. Kazi is a member of its management committee.  
His latest project, which at the time of writing is awaiting Home Office 
approval, is an imaginative scheme to provide a community chaplaincy 
project in three areas from which many Muslim prisoners come. The aim is to 
establish a team of chaplains who will recruit, train, and supervise teams of 
volunteers. These volunteers will act as mentors and provide one-to-one 
support for ex-offenders released from prison. Services on offer will include 
housing advice, drugs- and alcohol-awareness training, counseling, debt 
counseling, benefits advice, and job-search support. The project has the full 
support of all the chaplains and Anglican and Catholic dioceses. Although the 
project will cost in excess of £800,000 over three years, it would only have to 
keep twenty prisoners per year from re-offending and returning to prison in 
order to cover its costs through the money saved by the prison services.  
For Kazi the key to the success of such ventures is partnership: partner-
ship between Muslim scholars and Muslim professionals and partnership with 
a variety of agencies now willing to work with religious groups. Police now 
go into mosques to speak about drugs awareness, something that would have 
been unheard of just a few years ago. The mosques used to be closed worlds, 
and many of the elders and ’ulama were deeply suspicious of non-Muslim 
society. Kazi frankly admits that the shock of 9/11 has enabled him to open 
up this closed world: as a respected traditionalist religious scholar, he has 
been able to negotiate access to such agencies and legitimize such initiatives 
in Islamic terms by providing Islamic support materials.  
 
 
From Sec lus ion  to  Inc lus ion?  
 
The activities of ’ulama like Khalil Ahmed Kazi, who have developed a new 
set of skills by working outside the Muslim subculture of Islamic seminary 
and mosque, indicate a growing awareness of the need to connect with 
streetwise British Muslim youth and the increasing willingness of support 
agencies to work with them. Two young Bradford religious scholars reflect 
two overlapping sets of responses to this challenge. Although their work cuts 
across ethnic divides, Mufti Saiful Islam, a Bangladeshi scholar, serves a 
largely Bangladeshi community, and Sheikh Ahmed Ali, a Pakistani, serves a 
largely Pakistani constituency. Both are in their early thirties and have 
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established independent Islamic institutions, staffed and run largely by 
British-educated ’ulama whom they have recruited from Bury and its associ-
ate seminaries. Both continue to have good relations with local mosques.  
The aim of such independent institutions is to get away from the some-
what negative associations that mosques carry for Muslim youth. Both run a 
range of activities for Muslim youngsters which are intended to maintain their 
interest through adolescence—the major gap in provision that Kazi identified. 
Ahmed Ali runs additional educational classes on the weekend in computing, 
English, and math as well as homework clubs. Everything is studied through 
the medium of English. In all, he and his colleagues seek to supplement and 
consolidate state education. In the summer Ali takes youngsters camping and 
organizes day trips to local theme parks. In cooperation with youth workers 
they arrange weekend soccer games and competitions in the summer. They 
take groups of young men between fifteen and thirty years of age to the 
annual Islamic study camp (tarbiyya) organized by Bury since 1998, where 
they listen to addresses in English delivered over a period of three days and 
live under canvas. Ahmed Ali states quite clearly that his Islamic academy is 
to be understood as a “social center” generating a wide range of activities not 
normally associated with a mosque.  
Ahmed Ali is a charismatic speaker and has used this strength to develop 
an audiotape ministry. He has over sixty titles and sells between forty thou-
sand and fifty thousand tapes a year. He does not avoid controversial issues. 
One of his best-selling tapes is entitled Drugs, the Mother of All Evils. It is 
clear why he is popular: he can speak the language of the street, and his tapes 
are larded with local phrases drawn from the drug culture. The message, 
however, remains very traditional: shape up or else hellfire awaits you. He is 
a textual scholar, not a social scientist. Another recent tape is amusingly 
entitled “The IT Syndrome” (I am IT!); in it he parodies the “big-timers” and 
role models for disaffected youth in the community, with their “7-series 
BMWs, Mercs and mobile phones,” who forget the Quran’s warnings about 
“exalting riches and forgetting Allah.” He reminds them of the Quranic 
punishments: amputation for theft, “80 of the best” for false accusation, 
stoning for adultery with a married woman. He does not spare his hearers 
gruesome and lengthy details about the humiliations of hell. Ali makes no 
concessions to Western, liberal sensibilities.  
Two other tapes indicate that he is unapologetically traditional in his 
thinking. He addresses the issue of “forced marriage” and acknowledges that 
it is a widespread cultural abuse in South Asian communities: “some are 
blackmailed, some are threatened, some are severely beaten.” Drawing on 
Hanafi jurisprudence, he points out that Islamic legal norms insist that the 
wife is not a commodity, that she has rights to a modest dowry, and that she 
must give her permission to marriage. Moreover, the essential factor in 
choosing a partner should not be her wealth, status, or beauty but her piety. 
Marriage, he adds, is a form of worship; unfortunately, piety is not the first 
concern of parents who are more preoccupied with marrying “this or that 
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uncle’s or aunt’s son or daughter.” Further, a guardian should take account of 
kuf, equality of status. He also is deeply critical of conspicuous consumption 
at weddings—what he amusingly refers to as “blow [all your savings] and 
show [off your supposed wealth]”—as well as of the popularity of Hindu 
customs. Imparting much sensible advice, he mentions that if men contem-
plate multiple wives—no more than four, of course—they must treat them 
with “equality and justice.”  
In two recent tapes entitled Iraq, Ahmed Ali shows that he is well read in 
classical Islamic history. The burden of his lengthy narratives is that Allah 
tests his people; they show patience and eventually prevail. He reminds them 
of the early conquests of Islam, when the mighty superpower of its day—
Persia—was “humiliated” by the Muslim armies, whose faith struck “terror 
into the hearts of the kuffar.” Chapters drawn from Iraq’s bloody subsequent 
history are rehearsed to conform with this pattern: Ali is killed in vicious 
intra-Muslim wars, and the splendid Abbasid empire centered on Baghdad is 
exposed to defeat and “terrifying slaughter by the pagan Tartars.” Today the 
Iraqis have suffered terribly from sanctions and war, but, as Ahmed Ali 
reminds his audience, the Tartars were eventually converted to Islam. Allah 
prevailed then, and Islam will prevail again. For the present, Ali suggests to 
his audience that, “instead of spending their money on five mobiles and three 
satellite TVs,” they should visit Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine with an Islamic 
scholar in order to strengthen their faith. “Remember it is the site of your 
religious history … so when the bombs drop remember this.” 
He is anxious about the inroads of non-Muslim cultural practices. In one 
of his most recent cassettes, Tawheed and Shirk, he reminds his audience that 
shirk—associating something or someone with Allah—is the unforgivable 
sin. He expresses dismay that some misguided Muslims protested against the 
Taliban’s destruction of Buddhist statues in Afghanistan. He recounts with 
approval a hadith to the effect that a companion of the Prophet is commended 
for cleaving the head of a female seer. Yet all around Ahmed Ali sees Mus-
lims adopting unacceptable practices: whether consulting their zodiac signs in 
the tabloid press—a particular weakness, he alleges, of Muslim women; 
celebrating Valentine’s Day; or advertising the festivals of the mushrikun 
(those who commit shirk) in Islamic magazines. He also delivers an intra-
Muslim polemic against practices such as praying at the tombs of Islamic 
saints for children. All such activities are tantamount to shirk, as only Allah 
has knowledge of the future and of the unseen.  
Ahmed Ali, unlike the two other ’ulama discussed thus far, has not been 
systematically exposed to wider society, and so has not had to develop new 
intellectual and social skills to complement those acquired in his Islamic 
formation. His only openness to non-Muslim agencies has been some collabo-
ration with Muslim youth workers and teachers. He seems content to work 
within a relatively closed Muslim social world. In conversation with me, he 
expressed some bitterness that the valuable work he does to engage with 
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disaffected Muslim youth and raise educational standards is not recognized by 
teachers and the police.  
Whereas Ahmed Ali’s main medium of communication to a broader con-
stituency is the audiotape, Mufti Saiful Islam prefers the popular format of the 
magazine, the pamphlet, and poetry. Like Ahmed Ali, he went straight into an 
imamate at a local mosque after completing his ’alim training. Whereas Ali 
went to Cairo to complete his training at al-Azhar, Saiful Islam was in the first 
group to complete a newly developed ifta’ course begun in Bury in 1995 to 
train Hanafi muftis. Like Ali, he soon became aware of the limited impact of 
the traditional mosque on Muslim youth, who were increasingly being drawn 
into a range of antisocial and immoral behavior. For this reason, he too has 
established an independent Islamic institution.  
In addition to carrying out “normal” methods of teaching, Saiful Islam 
runs a weekly session of Quran exposition followed by a question-and-answer 
session. He makes clear in his publications that simply rehearsing what the 
Quran and Sunna say about issues is no longer enough. In a pamphlet entitled 
“Alcohol, the Root of All Evil,” he notes after the section on Quranic verses 
and hadith that “these traditions should be sufficient to display the corruption 
and evils of alcohol. Unfortunately in this ‘advanced age’ […] one may be 
more influenced by medical and scientific research.” He then includes 
material on the intellectual, physical, psychological, and social costs of 
alcohol, drawing on a range of popular sources, including Reader’s Digest.  
He has produced two volumes of pithy comments and articles entitled 
Pearls of Wisdom in 2001 and 2002. As with Ahmed Ali, fear of hell plays a 
central role in his teachings. Thus, a warning was sounded for would-be 
usurers when a Pakistani, well known for dealing in interest, died: “Soon after 
his passing away, his facial features began to change until it resembled that of 
a pig” (1:39).  
In both volumes a traditionalist reading of the social roles of women is 
commended. The second volume recounts a dialogue between “a modernist 
lady and an intelligent young girl.” The former accuses the latter’s father of 
keeping her imprisoned at home, as if in jail. The young girl protests that 
jailers keep criminals under lock and key, whereas “diamonds and gold [are 
kept] in a safe place. I am my father’s diamond, which he keeps in this holy 
sanctuary [home] … the thought of escaping does not arise in my mind … I 
love the safety and peace of my home” (2:42–43). In the first volume a hadith 
is narrated in which women are enjoined to pay “sadaqah [alms] and offer 
repentance abundantly,” as women feature more prominently in hell than 
men. The reason, according to another hadith, is that women are “more 
habituated to cursing (during conversation) and … are ungrateful to … 
husbands” (1:11). Another scholar is cited as saying that “Women who 
possess degrees of B.A. and M.A. cannot compete in understanding and 
intelligence with women who have acquired deeni [religious] knowledge. 
Yes, in deception and schemes, the western-educated women may be ahead. 
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But remember, that words of intelligence will come out from women of piety” 
(1:41).  
Mufti Saiful Islam is clearly not much impressed with Western education. 
A poem entitled “The Western Youth” includes the following: 
 
“He thought he was only twenty and was going to live to seventy. 
The West taught him to be free and to acquire a useless degree. 
Filled with selfishness and free, never did he perform a single deed. 
When told to change and repent, he said why? I’m happy and content. 
If only he knew what contentment was, he may not have made such a loss. 
Satisfaction is what he chased, with disbelievers he embraced […]”  (1:24)  
 
In conversation, however, he pointed out that in a non-Muslim context “the 
law of necessity” operated. Because the community needs women teachers 
and medical personnel, they would be allowed to go on to further education, 
albeit properly covered.  
His bimonthly magazine, Al-Mu’min, is a polished production. It enjoys a 
circulation similar to that of The Invitation. It includes sections on tafsir 
(Quranic commentary), hadith, religious and historic personalities central to 
Islam, a women’s section, poems, a children’s corner, and a question-and-
answer page where the mufti gives fatawa on everything from clones to 
contraception. Although there is a women’s section, women themselves do 
not seem to write for the magazine (though they do for The Invitation). 
Moreover, there are fewer articles on contemporary political events.  
However, there is no embarrassment about asking difficult questions; for 
example, a questioner asks whether a man’s marriage is still valid if he has 
had an affair with his wife’s sister. The mufti answers that the marriage 
remains valid, and then points out that the prevalence of such immoral 
behavior is rooted in the failure to maintain strict segregation (purdah) among 
close relatives within the family. A recent issue even answered questions 
about oral and anal sex. Moreover, many of the articles self-consciously seek 
to connect with the world of Muslim youth by using such catchy titles as 
“Designer Clothing,” “Benefits and Harms of the Internet,” and “Football: A 
Religion?”  
One innovation that Mufti Saiful Islam has pioneered is that of teaching 
the ’alim syllabus to local adults on a part-time basis—the course of study can 
take up to ten years. He realized that many men wanted to take up this study 
but, because of family commitments or full-time jobs, could not afford to 
study full time at a seminary. Already this pattern of religious formation is 
bearing fruit: one of his trainee imams, Amjad Mohammed, is already trained 
as a teacher; another, Rafaqat Rashid, is a local doctor. Both are in their early 
thirties and form the nucleus of a small group of fellow Muslim professionals 
who established the Islamic Cultural Association (ICA) in Bradford in 2003.  
The aims of the ICA are listed in their literature and on their Web site. 
They include portraying a positive image of Muslims; enabling Muslims to 
play a more positive role in the wider community by fostering better commu-
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nity relations and working for the good of society as a whole; facilitating a 
two-way communication between Muslims and public bodies and addressing 
educational and health deficits in the community; and seeking to eradicate the 
discrimination and disadvantages faced by Muslims. They stress that the ICA 
“consists of professionals who have been raised in England” and who have “a 
training in the classical sciences from qualified teachers and sources.”  
Their Web site has a range of helpful articles on Islamic beliefs. Many are 
self-critical, such as one entitled “Male Chauvinism and the Muslim World,” 
in which they criticize as incompatible with Islamic law such abuses as 
female mutilation, honor killings, and forced marriage. They have a chatroom 
where contemporary local issues are discussed, such as “Are our Muslim 
parents playing a proactive role in the education of their children?” and 
“What should the government do to promote social inclusion of Muslims?” 
Non-Muslims also take part.  
The vice chair of the ICA, Amjad Mohamed, produced an illuminating 
article on their Web site entitled “British Muslims—Where From, Where To, 
Where Now?” In it he noted: 
 
“Today, the Muslim community in Britain is a relatively settled community […] 
[which has] established a diversity of Islamic organizations. […] However, occur-
rences like The Satanic Verses, for example, are perceived as a conspiracy against 
Muslims. Also, external factors such as problems in the Holy Land (Palestine), the 
massacre of Muslims in Bosnia, and […] [lately] the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
not forgetting the controversial French ban on the headscarf, unsettle the resident 
British Muslims. […] The Muslim community had decided, possibly unconsciously, 
that rather than defend their religion, it would be better to isolate [themselves] from 
the wider society and, therefore, not attract attention. However, events over the last 
few years have changed that position. British Muslims can no longer hope not to be 
seen nor questioned. Events outside of their hands have dragged them from seclusion 
into the questioning eye of the general public. British Muslims have […] to decide 
whether [or not] to ‘open their doors’ to the wider community […] [and thereby] 
dispel myths, misconceptions made against the religion of Islam.”  (italics mine; see 
www.ica-online.org)  
 
The activist thrust of their work is evident in the Quranic text that adorns their 
literature: “[…] mankind can have nothing except what it strives for” (Surah 
An-Najm 53:39). Thus far they have organized or participated in a number of 
local conferences. In June 2004 they ran a drugs-in-community project in 
cooperation with the police. Dr. Rashid has organized gender-specific work-
shops on diet and diabetes issues in three mosques. More recently they have 
been working with Muslim youth workers by mentoring vulnerable young-
sters.  
The ICA is a welcome development in an area of the city with high levels 
of educational underachievement—in one ward 46 % of the community is 
without qualifications—unemployment, and youth disaffection spilling over 
into antisocial behavior and drugs. Amjad Mohamed is frank about the 
difficulties in encouraging cross-community relations in the present climate, 
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with “white faced British soldiers killing brown faced Muslims in Iraq … 
brown faced Muslims doing nasty things to white [hostages] … In all, it is 
difficult for Jones to feel comfortable with Ali and vice versa.” Moreover, 
unlike the Indian Gujarati communities of Batley or Leicester, which are used 
to living as a minority in India or East Africa, the large Pakistani communities 
in Bradford feel comfortable in their Muslim enclaves, where they are now 
the majority. The British National Party and far-right activity also make them 
reluctant to move too far outside the substantial Muslim quarters of the city.  
  
 
J ihad  to  Engage  Journa l i s t s  
 
Sheikh Ibrahim Mogra, a Gujarati in his mid-thirties, is based in Leicester in 
the East Midlands. Originally from Malawi, he was sent to the United King-
dom to train as a doctor, but decided to become an ’alim instead. His educa-
tional formation includes Bury, al-Azhar, and an MA at the School of Orien-
tal and African Studies in London. Mogra has worked part time in mosques, 
taught in one of the three Islamic seminaries in the city, and now runs his own 
mosque school. In addition to these traditional roles, he has pioneered work in 
the wider community, not least with local interfaith groups. He has organized 
joint Christian-Muslim fundraising for hospitals in Kosovo and Gaza. He has 
been part of a joint Christian-Muslim group setting up and delivering an 
innovative chaplaincy course for Muslims at a local Islamic institute. He runs 
the Leicester-wide Radio Ramadan, which, like two dozen similar ventures 
across the country, is granted a license for the period of Ramadan. Mogra 
realized that if a traditional imam has a congregation of some two hundred on 
Friday, Radio Ramadan would give him a constituency of thousands for his 
teaching and preaching. He consciously invites imams from all traditions to 
participate. He is active in the three local universities, where he delivers the 
Friday khutba on consecutive weeks and takes part in the annual conference 
of the Federation of Student Societies. The 2004 conference, with its seven 
hundred students, was covered in the Guardian newspaper. Sheikh Ibrahim 
Mogra, “a leading young imam,” was said to call on  
 
“Muslim students to reach out to their peers. Urging them to be more integrationist, 
he said: ‘That is where the struggle lies. If we reach out we can win the hearts of this 
country.’”  (Guardian, June 19, 2004)  
 
Mogra has frequently insisted to me that he did not want to be limited to the 
traditional role of imam. He preferred to work part time in his own mosque 
school rather than serve as a full-time imam and thus be constrained within 
the role envisaged by a majority of mosque committees. His local community 
work has won him a measure of national recognition. He has been appointed 
as an area representative for the MCB and chairs their mosque and commu-
nity committee, for which he was reselected in May 2004 for a further two 
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years. The MCB has very few active ’ulama as members, and of these Mogra 
is the first ’alim of his generation who was educated in a British seminary. In 
October 2004 he helped open the first regional office for the MCB outside 
London, based in Leicester. He is grateful to the MCB for giving him a 
national platform for his gifts—as well as for enhancing his skills with 
leadership training.  
Ibrahim Mogra passionately believes that post-9/11 Muslims must engage 
the media to correct misunderstandings and that mosques must open their 
doors to the public in order to show that they have nothing to hide. As part of 
his own efforts in this respect, he was profiled in a radio documentary entitled 
“Rookie Imams,” for which he negotiated access to a Deobandi seminary.14 
His personal jihad, he told me recently, was to engage journalists. He is 
unusual in that he is prepared to talk to and work with the local and national 
media. Imam training does not, historically, include communications skills 
necessary for a public and civic role, as such a role simply is not envisaged.15 
He was prepared to appear on a recent hard-hitting television program, Some 
of My Best Friends Are Muslim, broadcast on Channel 4 (August 17, 2003) 
and produced by Yasmin Alibahi-Brown, a columnist for the national broad-
sheet The Independent. Here Alibahi-Brown spoke openly about her worries 
about increasing intolerance in the community and about her own experience 
of receiving death threats and hate mail because, as an Ismaili, she is not 
considered an Orthodox Muslim—her sin compounded by the fact that she 
has married a Christian. 
Through his work with the MCB, as well as local and national interfaith 
contacts, he is clearly developing a national profile: he was one of six British 
imams to appear in a British television series entitled Shariah TV. The series 
consisted of six weekly, hour-long programs screened for Channel 4 in May 
and June of 2004. In many ways it indicated the coming of age of Islam in 
Britain. A Muslim was the head of religious affairs; the series was researched 
by Muslim consultants and fronted by a young mainstream television pre-
senter, So Rehman, who is himself a Muslim. The aim of the programs was to 
provide an opportunity for young British Muslims to pose a range of ques-
tions to specialists on Islamic law and other experts. So Rehman made clear in 
his introduction to each program that there are different interpretations on a 
range of issues.  
What was refreshing was a context in which imams could be quizzed on a 
range of controversial issues by a cross section of young Muslim profession-
                                                 
14  Access to such institutions remains very difficult; see S. Gilliat-Ray (2005).  
15  Tim Winter, an English Muslim who lectures on Islam at Cambridge University 
and who often appears in the media, recently wrote that “[…] we need to be more 
frank in blaming our own Muslim communities for failing to engage in more 
successful and sophisticated public relations […]. Major mosques and organisa-
tions have little or no public relations expertise. To accuse the West of misrepre-
sentation [of Islam] is sometimes proper, but all too often reflects a hermeneutic 
of suspicion rooted in zealot attitudes to the Other” (Seddon 2003, 13).  
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als, male and female, with and without the hijab. Most were in their twenties 
and thirties and clearly were located along the complete spectrum of Muslims, 
from cultural Muslim to traditionalist and radical. They were respectful of the 
imams, without being deferential. The series touched on a full range of issues, 
from domestic to civic and political, from homosexuality to mortgages to 
citizenship and interfaith relations. The program in which Mogra appeared 
touched on “consumerism and lifestyle” issues: Could a Muslim barrister-in-
training attend meetings in pubs if she did not herself drink? Should students 
apply for student loans? Was it halal to take out house mortgages? Could a 
Muslim doctor recommend abortion in the case of fetal abnormalities? Was it 
acceptable to run a sports club for young Somali Muslim women? Was there 
a place for cosmetic surgery, or was this prohibited? What was the status of 
organ transplants? Could a Muslim with Christian relatives attend a christen-
ing service or a Christmas party?  
 
 
The Po l i t i cs  o f  Vis ib i l i ty :  Conclus ion  
 
It will be clear that the “politics of visibility” refers to a number of issues: the 
extent to which the state encourages religious actors to engage in civic 
society; whether even British-educated ’ulama have the skills, competence, 
desire, and freedom to capitalize on such opportunities; and whether mosque 
committees, citywide councils of mosques, and national umbrella bodies—
traditionally run by Muslim businessmen and professionals—actually want to 
make space for a contribution by these ’ulama.  
We can conclude that, notwithstanding the events of 9/11, both state and 
local government, as well as public services, have sought to work with 
Muslim communities in general, and ’ulama in particular, on a range of 
issues. They are especially alert to the need to connect with British Muslim 
youth and welcome religious leaders who are willing to act as mediators in 
this process.  
Surprisingly, perhaps, 9/11 has not proved an unmitigated disaster for 
Muslim communities. Some ’ulama have seen it as a wake-up call for Mus-
lims to venture out from their comfort zones and relatively closed communi-
ties. They view it as an opportunity to explain themselves to the media and to 
engage with professionals in wider society—whether clergy, teachers, social 
workers, or the police—in order to address youth disaffection and help raise 
the worryingly low educational standards among sections of Muslim youth.  
The ’ulama presented in this chapter are all exceptionally able and have 
successfully negotiated multiple linguistic, educational, and cultural worlds. 
However, even they fall into two categories: one “cosmopolitan,” the other 
“transnational.”16 The latter, in contrast with the former, are “rarely heard and 
                                                 
16  This useful distinction is developed by Pnina Werbner (2002) in her studies of 
Manchester Muslims. 
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even more rarely recognised and listened to beyond their own communities. 
They speak a foreign language or enunciate alien, widely unacceptable 
sentiments” (Werbner 2002, 6–7). It is clear that two of the ’ulama discussed 
could probably be characterized as transnational in this sense. Both were 
trained and socialized in a relatively closed Islamic environment; neither have 
had direct exposure as the others have to Western tertiary education. Nor have 
they taken up social roles as chaplains, for which they would have to develop 
new social and intellectual skills—most often referred to in shorthand as the 
need for “professionalism.” However, in the case of Mufti Saiful Islam it will 
be interesting to see whether his training of ’ulama locally, of men who are 
already “professionals”—teachers and doctors—forces him to engage vicari-
ously with such complex social and intellectual worlds, the sine qua non of 
any mufti working in Britain.  
It is also evident that if more British-educated ’ulama are to follow these 
pioneers in seeking to access and influence civic and public life, certain 
structural weaknesses will have to be addressed in both mosque culture and 
the seminary. All of the ’ulama discussed have felt the need either to set up 
independent institutions or to maintain their economic independence of 
mosque committees. Ironically, working part time as a chaplain can generate 
a salary larger than what one would earn as an imam in a mosque. However 
able, an imam in a mosque usually is poorly remunerated and lacks contrac-
tual security. Further, if mosque committees are to attract the better educated 
who can connect with British Muslims, they will have to provide not just a 
living wage but also resources and opportunities for imams to develop 
professionalism.  
Clearly, seminary formation will have to include new intellectual, social, 
and communication skills. At the moment, it can take as much as ten years for 
the most able products of these seminaries to feel at ease in wider society. If 
these issues are not addressed, there is a danger that a two-tier system of 
’ulama will be created: those least able to understand and connect with the 
concerns of British Muslims will find employment inside the mosque, 
whereas those most able to connect will find employment outside it.  
What is also clear from these snapshots of the world of British ’ulama is a 
willingness to work with Muslims outside their own sectarian tradition. 
Dr. Hussian’s visit to Iraq is a spectacular example of this: because he is a 
Sufi, one might have expected him to have little in common with the member 
of the Muslim Brotherhood who accompanied him; yet they worked well as a 
team. Increasingly, there are examples of Islamists and ’ulama working 
together. Arguably, the MCB is—in origin and ethos—Islamist, yet it has 
begun to enlist a few able ’ulama into its ranks. Such active collaboration 
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Hamed Abdel-Samad 
ALIENATION AND RADICALIZATION:  
YOUNG MUSLIMS IN GERMANY 
“I want to call myself ‘a Muslim’ whenever I want, but I do not want to be called ‘a 
Muslim’ by ‘the others’ whenever they want. It is like when you call yourself ‘a 
farmer’: you mean that you are reliable, steadfast, and generous. But when others 
call you a farmer, they might have rather negative connotations, like being dirty and 
uncivilized.”  (Algerian, 32 years old) 
 
These are the words of an Arabic student whom I interviewed in 2002 in 
Augsburg, Germany. He did not want to be viewed as a Muslim in Germany 
and refused the German media’s frequent demands that Muslims should 
organize demonstrations in order to distance themselves from violence and 
terrorism:  
 
“Why should I go out and excuse myself for the terror attacks on New York, when I 
am not personally responsible for them? Why do I not expect every Christian to 
come to me and excuse himself for the massacre of Muslims by Christians in Bosnia 
and Chechnya?”  
 
In this chapter I examine two common assumptions in Germany. One holds 
that religious Muslims are more inclined to radicalization and militant ideolo-
gies than are “westernized” or “Western-oriented” Muslims. The other 
suggests that the established Islamic organizations in Germany are breeding 
grounds for terrorism and might even have relations with international 
terrorist organizations. I question the relation between religion and terrorism 
in order to determine whether or not the practice of violence as a means of 
visibility is a widespread phenomenon among Muslim diaspora communities.  
As I examined the issue of the (in)visibility of young Muslims in public 
space in Europe, I observed that the majority of my interviewees were at no 
point willing to draw political or media attention to themselves. They did not 
want to be visible as individuals, though they were trying to put their “case” 
at the center of the political debate. That case was by no means always the 
same. An Arabic student has different priorities and demands than a Turkish 
worker does, even when both define themselves as Muslims. I was able to 
discern, however, a set of strategies adopted by young Muslims in their 
attempt to create a collective voice in their European societies. This collective 
voice should not be confounded with the “voices” of public violence (Gug-
gemos and Abdel-Samad 2003; Waldmann 2003).  
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This chapter draws mainly from interviews with sixty-five Muslims, 
which I conducted in various German cities during the years 2002 and 2003.1 
Most of the interviewees were Arab students, others were members of the first 
generation—the so-called guest-worker generation—or second generation. 
The interviewees were selected according to the following criteria: age (up to 
40 years old), length of stay in Germany (minimum of two years), and their 
willingness to be interviewed. Their political inclinations (e.g., their personal 
views on terrorism) did not represent a criterion, as the idea was to get to 
know the worldview of “normal” Muslims. While assembling the sample, 
however, I aimed at an equal proportion of religious and practicing Muslims 
and nonreligious Muslims. Personal contacts were also significant in the 
process of selection. When the interviews were conducted, most of the 
participants were between 26 and 38 years old. Twenty-five of them were 
Arabs (mainly from the Near East), another twenty-nine were Turks (inclu-
ding Germans of Turkish origin). Forty of the interviewees were students 
(among them, nine were women). The total number of women interviewed 
was fourteen. Twenty-three were active members of or sympathized with 
some form of Islamic organization.2 About half of the interviewees are among 
those who visit Islamic associations, mosques, and other community settings 
on a regular basis.  
I had started off by distributing questionnaires, but soon realize that this 
method was in many ways insufficient to represent the various worldviews of 
young Muslims in Germany in a realistic and differentiated way. Especially 
since 9/11 many young Muslims in Germany have been interrogated by the 
police about their living habits and political opinions; it therefore was hardly 
advisable to confront the interviewees with standardized questions reminis-
cent of officialdom. An evaluation of the questionnaires that had been filled 
out revealed that most had answered the questions rather reticently and 
sometimes evasively. Thus, the questionnaires could not fully reflect the real 
situation of the subjects in question. Suspicion towards the questionnaires 
even kept some from answering in their own handwriting, so as not produce 
any evidence that could be used against them. My decision to switch to 
qualitative interviews proved successful in many ways. During extensive 
conversations I gained the confidence of these individuals, who allowed me to 
get a more detailed look into their lives and life philosophies. Most of them, 
however, insisted on remaining anonymous, making it impossible to use a 
tape recorder or even take notes during the interview. I attempted to re-
construct the discussions immediately afterwards in as complete a form as 
possible. Therefore, some of the quotations in this chapter reproduce content 
but are not verbatim. Many interviewees insisted on keeping silent about their 
personal data, but at least granted me the right to mention their country of 
                                                 
1  The duration of the interviews varied between thirty minutes and six hours; most 
took about three hours. 
2  I am aware that it is difficult to draw a clear line between an active member and a 
regular visitor of communal activities.  
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origin. Though I am aware of all these shortcomings, I had no other alternati-
ve but to finish my fieldwork under these circumstances, as others did before 
me in similar situations (see, e.g., Lindholm 2002).  
What I intend to stress in the following is that the process of radicalization 
in a foreign environment always depends on the articulation of several 
factors. In some isolated cases these factors can evolve in a framework in 
which an individual opts for violence aimed at public space (Finn 2001). 
More often, however, violence surfaces in a closed circuit: within the individ-
ual’s personality, in which some or all of these factors clash, or within the 
private sphere of marriage and partnership. In the first two sections I consider 
the web in which personality structure links up to marginalization and culture 
shock. In particular, I distinguish between two pathways: the first leading to 
isolation and the second to radicalization. In the next section I add gender 
conflicts in cultural transfers as a further component on the path to eventual 
acts of violence. In the final section, I recount the options that are open to 
individuals caught up in this web: to either remain invisible or to gain a 
visibility of their own choosing and making.  
 
 
Indiv idual  Embeddedness  in  a  Complex  Web:  
Pathw ays  to  I so la t ion  and  Radica l iza t ion  
 
The ways people practice Islam and live as a Muslim in a foreign environ-
ment are clearly different from the way people experience Islam in Muslim 
societies. In considering such difference, it is important to recognize that 
Islam is both a way of life and a Weltbild that is constitutive for identity. 
Within Islamic societies, Islamic belief and practice are part and parcel of 
everyday life, which means that Islam is automatically lived with a certain 
sense of commonality. Within the diaspora community, this sense of com-
monality often finds expression in an automatism of confrontation. Conse-
quently, Muslims in the diaspora have no fixed strategies for (in)visibility. 
Rather, one’s behavior as an individual or the image of a group depends on 
subjective interpretations as well as social and political calculations. Echoing 
the first quotation by the student who did not want to be called a Muslim by 
others, one female student tried to explain to me why “German paranoia” is 
responsible for disrupting the religious and social meaning of her veil.  
 
“The original purpose of wearing the veil for a woman is to be hidden, and as a 
consequence to be protected in society. But when everybody—both Germans and 
Muslims—either attacks or defends the veil publicly, then the veil automatically 
becomes a means of visibility … Why can’t I simply wear my veil peacefully 
without German institutions or Muslim interest groups making politics out of my 
harmless piece of cloth?”  (Turkish, 26 years old, in Munich, 2002) 
 
The Muslim diasporas of Europe find themselves having to confront different 
worlds, and the challenge lies in finding a way to live within a non-Muslim 
HAMED ABDEL-SAMAD 
 194
secular society that is subject to rapid societal change. At the same time, 
Muslims face the dilemma of complying with both the customs cherished by 
the members of the diaspora, on the one hand, and the normative regulations 
of a European society, on the other. Additionally, they feel compelled to 
clearly define their position towards their places of origin and/or home 
countries. Grappling with issues of continuity and preservation of cultural 
independence in a foreign environment often leads to an increase in the 
importance of religion. Moreover, in many cases the resulting fear and 
insecurity arising from these pressures instigate diaspora communities to turn 
to forms of tradition that are more radical than those commonly practiced in 
their home societies. In addition, many perceive their voluntary migration due 
to economic hardship as a form of exile and therefore mystify it. There is no 
shortage of examples of groups that have held on to outdated forms of 
religious expression, in all kinds of religious contexts: the German protestants 
who during the nineteenth century emigrated to southern Chile and rebuilt 
their rural communities in the middle of the Araucarias; the pivotal role of 
Catholicism among the Irish in the United States; and the role of the Talmud 
among the Jews in their various communities around the world until the 
founding of the Israeli state (Berthomière 2003).  
Like many Europeans, Muslims have a rather ambivalent attitude towards 
the expansion of Europe. On the one hand, they see the opportunity to live as 
equals in a pluralistic society that guards the rights of religious minorities; on 
the other, they fear that European society will be unable to offer them a stable 
sense of identity. There is a tendency, particularly among Muslim youth, to 
visualize their future in terms of the umma, the community of all-faithful, 
rather than to think of themselves as part of European society. The search for 
and insistence on possessing and maintaining a stable “closed-corpus iden-
tity” may lead to alienation as well as social and political radicalization. It is 
thus essential to map the forms of radicalization that have gained prominence 
in various milieus of migration. They can, but must not of necessity, lead to 
violence (Waldmann 1974, 2003). 
 
 
Mapping the Pathways to Isolation   
 
First on the map of pathways to isolation would be archaic conservatism, a 
tendency common among groups of migrants that come from rural, patriar-
chal regions where only a low level of education is available and tribal law is 
applied. This form does not necessarily rest on religious attitudes, yet religion 
is often instrumental in its legitimization of various forms of action. The 
violence that is generated within this atmosphere is usually not directed at the 
society of the host country. Rather, the “apostates” of the diaspora community 
become the victims of this violence, because they are charged with endange-
ring the stability and integrity of the entire group. This form of radicalization 
is exemplified in cases of honor killings and forced marriage, which various 
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European governments are currently targeting as a new kind of public 
problem. In Germany, for example, the norms and behavioral attitudes among 
certain groups of Turkish migrants have long been outdated in Turkey itself. 
Yet the existence of the virtual community in the diaspora is thought to be—
at least according to my research—dependent on the moral conduct of its 
members. Not only are blasphemous acts and apostasy severely sanctioned, so 
too are any kinds of liberal thinking or Western-oriented action. Characte-
ristic for such milieus is the demand for unconditional solidarity as well as 
strong social and moral surveillance.  
Young people who grow up with weak social structures are especially 
open to a form of radicalization that I call escapism. To them, neither their 
own families nor the host society can offer any kind of useful guidance in life. 
Frustration and a lack of substantial, positive perspectives for their future 
push these members of the second and third generations and young people 
with a migrant background to form so-called Turkish gangs and to direct 
outbreaks of violence against others in the migrant community. In the district 
of Mülheim in Cologne, cases of street-fighting between Turks and Arabs are 
common, despite the fact that they are coreligionists.  
Religious avant-gardism can be found in the biographies of certain radical 
individuals. They generally refrain from traditional forms of Islam by steering 
clear of the conservative centers of so-called mainstream Islam in Europe. 
Religious solipsism, a tendency towards autodidactic methods, intergenerati-
onal tensions, dissolution and/or rejection of any kind of family-based 
authority, a minimum of socialization within one’s own ethnic and religious 
communities: all are as characteristic for these individuals as their strong 
orientation towards the umma—conceptualized in the form of an ahistorical, 
abstract, and falsely heroic model of Islam.  
These three pathways often produce isolated individuals. Once alienated 
from their milieus of origin, they rarely become integrated into the host 
society and consequently suffer a double marginalization. Lack of integration 
is especially critical among second-generation Muslims. It is thus especially 
alarming that members of the second generation—in particular those with an 
academic education—set the tone within the radicalization process. One 
example is the conduct of the Kaplan community, whose leaders explicitly 
aim at an “Islamic revolution” (Schiffauer 2000). Yet members of the first 
generation do not seem to be immune to radicalization. A closer look at the 
biographies of the perpetrators of the terrorist acts in New York and Madrid 
reveals that these individuals initially arrived in Europe as ambitious students 
oriented to the West, who then became radicalized during their stay in the 
“Occident.” One should therefore recognize that the anxieties caused by an 
identity conflict and the unsuccessful pursuit of a sense of security may also 





Pathways to Radicalization 
 
A closer examination of the relationship between religion and terrorism can 
clarify this. It is a common (mis-)conception in the West that a potential for 
violence is inherent in Islam, and that, as a result, faithful Muslims are more 
open to intolerance and radicalism than are their more “liberal,” Western-
oriented coreligionists. Most Muslims, however, are eager to stress that Islam 
literally means “peace” and hence has nothing to do with violence and terror. 
Certainly there is in Islam, as in any other religion, a potential for peace and 
charity as well as war and division. Whereas the West nourishes the com-
monplace notion of an “Islam on the move,” in which Muslims increasingly 
turn to their postulates of faith for guidance, Muslims feel rather defensive 
about their faith and complain about a general decline of religiosity within 
Muslim societies. In fact “Islam on the move” is nothing more than a drifting 
from mainstream Islam. The jihad Muslims believe that they are living in an 
emergency situation and therefore try to reconstruct an “emergency Islam” in 
which they search for angry answers to their geopolitical situation. Needless 
to say, when it comes to Islamic terrorism, religion constitutes the central 
factor in the mobilization of zealots and the legitimization of violence, as it 
remains the most important source of identity.  
An examination of the biographies of the alleged perpetrators of the 9/11 
attacks shows that, against all appearances, the majority of them did not visit 
Quranic schools in their childhood. They did, however, belong to those 
Muslims who are decisively familiar with the West: “They all pursued 
modern ways of life common to the secular middle and upper classes in the 
West, their lives marked only later by experiences of conversion” (Kermani 
2002, 27). Such biographies make it clear that we are not dealing here with 
poor, underprivileged, barely educated, and naive individuals who spent their 
lives in religious isolation. Rather, these people have had a rich experience of 
life and have been commuting between the East and the West. Under the 
pressure of their insecurity and isolation in the West, they turned to radical 
organizations, but they had envisaged other aims in life before turning to the 
career of a terrorist. Religion, then, was not the driving motive behind their 
terrorist activities; it rather became the legitimization of their actions. To a 
great extent, these were converts discovering their religion for the first time or 
rediscovering it after a period of “drifting.” They were not socialized in these 
religious structures to any considerable degree; rather, religion became more 
important later in their lives, offering them much-needed shelter from disap-
pointment and social stress. Converts and reconverts seem to be especially 
susceptible to extreme forms of religiosity and moral purism.3  
                                                 
3  In this context it is of particular interest that the life of the current U.S. president, 
George W. Bush, also has a biographical turn of a religious nature. After a “sin-
ful” life of indulging in the consumption of alcohol and the like, he experienced a 
Christian conversion that changed his life radically. Now, as a president, he does 
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Yet one cannot conceive of a direct link between religiosity and radica-
lism (Roy 2004). Instead, one might consider the nexus that forms when a 
certain personality structure hits upon the double process of marginalization, 
the identity conflicts that are specific to migration, and the proximity of a 
radical group. A few lines will suffice to typify each of these strands.  
The personality structure matters. A sensibility for social issues and low 
frustration-tolerance are characteristic for individuals involved in extremist 
groups. Often they are people who want to change the world radically but do 
not have enough patience with it. They suffer from the paradoxical combina-
tion of an inferiority complex and dreams of omnipotence. This explosive 
combination explains how these people can both lead a schizophrenic way of 
life and perpetrate inhumane, deadly acts of terror. Marginalization touches 
upon the dual experience of alienation and marginality. It is “characterized by 
close relationships entertained by persons of diverse groups, while the issue 
of belonging remains unclear” (Heckmann 2002, 7). There is much to back 
the hypothesis that emotional and social isolation facilitate the bonding of 
individuals with radical groups. The most important forms of isolation are (a) 
self-isolation, (b) isolation resulting from discrimination, and (c) marginaliza-
tion, or the isolation of entire groups. Culture shock results from a range of 
identity conflicts specific to migration—the problems of alienation among 
Muslim migrants among them. The term culture shock is actually too simplis-
tic to adequately describe the complex processes that a young Muslim 
undergoes in a foreign society. There is more at stake than merely coming to 
terms with two very different cultures. Questions of origin, cultural identity, 
and positioning one’s self become especially salient when the decision to live 
in a foreign environment is made. Finally, radical proximity can take several 
forms, including growing up within a fundamentalist infrastructure and 
proximity to a radical (peer) group or radical preacher. It seems that when 
young Muslims turn to extremist organizations, it is mainly due to a lack of 
self-esteem and a feeling of abandonment. Initially these organizations offer 
youth a way to re-establish self-esteem, while empowering them as emanci-
pated social actors. Soon, though, the organizations demand full commitment. 
This newly acquired membership status helps compensate for numerous 




Culture  Shock ,  Male  Pr ide ,  and  the  Concept  o f  “S in”  
 
There are roughly four groups that account for the presence of people with 
different religious and social backgrounds in Germany today: the so-called 
guest workers (Gastarbeiter), fugitives who seek asylum, academics and 
                                                                                                                                               
not seem to be willing to accept “evil” in the world, pursuing his goal to free the 
world of its “villains.” 
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other intellectuals pursuing an education, and persons who marry a German.4 
Putting the category of guest workers aside, we are looking at persons who 
seem in principle to be willing to dispose of their old shared social structures 
by adjusting themselves to new conditions in order to work towards political, 
economic, and/or personal fulfillment. To a large extent they are capable of 
and willing to take risks, such as the danger of losing contact with their 
homeland or, worse, the danger of sacrificing part of their cultural identity. 
They are emotionally prepared to confront something new, and they approach 
the prospect of being intellectually and culturally challenged with curiosity 
and eagerness.  
The problems that develop in the process are specific to each group. The 
guest workers conceive of themselves as migrants, whereas their children 
usually view themselves as part of the host society. In other words, what is 
“home” to the first generation is myth to their children. On the other hand, 
what is “home” to these children remains an alien environment to their 
parents. The children often cannot afford to limit their social activities to 
diaspora circles: the host society has certain expectations of them, and often 
they have no choice but to conform (e.g., learning the language of the host 
country). Whereas this participation is crucial to the development of the 
children, it was less central to their parents’ concerns. On the other hand, a 
new factor for the second generation is an inescapable friction with the 
country of origin. For many, their own families appear to be rather conserva-
tive, yet the seemingly more liberal host society appears to be exclusive and 
difficult to approach. According to a young Turkish Muslim male, many feel 
pressured and hindered by both their family and the host society. Neverthe-
less, the second generation finds new and more creative ways to deal with the 
issues of discrimination and marginalization, perhaps because members of 
this generation have proceeded further on the path of assimilation and have 
been socialized to some extent according to the norms of the host society. As 
one Turkish male interviewee told me, “Since kindergarten we have been 
learning to make ourselves heard … but we certainly have gained more than 
just bad experiences” (Augsburg, 2003). In contrast to the first generation—
and many other migrant groups—the second generation has advanced Ger-
man language skills and identifies to an extent with Germany. Germany has 
become, by necessity, the center of their lives. In fact, although a conscious 
adoption of a German identity might still be problematic for some, a self-
understanding in terms of regional or urban belonging—for example as an 
“Augsburger” or a “Kölner”—is more easily accepted.  
The situation for refugees is far more problematic. Unlike other migrant 
groups, refugees do not have a choice between two or more societies while 
“relocating” their identity. The factors that force them to leave their countries 
essentially make them dependent on the protection of the society of refuge. 
                                                 
4  This list is not exhaustive. There are many other ways to enter Germany legally 
(e.g., as a tourist) or illegally (e.g., clandestine migration). 
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Indicative of the complex emotional implications that result from this relation 
of dependence is the fact that many traumatic processes are projected onto the 
host society. Marginalization and discrimination levels are, it seems, at their 
highest when it comes to refugees. The paradox of their situation—being 
excluded from the very society that simultaneously welcomes them as a place 
of refuge—generates a kind of “love/hate relationship.” This ambiguous 
sentiment can be observed among all migrant groups but is strongest among 
refugees, in part because complex problems originating from their socially 
and politically charged places of origin continue in exile. Often the refugee 
has been politically active in the home country, in some cases within funda-
mentalist circles. In the latter case, neither the authority of their home country 
nor the principles of the host society can have much of an impact when 
competing against their own ideologies. Consequently, the options for social 
ascension that are open to refugees—including the illegal ones—are rather 
few and far between, to say the least. As one refugee put it, “I thought I would 
come here and after one or two years I would be financially independent. But 
never in my life have I been more dependent than I am today” (male Iraqi 
refugee, 37 years old, in Cologne, 2002).  
Inappropriate treatment by public agencies and institutions leave many 
refugees in doubt about the alleged principles of freedom and equality in 
Germany. “I have the impression that the institutions are punishing us 
because we chose Germany as a place of refuge … Human rights and dignity 
in this place are reserved for Germans” (male Iraqi refugee, 37 years old). 
Under these circumstances, religious frameworks offer ultimate protection in 
the face of humiliation and discrimination. One of the positive dynamics of 
religious socialization circles is the integrative power they exert on many 
young and insecure persons, who often stand on the verge to criminality. One 
student told me:  
 
“If there is still blood running in your veins [i.e., if you still have pride and emo-
tions], you’ll lose control several times a day. They [the institutions] don’t leave a 
single door open for us and humiliate us intentionally. If I wasn’t a believer, I would 
already have a criminal record.”  (Iraqi, 28 years old, in Augsburg, 2002) 
 
Last but not least, the so-called illegal migrants pose a rather obvious prob-
lem, as much for themselves as for the “alien” host society. An illegal migrant 
from the Muslim world is very much in need of support from those he meets 
and can trust. Hiding and keeping a low profile is a constant necessity that 
requires help from fellow Muslims who are familiar with the host country and 
who can provide offers of work on the black market. These people look for 
such help in the mosques and are completely dependent on whoever can offer 
it. Once they land in the wrong hands, they are easily manipulated and led 
astray.  
The attraction of religious identification can enhance the resentments and 
frustration that young people entertain towards a society that offers them 
almost no perspective. The normative standards set by a “consumer and 
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hedonistic culture,” widely accepted in Germany, are perceived by young 
Muslim men as a kind of “cultural hostility,” against which they feel defense-
less. The ensuing contradictions and tensions that young Muslims, in particu-
lar, have to deal with are felt more intensely in a foreign environment. In this 
setting religion often becomes an alternative to an imposing Western civiliza-
tion and to a “God is dead” attitude. To many Muslims, freedom in a foreign 
environment proves to be nothing more than a fata morgana, either unattai-
nable or simply threatening. Freedom is understood as a way to define the self 
and the right to participate. Yet this often remains only partly achievable. 
When one looks on from the outside, it is hard to grasp the psychological 
strain on the ambitious newcomer, who experiences rejection and disap-
pointment once he sees his cultural identity and moral standards excluded.  
In contrast to people back home, who face conflicts in a rational and prac-
tical manner, diaspora communities tend to approach conflicts in their home 
societies with a dogmatic spirit and largely infeasible purism. With respect to 
the Near East conflict, for example, the Muslim and Jewish communities in 
the United States and Europe usually take extremist positions. Whereas 
people in the affected regions try to reach a practicable solution through 
negotiations, the diaspora hardly ever sees options for a rational compromise. 
When I asked Avi Primor, the former Israeli consul in Germany, why the 
diaspora appears to be much more emotional and less willing to compromise, 
he explained, “The diaspora cultivates a bad conscience. People say, ‘We are 
happy here. We are in no position to tell people in Israel what to do, we 
should simply support them’” (Augsburg, 2003).  
Indeed, people abroad often judge conflicts with a sense of detachment 
from the real conditions, taking up an emotionally charged and dogmatic 
stance. This stance is often accompanied by fierce religiosity, which can be 
interpreted as a kind of “symbolic return to one’s roots,” or even a kind of 
“making up” with one’s home country and the family one left behind. Mi-
grants often arrive in a host country with certain “life projects” in mind and 
little interest for the conditions they find there. In the same sense, there is 
little interest on the part of the host society in the “life project” of the newco-
mers. All that is expected of them is a certain amount of loyalty and fulfill-
ment of the duties that the conditions for their entry state or imply. Yet many 
of the hopes that drive people to emigrate in the first place remain unfulfilled, 
even after a long period in the new environment. Desires for wealth, freedom, 
independence, and the right to participate in society hardly ever are realized. 
Poor migrants do not really see the relation of poverty and wealth change, for 
even if migrants experience a slight economic improvement in comparison to 
their situation back home, they continue to be among the poorer, in their new 
environment as well.  
Within a foreign environment, most migrants belong to an underprivile-
ged minority. Various forms of dependency on the host society—for the right 
to asylum, employee status, or financial support from the state or even a 
German spouse, just to name a few—determine the situation of the foreigner 
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in Germany to a substantial degree. These dependencies affect the self-esteem 
and pride of a “man from the Orient.” Interestingly, one could replace “pride” 
with “masculinity,” as the words “man” and “pride” are semantically linked in 
the Arab language. Maintaining a “culture of honor” in a society in which the 
notion of honor is rather relative and ambivalent can lead to an outbreak of 
violence against Western ways of life, as the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the 
Netherlands has shown. Yet autoaggression and violence against weaker 
members of one’s own community (e.g., women and children) are often the 
result of an adherence to archaic understandings of honor. In the home 
societies, public practice of religion and adherence to moral standards help 
relieve life’s pressures (Dupret, Berger, and Zwaini 1999). In a Western, non-
Muslim environment, however, these practices can turn into obligations 
whose compliance proves difficult. If an individual is not embedded in a 
community in which religious practices are followed collectively, religious 
zeal can serve to isolate him or her. At times, this exaggerated holding on to 
religious principles leads to a disorientation of values and moral confusion.  
Needless to say, the marginalized position of religion in societies like 
Germany and the usual “enlightened” treatment of religious symbols intimi-
date those who guard their sense of holiness. One of the Arab students I 
interviewed told me of his bewilderment when listening to a fellow German 
student tell a joke that involved disrespectful reference to Jesus and Mary. 
“How should a society,” he asked, “that does not understand nor respect its 
own religion understand and respect our own?” The relativization of what is 
“holy” or even “sin” intimidates many Muslims of the diaspora. For the most 
part, the idea of sin has lost its implications for emancipated German society. 
Indeed, the concept is marginalized and robbed of its seriousness when it is 
applied to actions like tax fraud, petty crime, or even giving in to small 
indulgences such as eating too much chocolate. In Europe in general, the 
practice of quoting from the Holy Scripture or of interpreting life in wider 
religious contexts of meaning has become outdated. For a Muslim, however, 
the concepts of “sin,” the “devil,” and “divine punishment” are omnipresent.   
When one “reads between the lines” when talking to young Muslims, it 
becomes quite clear that insecurity about their identity is at the core of a host 
of problems that these young migrants face. The friction between imported 
ideals of social conduct and the norms of Western societies—all accompanied 
by a sense of ambivalence and relativity—proves much harder to deal with 
than the daily experiences of discrimination and social inequality. In the West 
the young Muslim man lacks a certain “absolute” that functions at the center 
of his life. This estrangement manifests itself even in everyday language. In a 
way, the German use of the conditional—such as “it could be the case, but not 
necessarily”—makes it difficult for young Muslims to adjust and make 
decisions. The “lack of a center” and the “end of metaphysics” foster their 
fears that the line between the “holy” and the “profane” might dissolve. One 
of the interviewees tried to express this crisis as follows: “This relativity strips 
down young Muslims in front of themselves, only to reveal their purposefully 
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hidden double morale, their personal duality, and the weaknesses of their 
culture.” This, he added, is “unforgivable” (Egyptian, 33 years old, in Augs-
burg, 2003).  
Although in Germany many young Muslims experience these problems of 
alienation and the consequent identity conflicts, the majority refrain from 
choosing a confrontational course with the host society. In a way it is not 
unlike the rules on haggling at an “Oriental bazaar,” with which they are 
familiar: one must constantly evaluate one’s own interests. Although they 
seldom admit it, these young people have an elastic and versatile identity. 
Their life practices and perspectives are constantly renegotiated while they 
choose from a range of values offered to them from both their families and the 
host society. To some extent this process of constructing a hybrid identity that 
can respond to specific situations unfolds as a conscious act of choosing 
among values. Yet most processes of adoption or rejection of the components 
that add up to hybrid identities take place subconsciously; the individual is 
seldom aware of them. Those who shy away from the idea of “contaminating” 
what they understand to be their “pure cultural identity,” or who are incapable 
of coming to terms with foreign values, tend to retreat into a parallel society. 
Within this confined social space the forces of assimilation increasingly 
weaken as confrontation with everyday German society becomes less fre-
quent. Yet the social tensions remain the same. Because of their inability to 
reduce or avoid the increasing pressures and expectations, some individuals 
project the conflicts that emerge from a hybridization of their identity onto the 
world around them. A reconstructed, unrealistic, and falsely heroic Islam 
provides them with an “angry answer” to modernity, to the geopolitical 
situation that they hold responsible for their situation. What these angry 
answers can look like can be clearly seen in the recent attacks on New York, 
Madrid, and London. The longing for a “sense of home,” for tolerance and 
security, shifts the focus to the question of ethnic and religious belonging. 
 
 
Gender  and Class  I s sues  in  Cul tura l  Transfers  
 
When thinking about another migrant group in Germany, namely, those who 
pursue academic and other kinds of education in this country, one hardly 
considers them to be at all problematic. The image of an academic person 
lends an aura of sincerity, reinforcing their reputation as studious and—above 
all—temporary residents of the country. Yet since 9/11 these commonplace 
assumptions have been proved wrong, if not dangerous. Although a revision 
of the common understanding of this migrant group is in order, one should 
not jump to conclusions by conceiving a “sleeper theory” or regard them as 
typical suspects. Many Germans are not aware of the difficulties that non-
European students face in Germany, let alone can sympathize with them. 
Their stay in Germany is complicated by extensive bureaucratic requirements, 
which demand from them constant attention to matters of administration. In 
YOUNG MUSLIMS IN GERMANY 
 203
order to prolong their visa for one year, for example, it is necessary to give 
proof of relative financial independence—namely, €6,000 or more in a bank 
account and an income—or provision from home—of €600 per month. In 
addition, their work allowance is limited to 90 days or 180 half-days per year. 
Understandably, many feel cheated and ripped off by the institutions, and this 
perception weighs heavily on their emotional and intellectual ties to the host 
society. As one Arab student lamented, “My father earns less than €150 a 
month. How can I possibly have €6,000 in one go? Only terrorists can meet 
these standards, because only they have so much money” (Egyptian, 33 years 
old, in Augsburg, 2003).  
Students are known to be, in the best case, ambitious, curious, and critical 
idealists—some want to change the world. Yet, they often also are impatient 
and do not tolerate frustration well. None of these qualities protects a young 
and angry person from turning to radical organizations once he sees no other 
perspectives open to him. Students of the natural sciences, engineering, or 
economics usually do not encounter situations in which they can familiarize 
themselves with the outlooks and values of the host society, as do students of 
the humanities. For the most part, the actors involved in the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 were students of the natural sciences. Yet neither quarrels with the 
bureaucracy nor financial burdens seem to have stood in the way of their 
radicalization. Rather, it seems alienation and identity conflicts played a 
major role.  
Binational marriages provide a good opportunity and basis for integration, 
though at times they do become a platform for intercultural and interreligious 
conflict. In many cases, the foreign male depends on the woman financially 
and legally. This circumstance encourages the development of the love/hate 
relationship mentioned above, creating feelings of gratitude and at the same 
time nourishing general dissatisfaction. It is a constellation that primarily 
affects Arab men who have been socialized with a strong sense of pride. 
Individual conflicts often get blown out of proportion. One Arab man I 
interviewed told me of his marriage: “a German woman together with an 
Arab man equals hell.” Usually it is the German woman who takes on the 
daily work that back home is traditionally left to men, such as caring for the 
material well-being of the family or dealing with administrative institutions. 
This situation proves harmful for the husband’s pride and puts his role as 
paterfamilias into question.  
The potential for conflict emerges with the birth of the first child. Even a 
moderately religious person will insist on granting his child a Muslim educa-
tion. He starts to familiarize himself with the principles of Islam, often in 
order to sustain the upper hand in negotiations with his wife. Yet the fact that 
the child spends the greatest part of his or her early years with the mother is in 
many ways troublesome for the husband. A divorced man named one of the 
reasons for his divorce from his German wife: “Whenever I left the house, I 
feared my ex-wife would talk to my daughter about Christianity and speak 
disrespectfully about Islam” (Moroccan, 39 years old, in Augsburg, 2002).  
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Especially with regard to their daughters, Muslim fathers tend to be over-
protective: “I don’t want to sit and wait to see my daughter coming home with 
a boy at the age of fourteen.” Marriage to a German woman nevertheless can 
help Muslim men in many respects, enabling their detachment from religion 
and old traditions while furthering their integration into the host society. Yet 
only very few continue on this path. 
 
“My wife and I had decided to raise our children without coercion or fear. We 
always went around naked in the house and on the beach. But at one point I realized 
that my children, as they were growing up, tended to be ashamed. I tried to convince 
them that being naked means being free, but I had to understand that I actually did 
exercise coercion on my children, by forcing them to act against nature. It is in the 
nature of man to be ashamed, but we in the West try to rid ourselves of any sense of 
shame and call that free and natural … When Adam turned from animal to human, 
he was looking for leaves to cover himself … The West tries to wake up the animal 
in us, but Islam tries to domesticate it. Islam attempts to protect man from his own 
weaknesses, yet the West tries to use these weaknesses to increase consumerism, and 
disguises it in the cloak of freedom.”  (Syrian, 62 years old, in Augsburg, 2002) 
 
The 62-year-old Arab male who made this statement has been living in 
Germany for forty-three years; he is now divorced from his wife. He found 
his way back to religion because he tried  
 
“many ways that led me nowhere … Freedom over here is not real freedom. While 
nobody would tell you not to ‘do this or that,’ often you would get to hear: ‘What? 
You didn’t do it?’ They exercise a certain power—not with orders and command-
ments, but with deals and offers!”  
 
Young men who are married to older women in Germany—a phenomenon 
that can be observed among those who come from countries that are tourist 
destinations—often are looked down upon by fellow nationals and coreligion-
ists. Within the mosques and Muslim community these men feel obliged to 
show ever more faithfulness and activism in order to rid themselves of the 
outsider role. Many avoid the places where their fellow nationals gather. 
Moreover, many marriages break up as soon as the husband acquires German 
citizenship, even if the marriage initially did not serve this single purpose. 
After divorce many turn back to the Muslim diaspora community and invest 
their time and efforts there.   
 
 
Options  for  ( In)Vis ib i l i ty  
 
On the basis of my research I have concluded that Muslims in Germany 
choose between the following options when negotiating their relationships to 
the host society, religion, and the homeland: 
1. The individual follows a predetermined path, sticking to the family 
perspective and goals or following the principles of society: for example, 
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a student who comes to Germany from an Arab country in order to study 
at a German university and then returns home after a couple of years and 
marries within the wider circle of relatives. Those who achieve this option 
usually prove to be mentally strong and quite flexible. They prefer to have 
things unfold according to plan. Their social backgrounds and their cul-
tural identity serve as a protective layer between them and the influences 
of the host society. They seek out familiar structures within the Muslim 
community and/or the mosque. Because these individuals do not entertain 
any clear perspective during their stay in the host country and plan to re-
turn to their home country, one might expect them to be harmless. This is 
only the case, however, as long as aggravations from local society keep 
within certain limits and bonds with the family and community stay intact. 
One could view this relationship as a kind of “noninterventionist” agree-
ment between the migrant and the host society, amounting to a mutual 
policy of “live and let live.” Yet this agreement remains, at best, imagi-
nary. For a conservative migrant to be able to reintegrate into his home 
society after his stay in a Western country, three factors must come into 
play. First, the host society does not provoke him too much; second, the 
bonds to his family back home remain strong over this period; and third, 
the migrant encounters supportive structures in the respective migrant mi-
lieu. It is commonly assumed that conservative and religious persons are 
more isolated and feel a stronger aversion towards the host society. Yet 
the research presented in this chapter has offered a slightly different pic-
ture. Through long conversations with members of migrant groups and an 
discourse analysis, I came to the conclusion that religious persons who 
stand firmly by their beliefs encounter fewer problems because they inter-
nalize a fundamental respect for hegemony through their belief system.  
2. The migrant succumbs to new influences and starts to stray off the path. 
He becomes acquainted with new Western lifestyles and adopts them as 
an alternative. He may risk damaging his reputation and losing respect 
within traditional circles of the diaspora and homeland, but some manage 
to ascend socially and assimilate themselves into the host society through 
“westernization.” An improvement of one’s social and economic situation 
is seen as a strong enough reason to distance oneself from tradition. Fami-
lies and traditional groups in the diaspora interpret this step rather harshly, 
as though “the lost son had sold his soul to the devil.” Regrets and a bad 
conscience about what often turns out to be a complete detachment from 
religion, tradition, and family are in many cases the consequences. If the 
“lost son” does not find a ready and welcoming new harbor within the 
host society, it is likely that he will return to old structures and be left with 
strong resentment and frustration towards the host country.  
3. The individual changes sides frequently inhabiting and negotiating the 
“in-between” of the two camps—the traditional one and the “Western” 
one—yet without having any essential connections to the core of either of 
them. His belonging—to his self and to the respective camps—remains 
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only partially defined: he is neither fully integrated nor excluded. This 
situation could carry on indefinitely, as long as the pros and cons offered 
by both worlds maintain an equilibrium. As time goes by, the pressures 
arising from this polarization may result in conflicts of belonging, dual 
identification, or multiple personality structures. At some point the desire 
to break out of this situation emerges; the individual then either chooses a 
clear orientation along the lines of one group and detaches himself from 
the other, or he looks for other alternatives.  
4. The migrant arrives with radical ideologies but becomes increasingly 
tolerant and moderate within the host society. These people arrive with an 
exaggerated sense of being under threat, viewing the West as inherently 
evil even before their departure. Through positive and personal social in-
teractions with Germans, both their ideologies and the conception of 
Western societies are called into question. This process presupposes a cer-
tain amount of acceptance of criticism as well as a readiness to learn and 
develop. Migrants who once were persecuted in their home countries for 
their radical beliefs now enjoy constitutional protection in the host country 
while exercising their freedoms of speech, religious expression, and social 
conduct. As a result, some may soften their radical attitudes towards Ger-
man institutions. Interestingly, the original position taken towards the 
policies of the regimes and institutions back home is maintained in the 
new environment and often is even strengthened and radicalized under the 
favorable conditions for freedom of expression.  
5. The individual tries to find a healthy balance between his or her own 
cultural identity and the fundamental principles of Western lifestyles. 
These people often have intentionally chosen Germany as their country of 
immigration. A pre-existing notion of or intellectual connection with 
Germany provides the basis for a readiness to accept Germany as a second 
home. Anything encountered in the host or home society that is identity-
enhancing and that communicates meaning may function as an equalizing 
factor between one’s cultural identity and Western principles, thereby 
helping to keep and solidify a healthy balance between the two. Once the 
everyday presence of Muslim symbols loses its intimidating effect on 
members of the host society—as is happening through the increased num-
ber of mosques and veiled women in public spaces—Muslims also might 
ease up in their conduct with these symbols and refrain from politicizing 
them. Further steps taken by the host society, such as logistical support in 
the process of building new mosques, might in turn encourage Muslims to 
engage with local society.  
6. What I did not find in my sample is the option of premeditated murder. It 
is conceivable that this option opens up when the factors of marginaliza-
tion, culture shock, and a specific personality merge with radical company 
and begin a process of radicalization. What follows contains a religious 
element that no longer can be ignored. It seems, for instance, that the per-
petrators of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington used a 
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manual instructing them to follow rigorous code of ritual conduct (Kip-
penberg and Seidensticker 2004). However that may be, my research re-
vealed that the overwhelming majority of Muslim youth, even when they 
experience culture shock, isolation, radical ideologies, and loss of identity, 
nonetheless rejected this option.  
 
 
Conclus ions  
 
It is difficult to conceive of the members of the second generation committing 
a terrorist act in the country that to a certain extent is their second “home 
country.” Though many children of immigrants distance themselves from 
Germans when describing their experiences of discrimination and racism, 
they still speak of their strong bonds to Germany. Most of them view them-
selves as Germans, but they identify primarily with the cities in which they 
were brought up. Newcomers, on the other hand, seldom identify with their 
country of immigration. Because they do not have a history in Germany, it is 
easier for them to identify and label the country with terms such as “the 
West,” “capitalism,” or even “the devil.” In contrast, children of the second 
generation have been socialized in German schools; they are reluctant, despite 
all difficulties, to describe their country in such vague and abstract terms.  
However, against the odds there is some evidence to support the hypothe-
sis that second-generation children are more resistant to militant ideologies 
and terrorism than are newcomers. They are very unlikely candidates for 
calculated terrorist violence. Still, it is possible that they may react to daily 
discrimination through spontaneous violence, anger, and frustration. Of 
course, one should not outright exclude the possibility that the second genera-
tion could make contacts with terrorist groups. The latest attacks in London 
have been terrible proof of that possibility. Yet it is difficult to compare 
German and British policies on immigration, for it is difficult to draw paral-
lels between the Pakistani and the Turkish communities. It therefore seems 
hardly probable that a group recruiting exclusively from the second generati-
on would perform terrorist acts on their own initiative. However, under the 
effects of social stress, discrimination, and identity conflicts, violence could 
erupt among the children of migrants as well. Typical for this group, howe-
ver, is escapism or violence committed by individuals, not violence in the 
form of organized terrorism.  
It is important to distinguish between tendencies to violence as a means of 
conveying a political or social message and the tendency to use violent 
rhetoric as a means to gain attention or publicity. Most of the time the loud 
paroles of violence and the conspicuous Islamic clothes are nothing more than 
a message aimed at both German society and Turkish communities: We are 
different; we are here. Though these groups wish to stress their self-made 
identity and to reconstruct their religion, they are in fact still willing to 
address their surroundings. Their clothes and rhetoric could therefore be seen 
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as a strategy of communication. Rhetoric often is the weapon used by those 
who have no other weapons: those who feel helpless, unheard, and humilia-
ted. It can be seen as an outlet or as a means of channeling frustration and 
social stress. A person who is seriously planning to burn the world down does 
not announce it in advance. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks chose to be 
“invisible” up to the actual attacks. In accounts made to the press, they were 
frequently described by those who had known them as “polite,” “restrained,” 
and “helpful.”  
Some Muslim organizations nevertheless use violent rhetoric occasionally 
as a strategy to keep their own members or gain new supporters. When such 
groups talk about their aims, they do not claim to behave like good citizens—
at least not as the concept is commonly understood. Rather, they wish to give 
their supporters the feeling that they are part of a great avant-garde mission, 
one that “liberates the world from injustice,” “leads the world to the path of 
Islam,” or “sends the unbelievers to hell.” Undoubtedly, such statements work 
against peace and integration, but there is not always a readiness for violence 
behind them. Such statements are made primarily to legitimate the existence 
of the club or organization and to increase the likelihood of receiving more 
donations. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the effects of the 
rhetoric of violence. Many young people begin their radical career after 
listening to a charismatic leader using precisely such rhetoric. Since the latest 
wave of violence in the name of Islam, many members of Islamic organizati-
ons seem to understand that they cannot maintain the split between democra-
tic structures and militant rhetoric for much longer. Yet there are still some 
among them who believe that following the ideology of jihad is a better 
investment.  
Finally, there are ways to counteract these processes within the migrant 
context, so that political radicalism will remain the exception and not become 
the norm. The classic candidate for such radicalism is the socially isolated 
individual—the biographies of the 9/11 perpetrators and the members of the 
Kaplan community have made this clear. To them the attractiveness of radical 
organizations and their charismatic leaders lies in the promise of “commu-
nity” and “security.” Further conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
1. The diaspora does not nourish the tendency to violence; rather, it creates 
conditions for political calm and conservatism. 
2. Those who feel grounded in their faith tend less towards radicalism than 
do “converted” or “reconverted” former liberals. This claim is supported 
by the biographies of the 9/11 perpetrators and by analysis of the inter-
views conducted for my research.  
3. Individuals who are not fully integrated into a religious or ethnic commu-
nity or into the host society may be more open to terrorism.  
4. In the diaspora community, Islam is understood to be the main source of 
ethnic self-understanding and continuity with the past. Therefore, the eth-
nic community and the religious community are considered to be identi-
cal.  
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5. There is reason to believe that integration into the migrant milieu (i.e., 
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FUCI  Federazione Universitaria dei Cattolici Italiani (University 
Federation of Italian Catholics) (I) 
GMI  Giovani Musulmani Italiani (Association of Young Italian 
Muslims) (I) 
ICA  Islamic Cultural Association (UK)  
IUR  Islamic University of Rotterdam (NL) 
MCB  Muslim Council of Britain (UK) 
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic 
Party of Germany) (GER) 
TBB  Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (Turkish Union in 
Berlin-Brandenburg) (GER) 
UCOII  Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazione Islamiche in Italia 
(Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy) (I) 
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Antwerpen (Union of Mosque and Islamic Organisations of An-
twerp) (B) 
UMP  Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular 
Movement) (F) 
WIM  World Islamic Mission (NL) 
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